against a minor when the minor has only satisfactorily completed probation for an
offense alleged in a later-filed petition. Based on the plain language of the statute, we
conclude it may not. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Petition No. 1: G3203
In April 2013, Minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to
delaying a police officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1). The
juvenile court placed Minor with her parents, subject to supervision by a probation
officer. She was ordered to obey all federal, state, county, and city laws. In October
2013, Minor admitted to violating the terms of her probation; she had repeatedly used
1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Subsequent unspecified references to section 786 are to the version effective January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015. (Stats. 2014, ch. 249, § 2, p. 2506.)
2
marijuana and had unexcused absences from school. In November 2013, the court
ordered her detained in juvenile hall pending completion of a rehabilitation program.
2. Petition No. 2: G5989
In February 2014, a new petition (G5989) was filed against Minor, relating to a
January 2014 incident at her school. She admitted to one count alleged in the new
petition, a felony offense of resisting an officer by use of force (Pen. Code, § 69). The
juvenile court continued Minor's wardship, committed her to the Breaking Cycles
program for a maximum term of 240 days, and placed her under the supervision of a
probation officer. In April 2015, Minor admitted to violating her probation terms by
drinking alcohol, but then made progress in a substance abuse counseling program.
In May 2015, Minor's probation officer recommended that wardship be terminated
and requested the records for G5989 be sealed, noting Minor's satisfactory compliance
with her probation terms. At a hearing, the deputy district attorney stated Minor had
"pick[ed] up a new petition" while she was still on probation for a prior offense (G3203),
but agreed she had recently been doing well. The People's position on the issue of
terminating jurisdiction was "without comment." The juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction, found Minor had satisfactorily completed the terms and conditions of
probation on her Penal Code section 69 offense, ordered that "[t]he arrest upon which
G5989 is based is deemed never to have occurred," and sealed all records relating to her
second petition.
Minor timely appealed on the ground that records pertaining to her prior petition
should have also been sealed.
3
DISCUSSION
Section 786 provides in pertinent part: "If the minor satisfactorily completes . . . a
term of probation for any offense not listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707, the court
shall order the petition dismissed, and the arrest upon which the judgment was deferred
shall be deemed not to have occurred. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining
to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court. . . ." (Italics added.) It is
undisputed that Minor's offenses are not listed in section 707, subdivision (b).
Minor contends the juvenile court misinterpreted section 786 and erred by not
sealing her prior petition. She argues the Legislature intended for minors to have their
entire juvenile record sealed by satisfactorily completing probation for the offense
alleged in the most recently filed petition.
"In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to
effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] In determining intent, we must look first to
the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.
[Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the
statute governs." (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056.) In other words, if
there is "no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have
meant what it said," and it is not necessary to "resort to legislative history to determine
the statute's true meaning." (People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 400-401.)
We conclude the juvenile court did not err. When the sealing order was issued,
the unambiguous language of section 786 required the court to seal records pertaining to
the "dismissed petition" based upon first finding Minor had satisfactorily completed
4
probation for an offense alleged in the petition. Nowhere in the statute is there any
reference to a prior petition. The court found Minor had satisfactorily completed
probation for the offense alleged in G5989, dismissed that petition, and accordingly
sealed the records relating to it. Conversely, the court did not address whether she
satisfactorily completed probation for the offense alleged in the prior petition filed
against her.
Minor has not cited, and we are unaware of, any controlling or persuasive
authority supporting the conclusion that section 786 required or permitted the juvenile
court to seal records relating to a prior petition for which no finding was made regarding
satisfactory probation completion. We are not convinced by Minor's contention that the
statute should be interpreted to require a juvenile court to seal a minor's entire juvenile
record. Doing so would compel us to include language omitted from the statute in
violation of "the cardinal rule that courts may not add provisions to a statute or rewrite it
to conform to an assumed intent that does not appear from its plain language." (People v.
Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 692.) We presume the Legislature meant what it
said in section 786 and need not look to the legislative history.
Minor argues the trial court's interpretation of the statute yields convoluted and/or
absurd results. She contends the Legislature intended to streamline the sealing process
for minors, yet now only a portion of her juvenile record is sealed and minors like her
will have to "remember" to request sealing of the remaining portion at a later date.
As we have indicated, the plain language of section 786 does not support the
proposition that it was intended to be a panacea for all sealing issues. Moreover, as the
5
People point out, the Legislature may very well have intended to reward a minor with
automatic sealing only if he or she satisfactorily completed probation for each offense—
and not merely the last offense alleged in the most recently filed petition while the minor
was still a ward of the court. By satisfactorily completing probation for each offense, the
sealing process is streamlined. Otherwise, a person's ability to request sealing of juvenile
records at a later date remains intact. (See § 781; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830.) This
is not an extreme case in which it is appropriate to disregard unambiguous statutory
language. (Gorham Co., Inc. v. First Financial Ins. Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1532,
1543-1544 [courts should disregard unambiguous language "only in 'extreme cases'—
those in which, as a matter of law, the Legislature did not intend the statute to have its
literal effect"].)
After Minor's case was terminated, section 786 was amended, underscoring the
Legislature's ability to add provisions or rewrite statutes to achieve a desired result.3 Of
course, a "new or amended statute applies prospectively only, unless the Legislature
clearly expresses an intent that it operate retroactively." (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39
Cal.4th 641, 664.) There is no expression of any intent that the amended version of
section 786 operate retroactively, nor would it be of assistance to Minor. The amended
version contains a new provision regarding what "satisfactory completion" of probation
3 Effective January 1, 2016, subdivision (e)(1) of section 786 provides: "The court may, in making its order to seal the record and dismiss the instant petition pursuant to this section, include an order to seal a record relating to, or to dismiss, any prior petition or petitions that have been filed or sustained against the individual and that appear to the satisfaction of the court to meet the sealing and dismissal criteria otherwise described in this section." (Stats. 2015, ch. 368, § 1, p. 3442.) 6
entails. (§ 786, subd. (c)(1).) There is nothing in the record to suggest that Minor
satisfactorily completed probation on the offense alleged in her prior petition.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MCDONALD, J.
IRION, J.
7
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, a juvenile court is not authorized to seal records pertaining to a prior petition when a minor has only satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition.
Issues
Whether section 786 permits a juvenile court to seal records of a prior petition when a minor has only satisfactorily completed probation for a later-filed petition.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court.”
“Nowhere in the statute is there any reference to a prior petition.”
“We presume the Legislature meant what it said in section 786 and need not look to the legislative history.”