Rosenblum v. U.S. Bank, Assn. CA1/5

Filed 4/1/16 Rosenblum v. U.S. Bank, Assn. CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JENNIFER MAE ROSENBLUM, Plaintiff and Appellant, A143027 v. U.S. BANK, NATIONAL (San Mateo County ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, Super. Ct. No. CIV 463382) Defendant and Respondent.

In this quiet title action, plaintiff Jennifer Mae Rosenblum (formerly known as Jennifer Moore) appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for CSFB Mortgage Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-7 (U.S. Bank). Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in sustaining U.S. Bank’s demurrer after finding valid U.S. Bank’s lien on 50 percent of the real property at issue. We affirm.

1

BACKGROUND1 In 1993, Richard Hatfield purchased the real property at issue (the Property). Title to the Property was in Hatfield’s name. At the time, plaintiff and Hatfield were living together and had two children, but were not married. Plaintiff and Hatfield subsequently separated. In 2001, plaintiff sued Hatfield seeking joint ownership of their property, including the Property. Plaintiff filed a dissolution action, a Marvin action,2 and apparently others. The cases were consolidated in the trial court. In 2002, plaintiff recorded a lis pendens providing notice of the pending dissolution action in which she asserted an interest in the Property. In 2003, an order expunging the lis pendens issued but was never recorded. In 2004, Hatfield executed a deed of trust against the Property to secure a loan (the Deed of Trust).3 The Deed of Trust was eventually assigned to U.S. Bank.4 In 2007, a statement of decision issued in the Marvin action (the 2007 Marvin decision) finding plaintiff and Hatfield jointly owned all their property, including the

1 Our recitation of the facts assumes the truth of the complaint’s allegations and includes matters judicially noticed by the trial court. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) In setting forth certain background facts, both parties cite to orders issued in a related bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court took judicial notice of the orders, but judicial notice may not be taken of the truth of factual findings contained therein (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1551) and neither side has argued these background facts have collateral estoppel effect. Regardless, “where the parties agree, we accept their agreed facts as mutual concessions.” (Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. 3.) 2 Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 “held that express or implied contracts between persons living together in a nonmarital relationship should be enforced, unless the contracts were explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services.” (Chodos v. Borman (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 76, 82, fn. 1.) 3 Hatfield also executed a second deed of trust, which is not at issue in this appeal. 4 Plaintiff challenges the validity of this assignment. We discuss the facts relevant to this challenge below.