California Court of Appeal Apr 5, 2016 No. E064337Unpublished
Filed 4/5/16 P. v. Grant CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E064337
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF1203310)
RYAN KEITH GRANT, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Becky Dugan, Judge.
Affirmed.
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor, and Daniel
Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant Ryan Keith Grant pled guilty to 13 felony counts of
receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a), counts 1-13), one felony count of
defendant willfully and unlawfully received mail, personal documents, and checks
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belonging to 13 different persons which had been obtained by theft. Prosecutors charged
defendant with one felony count of possessing heroin. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350,
subd. (a).) Prosecutors also charged defendant with one felony count of forging the seal
and handwriting of another with intent to defraud (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (b)), based on
the allegation that “he did willfully and unlawfully counterfeit and forge the seal and
handwriting of another, to wit: KATHERINE K., with the intent to defraud.”
On October 26, 2012, defendant entered a plea to the court, admitting guilt as to
all counts and allegations against him. On December 28, 2012, the superior court
imposed a 32-month prison sentence composed of consecutive eight-month terms for
counts 1 and 14, each doubled because defendant admitted a strike prior. The court
stayed the sentences on counts 2 through 13, and 15 under section 654.
On November 4, 2014, after defendant had begun serving his sentence, the voters
of California passed Proposition 47, reducing some felony theft and drug possession
offenses to misdemeanors. Subject to certain exceptions, defendant’s possession of
heroin offense is now a misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350) and his receipt of
stolen property offenses are now misdemeanors if the value of the property stolen in each
offense did not exceed $950 (Pen. Code, §§ 496, subd. (a), 490.2, subd. (a)). Proposition
47 also amended Penal Code section 473 to reduce to misdemeanors all forgeries
“relating to a check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s check, traveler’s check, or money
order, where the value of the check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s check, traveler’s
check, or money order does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).” (Pen. Code,
§ 473, subd. (b).) Proposition 47 also created a resentencing procedure allowing
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offenders to petition for resentencing if they are “currently serving a sentence for a
conviction” for committing a felony and “would have been guilty of a misdemeanor
under” the provisions added by Proposition 47. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (a).)
On December 23, 2014, defendant filed a petition for resentencing. His petition
requested resentencing on his convictions for violating Penal Code section 496,
subdivision (a) and Health and Safety Code section 11350. The written petition does not
request resentencing on his conviction for violating Penal Code section 470, subdivision
(b), but defendant later made an oral request for resentencing on that conviction as well.
On August 7, 2015, the superior court held a hearing on the petition. The
prosecution did not contest that defendant was entitled to be resentenced on counts 1
through 14, and the superior court deemed those convictions misdemeanors. On the
forgery conviction, defendant argued “Proposition 47 clearly gave relief on the 470 class
of crimes, and there’s no suggestion that the loss was over $950, so he should receive
relief on all counts.” Defendant did not present evidence his forgery offense related to a
check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s check, traveler’s check, or money order. Nor did
defendant present evidence that any such instrument did not exceed $950 in value. The
record on appeal is silent on both these points.
The superior court noted “[t]he 470 class of crimes you refer to, they actually did
describe with a bunch of commas, and all those commas have to do with the theft of
money or money orders or the, like, forged ID cards are not included in that, and
[section] 470[, subdivision] (b) specifically is not included. [¶] So when you look at all
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the catchall language, none of the catchall language refers to forged identity cards. So
the Court will find that he is not eligible for relief under [section] 470[, subdivision] (b).”
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the superior court erred in denying his petition as to count 15
because it mistakenly believed he was convicted under section 470b for forging an
identity card. The record on this point is unclear. The abstract of judgment records the
statute under which defendant was convicted as section 470, subdivision (b), not section
470b. However, it records the crime as “Forged ID Card.” Similarly, the superior court
referred to section 470, subdivision (b) as the statute violated, but stated that defendant’s
offenses did not qualify for resentencing under section 473, subdivision (b) because
“forged ID cards are not included” among the reclassified felonies. We need not resolve
the issue because on appeal we are concerned with the correctness of the superior court’s
determination, not the correctness of its reasoning. (People v. Dawkins (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 991, 1004.) “‘[W]e may affirm a trial court judgment on any [correct] basis
presented by the record whether or not relied upon by the trial court. [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257,
1268.) In this case, the record establishes defendant did not support his petition with
evidence of his eligibility. That deficiency warrants affirming the superior court’s order.
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Defendant contends he was eligible to be resentenced unless the prosecution
established his forgery offense did not relate to a check or other listed financial
instrument or the value of such instrument exceeded $950. Since the prosecution
presented no evidence on those points, he argues he was entitled to be resentenced.
This case requires us to construe the language of an initiative measure, Proposition
47, and other statutory provisions. The same principles that govern construction of a
statute enacted by the Legislature apply to construing a voter initiative. (Taxpayers for
Accountable School Bond Spending v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1013, 1025-1026, 1056.) If the statutory language is not ambiguous, the
plain meaning governs. (Id. at p. 1025.) Our review involves a pure question of law and
is therefore de novo. (Id. at p. 1026.)
An offender who is currently serving a felony sentence for forging the signature of
another with intent to defraud (§ 470, subd. (b)) may qualify to have his sentence recalled
and to receive a misdemeanor sentence where the facts show his offense has been
reclassified as a misdemeanor (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (b)). At the time of his conviction,
the prosecution was permitted to plead and prove forging the signature of another as a
felony regardless the value of the stolen property. (§§ 470, subd. (b), 473, subd. (a).) As
amended by Proposition 47, section 473, subdivision (b) now specifies, with certain
exceptions, that “[n]otwithstanding subdivision (a), any person who is guilty of forgery
relating to a check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s check, traveler’s check, or money
order, where the value of the check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s check, traveler’s
check, or money order does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), shall be
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punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year.” Thus,
defendant could be eligible for resentencing if his forgery conviction related to a check or
other listed financial instrument and the value of the instrument in his case did not exceed
$950. (People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1309-1310.)
However, it is settled by statute that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a
party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is
essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.” (Evid. Code, § 500.)
Proposition 47 itself is silent as to the burden of proof, so Evidence Code section 500
controls. As a result, a petitioner for resentencing under Proposition 47 must establish his
or her eligibility for resentencing. (People v. Perkins (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.)
In this case, defendant was required to establish both that his forgery offense falls within
the class of offenses redesignated as misdemeanors under the amended Penal Code
section 473, subdivision (b) and that the value of the forged instrument did not exceed
$950.
Defendant did not present evidence to meet this burden. At the hearing on the
petition, defense counsel offered no evidence related to the nature of defendant’s offense
or the value of any financial instrument it involved. Instead, defense counsel simply
asserted that there was “no suggestion that the loss was over $950.” Having failed to
present such evidence, defendant failed to meet his burden of showing his felony
conviction would have been a misdemeanor had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time
of his conviction. The superior court therefore properly denied defendant’s petition.
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(§ 1170.18, subd. (b) [“the court shall determine whether the petitioner satisfies the
criteria in subdivision (a)”].)
Defendant contends we should refer to Evidence Code section 501 to locate the
burden of proof on petitions brought under Penal Code section 1170.18. Evidence Code
section 501 provides that “[i]nsofar as any statute, except [Evidence Code s]ection 522,
assigns the burden of proof in a criminal action, such statute is subject to Penal Code
[s]ection 1096.” Penal Code section 1096 in turn provides that “[a] defendant in a
criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a
reasonable doubt whether his or her guilt is satisfactorily shown, he or she is entitled to
an acquittal, but the effect of this presumption is only to place upon the state the burden
of proving him or her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” These principles plainly
applied to defendant before his conviction. But they have no relevance to a petition
brought by a defendant to reduce a sentence after his conviction. Under that
circumstance, defendant is the party seeking relief, and Evidence Code section 500
provides that he carries the burden of proof.
Defendant contends People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 supports placing the
burden of proof on the prosecution. In Guerrero, the California Supreme Court
recognized courts have applied a presumption in favor of the least offense punishable
where the prosecution sought to enhance a current sentence based on the facts of a prior
case. In such cases the prosecution has the burden of establishing enhancements apply.
(People v. Towers (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1277 [“The prosecution bears the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s prior convictions were
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for either serious or violent felonies”].) As a result, any failure of evidence defeats the
ability of the prosecution to meet its burden to show the prior offense was subject to
greater punishment, triggering an enhancement. Here, as we have discussed, the
defendant is seeking relief and the defendant therefore must carry the burden of showing
eligibility. In that setting, the failure of proof cuts against defendant.
People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322 does not support defendant’s
position. In Bradford, the Third District held that under the Three Strikes Reform Act of
2012 the prosecution was not permitted to go outside the record of conviction to establish
a defendant is ineligible for resentencing on the basis of the nature of his conviction.
(People v. Bradford, supra, at p. 1339.) The Bradford court did not relieve the defendant
of his burden of presenting evidence to support his petition. On the contrary, the court
indicated “the petitioner would be well advised to address eligibility concerns in the
initial petition for resentencing.” (Id. at p. 1341.) Here, defendant did not raise such
issues and did not offer testimony or other evidence concerning the nature of his offense
or the value of any forged instrument. (See People v. Perkins, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th
129.) Without such a showing, the superior court did not err in deciding that defendant
had not established his eligibility for resentencing.
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III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing on count 15.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH J.
We concur:
MILLER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a petitioner seeking resentencing under Proposition 47 bears the burden of proving their eligibility, including demonstrating that their forgery conviction involved a qualifying financial instrument valued at $950 or less.
Issues
Whether a defendant seeking resentencing under Proposition 47 for a forgery conviction bears the burden of proving the offense involved a qualifying instrument valued at $950 or less.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the petition for resentencing on the forgery count due to the defendant's failure to present evidence of eligibility.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“a petitioner for resentencing under Proposition 47 must establish his or her eligibility for resentencing.”
“In this case, defendant was required to establish both that his forgery offense falls within the class of offenses redesignated as misdemeanors”
“Having failed to present such evidence, defendant failed to meet his burden of showing his felony conviction would have been a misdemeanor had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of his conviction.”