Zink v. Clock Towers Inn CA2/6

Filed 4/12/16 Zink v. Clock Towers Inn CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

CHRISTOPHER LEE ZINK, 2d Civil No. B262414 (Super. Ct. No. 56-2013- Cross-complainant and Appellant, 00435440-CU-PA-VTA) (Ventura County) v.

CLOCK TOWERS INN, LLC,

Cross-defendant and Respondent.

Christopher Lee Zink along with some friends decided to get drunk. After a night of carousing they succeeded. Zink returned to respondent's Clock Tower Hotel where he had arranged to stay the evening. He was so boisterous, however, that management ordered him to leave. Ultimately he complied, retrieved his car, and headed home. En route he collided with a car driven by Francisco Briones. The collision rendered Briones a quadriplegic. Briones sued Zink, who cross-complained against respondent (Clocktower) alleging it breached a duty not to throw him out of its hotel in his intoxicated state. Clocktower's demurrer to Zink's third amended cross-complaint for implied contractual indemnity and contribution was sustained without leave to amend. Zink appeals and we affirm. FACTS As alleged in the third amended cross-complaint, Zink was a partygoer at a graduation celebration. Clocktower rented two rooms to accommodate the partygoers so that they could "consume alcoholic beverages without the risks of driving" in a tired or

intoxicated state. Relying on this contractual agreement with Clocktower, Zink consumed alcoholic beverages in the rooms and at two nearby bars. In "the early morning hours," Clocktower demanded that Zink leave the premises, threatening to involve the police if he did not do so. Zink "personally appealed" to Clocktower's representative "to reconsider the demand to leave." He and the party organizer promised that they would "rectif[y]" noise complaints by "quiet[ing] down." When Clocktower called the police, Zink "obliged Clocktower's demand . . . and walked several blocks to a multistory parking structure" where his vehicle was parked so that he could drive the approximately 20 miles home. Zink lived near the "Point Mugu military facility" where he worked. Zink "was tired and under the effects of [the] alcohol that he had consumed." On his way home, Zink collided with another vehicle at the intersection of Channel Island Boulevard and Rice Road. The other driver, Briones, sued Zink for damages from the accident, including "a serious spinal injury that has rendered him a quadriplegic." Zink is currently incarcerated. DISCUSSION The trial court ruled that "Zink has neither alleged nor argued any basis for finding [Clocktower] to be responsible for his decision to drive while intoxicated." Zink contends that the trial court erred. We review the third amended cross-complaint de novo to determine whether it contains sufficient allegations, if true, to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) It does not. Section 1714, subdivision (b) of the Civil Code provides that "the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person." This rule was codified to overturn a trio of Supreme Court cases holding that social hosts who served alcohol could be liable for injuries caused by their guests. (See Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (b) ["It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313, and Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 and to reinstate the prior judicial interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for injuries 2