Hawkins v. SunTrust Bank

Filed 4/6/16 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

FLORDELIZA HAWKINS, 2d Civil No. B264541 (Super. Ct. No. 56-2014-00453733-CU- Plaintiff and Appellant, NP-VTA) (Ventura County) v.

SUNTRUST BANK,

Defendant and Respondent.

Rather than giving full faith and credit to a South Carolina foreclosure judgment, appellant contends that we should give it no faith and no credit. This would require riding roughshod over Article IV, §1 of the United States Constitution, section 1913, subdivision (a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, and time honored 1 principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. There is no principled reason to do so. Flordeliza Hawkins appeals from a judgment on the pleadings entered in favor SunTrust Bank (SunTrust), a Georgia state chartered bank, on her complaint for

1 United States Constitution, Article IV §1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

Code of Civil Procedure, §1913, subd. (a) provides: "Subject to subdivision (b), the effect of a judicial record of a sister state is the same in this state as in the state where it was made, except that it can only be enforced in this state by an action or special proceeding."

wrongful foreclosure. The trial court ruled that the action was barred by a South Carolina judicial foreclosure judgment. We affirm. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue decided in the South Carolina action, i.e., that appellant was personally served with a summons and complaint before a default judgment was entered. The doctrine of res judicata, of which collateral estoppel is a part, encompasses both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897, fn. 7.) "The best way of remembering these doctrines clearly is to view collateral estoppel as a miniature of res judicata; the former applies to issues, the latter to entire claims or lawsuits." (Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2d. ed. 1995) p. 169.) Facts and Procedural History In 2006, appellant and her now deceased husband, James C. Hawkins (Hawkins), arranged for a $154,000 revolving line of credit with SunTrust. The loan was secured by a mortgage on appellant's South Carolina home, at 2130 Cheddar Road, Belton, South Carolina. In December 2010, appellant and Hawkins defaulted on the loan, owing $157,631.82. SunTrust sued for judicial foreclosure in a South Carolina state court. On January 11, 2011, SunTrust filed affidavits of service declaring that the summons and complaint were personally served on Hawkins and appellant on December 9, 2011 at 2130 Cheddar Road, Belton, South Carolina. A default was entered against appellant and Hawkins, and the judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered on April 19, 2012. The 2130 Cheddar Road property was sold at a foreclosure sale and a $119,994.62 deficiency judgment was entered against appellant and Hawkins. They were evicted in January 2013. A year later, appellant appealed on the theory that she had no knowledge of the judgment because she and Hawkins "were not serve[d] properly." (SunTrust v. Hawkins et al, South Carolina Court of Appeals, Case No. 2014-001363.) On August 25, 2014, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to cure deficiencies in the notice of appeal. The South Carolina foreclosure judgment is final.