Lucas v. Wells Fargo Bank CA4/2 (2016) · DecisionDepot
Lucas v. Wells Fargo Bank CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Mar 11, 2016 No. E061065Unpublished
Filed 3/11/16 Lucas v. Wells Fargo Bank CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
HENDRICK LUCAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E061065
v. (Super.Ct.No. MCC1301512)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Thomas A. Peterson,
Judge. (Retired judge of the Los Angeles Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Hendrick Lucas, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Anglin Flewelling Rasmussen Campbell & Trytten, Robert Collings Little and
Robin C. Campbell for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant, Hendrick Lucas, sued defendant and respondent, Wells
Fargo Bank, NA (WFB), alleging several causes of action based on the unlawful
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foreclosure sale of his property located at 41102 Lomar Circle in Temecula. The trial
court sustained WFB’s general demurrer, without leave to amend, and dismissed the
complaint with prejudice on the ground it was barred by res judicata.
In a prior lawsuit, dismissed with prejudice in September 2012 before the present
action was filed in October 2013, Lucas sued WFB in several causes of action based on
the same primary right underlying his present complaint: the alleged wrongful
foreclosure sale of his Lomar Circle property.
Lucas appeals the judgment of dismissal in the present action, claiming the present
complaint is not barred by res judicata because it alleges different theories of recovery
and facts not alleged in the prior action. We agree that the complaint is barred by res
judicata, and affirm the judgment of dismissal.1
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings
In 2008, Lucas obtained two loans from WFB totaling $717,432 and secured by
first and second deeds of trust on residential property located at 41102 Lomar Circle,
Temecula. In 2009, Lucas defaulted on the loans, causing the trustee under the deeds of
trust to record a notice of default and, later, a notice of sale. On October 5, 2009, Lucas
filed for bankruptcy, but his bankruptcy petition was dismissed on October 26, 2009.
1 In an appeal by Lucas in an unrelated case, No. E061178, we affirm a judgment in Riverside County Superior Court case No. RIC1301701, dismissing Lucas’s complaint against JP Morgan Chase, N.A. (JPMC) on the ground it is barred by res judicata. Lucas twice sued JPMC and WFB, in separate, successive actions, for their alleged wrongful foreclosure of deeds of trust on two separate Temecula properties Lucas owned.
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On October 13, 2010, Lucas and his wife recorded two documents titled
“Assignment,” granting, assigning, and transferring to “Marcia Willardson, Spiritual
Alliances Corporation Sole,” all “existing right and interest” under the two deeds of trust
securing Lucas’s two WFB loans.
On December 6, 2010, the trustee under the deeds of trust conducted a trustee’s
sale of the Lomar Circle property, and sold the property to WFB, the foreclosing
beneficiary, for $247,447. The unpaid secured debt at the time of the sale, together with
costs, was $606,368.56. WFB subsequently sold the property to a third party, Amnon
Yadin, on August 26, 2011.
B. The Prior Action (RIC 1110200)
In June 2011, Lucas filed his first lawsuit against WFB, titled Lucas v. Wells
Fargo Bank, in the Riverside County Superior Court, case No. RIC1110200 (the prior
action). In June 2012, Lucas filed a second amended complaint (SAC) in the prior action,
alleging a single cause of action titled “Set Aside Default.”
The SAC sought to void the December 6, 2010, trustee’s sale of the Lomar Circle
property to WFB based, among other things, on allegations that the sale was void because
no public auction was conducted when WFB purchased the property at the trustee’s sale.
(Civ. Code, § 2924g, subd. (a).) The SAC also alleged that WFB wrongfully resold the
property to Yadin, in August 2011, without informing Yadin that Lucas filed the prior
action and had a claim to the property. The SAC sought the return of the property to
Lucas, along with statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages, and other relief.
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WFB answered the SAC and moved for judgment on the pleadings. In September
2012, the court in the prior action granted the motion, dismissed the prior action with
prejudice, and entered judgment in favor of WFB. Lucas did not appeal from the
judgment of dismissal in the prior action. By the time he filed the present action in
October 2013, the time for appealing from the judgment in the prior action had passed.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104.)
One of the grounds asserted in WFB’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in the
prior action was that Lucas lacked standing to sue WFB for his foreclosure-related claims
because he assigned his rights under the deeds of trust to Willardson in October 2010,
before WFB purchased the property at the December 2010 trustee’s sale.
In an apparent effort to restore his standing, in September 2012, Lucas accepted an
assignment from Willardson of part of Willardson’s interest under the deeds of trust,
though the December 2010 foreclosure sale had already occurred.
C. The Present Action (MCC1301512)
In October 2013, Lucas filed the present complaint. It alleges five causes of action
titled “fraudulent misrepresentation,” “negligent misrepresentation,” “fraud by deceit,”
“intentional infliction of emotional distress,” and “violations of [Civil Code section]
2923.55 et seq.” Like the SAC, the present complaint seeks to void the trustee’s sale of
the Lomar Circle property to WFB and alleges, among other things, that no public
auction was conducted at the time of the trustee’s sale.
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WFB demurred to the complaint on several grounds, including that it was barred
by res judicata. At a February 14, 2014, hearing, the trial court agreed that the complaint
against WFB was barred by res judicata, sustained the demurrer without leave to amend,
and issued an order dismissing the complaint against WFB, with prejudice. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 581d.) Lucas appealed.2
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
On appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint following the sustaining of a
general demurrer, we review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts
2 On January 26, 2015, we denied Lucas’s motion to augment the record on appeal with 12 items, on the grounds that six of the items were already part of the record on appeal and the other six items were not, apparently, presented to the trial court. Then, on February 19, 2015, Lucas requested that we take judicial notice of the same 12 items. WFB opposes the request, and we deny it in its entirety. Again, six of the items are already part of the record on appeal and to that extent the request is moot. Regarding the other six items, we not required to take judicial notice of matters not presented to the trial court (Brosterhous v. State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 325) and generally will not do so absent exceptional circumstances (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3). No exceptional circumstances appear here. Indeed, the six items appear to be records from the prior action, including Lucas’s opposition to WFB’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, but Lucas has not explained why he did not present the records to the trial court for its consideration in ruling on WFB’s demurrer to the complaint in the present action. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [“It has long been the general rule and understanding that ‘an appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial court for its consideration.’”].) In any event, none of the records are either necessary or helpful to Lucas’s claims on this appeal. (People ex. rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [a precondition to the taking of judicial notice in either its mandatory or permissive form is that the matter must be relevant to a material issue].)
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sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Landmark Screens, LLC v.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 238, 243-244.)
In determining whether the complaint states a cause of action, we assume the truth
of all material facts properly pleaded, but not factual contentions or legal conclusions; we
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context; and we consider matters which may or must be judicially noticed, but we
disregard any allegations that are contrary to law or judicially noticeable facts. (C.R. v.
All three elements of res judicata are present here. First, the parties to the present
action, Lucas and WFB, were parties to the prior action. Second, the complaint in the
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present action and the SAC in the prior action are based on the same “cause of action” or
claim of right: the alleged wrongful foreclosure under the deeds of trust and the trustee’s
sale of the Lomar Circle property to WFB in December 2010. Third, the prior action
resulted in a final judgment on the merits, simply because it was dismissed with
prejudice.
“[F]or purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata . . . a dismissal with
prejudice is the equivalent of a final judgment on the merits, barring the entire cause of
action. [Citations.] . . . ‘The statutory term “with prejudice” clearly means the plaintiff’s
right of action is terminated and may not be revived . . . [A] dismissal with prejudice . . .
bars any future action on the same subject matter.’” (Boeken v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc.,
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 793.) As noted, Lucas did not appeal from the judgment in the
prior action.
Lucas claims res judicata does not bar the present action against WFB because the
prior action was not adjudicated on its merits. He asserts that the motion for judgment on
the pleadings in the prior action was granted based on his lack of standing to sue WFB,
and a dismissal based on lack of standing to sue is not an adjudication of a case on its
merits. He relies on Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) ___ U.S. ___ [133 S.Ct 2652] for the
proposition that a dismissal of an action based on a party’s lack of standing to sue is not
an adjudication of the merits of the case. The high court in Perry held that the “official
proponents” of California’s Proposition 8, a voter initiative, did not have standing, under
article III of the federal Constitution, to appeal the federal district court order declaring
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that Proposition 8 violated the federal Constitution. (Hollingsworth v. Perry, supra, 133
S.Ct. at pp. 2662-2668.) As Lucas points out, the high court declared early in its opinion
that “[b]ecause we find that petitioners do not have standing, we have no authority to
decide this case on the merits . . . .” (Id. at p. 2659, italics added.) To be sure, Perry did
not reach the merits of the proponents’ claim that Proposition 8 was constitutional. But
Perry is inapposite because, unlike the present case, it did not involve the application of
res judicata or claim preclusion to a second action between the same parties based on the
same primary right under California law.
Lucas further claims res judicata does not apply to the present complaint against
WFB because his prior action against WFB was erroneously dismissed based on his lack
of standing to sue. Again, Lucas is mistaken. A final judgment of dismissal in a prior
action is not subject to collateral attack in a subsequent action, unless the court in the
prior action lacked “fundamental jurisdiction [i.e. of the person and subject matter] . . . .”
(In re Marriage of Maxfield (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 755, 760-761.) In other words, when
the error in a judgment “does not reach the power of the court to act, but concerns instead
a mistaken application of law,” the judgment may not be collaterally attacked in a
subsequent action. (Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 950-951; see also
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 727-728.) Here, the court
in the prior action ostensibly had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
Thus, the judgment in the prior action may not be collaterally attacked regardless of
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whether the prior action was erroneously dismissed based on Lucas’s lack of standing to
sue WFB.
Our state Supreme Court’s recent decision in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage
Corp. (Feb. 18, 2016, S218973) ___ Cal.4th ___ [2016 Cal. Lexis 956] does not assist
Lucas. There, the court narrowly held that, in an action for the wrongful, nonjudicial
foreclosure of a deed of trust securing a home loan, the borrower has standing to
challenge the assignment of the note and deed of trust based on defects allegedly
rendering the assignment void.
Unlike the present action case, Yvanova did not involve a second action that was
barred by res judicata based on a prior action involving the same parties, in which the
plaintiff asserted injury to the same primary right he or she asserted in the second action.
Here, for the reasons discussed, the judgment of dismissal in the prior action is final, and
Lucas cannot collaterally attack that judgment regardless of the reasons the action was
dismissed, or erroneously dismissed.
Further, the court in the prior action concluded that Lucas lacked standing to sue
for wrongful foreclosure because he had transferred his interest under the foreclosing
deed or deeds of trust. In the prior action, Lucas did not assert that the foreclosure sale
was void based on alleged defects in an assignment of beneficial interest under the
foreclosing deed of trust. Because such a claim “was within the scope of the [prior]
action, related to the subject matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been
raised,” the judgment in the prior action is conclusive on it even though it was not urged
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in the prior action. (Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court, supra,
209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 181-182, italics omitted.)
Lastly, Lucas claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying him leave to
amend his complaint because he demonstrated a reasonable probability that it could be
amended to state a cause of action against WFB. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p.
318; Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 53 [a demurrer
sustained based on technical or formal defects in a complaint, curable by amendment, is
not a judgment on the merits].) We disagree. The defects in the present complaint are
not curable “defects of form,” as Lucas asserts. For the reasons explained, the present
complaint is barred by res judicata, and it cannot be amended to state any cause of action
against WFB based on the alleged wrongful foreclosure and trustee’s sale of the Lomar
Circle property to WFB.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. WFB shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff's current lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it arises from the same primary right—the alleged wrongful foreclosure of the same property—as a prior action that was dismissed with prejudice.
Issues
Whether the doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent action based on the same primary right as a prior action dismissed with prejudice.
Whether a dismissal based on a prior court's determination of standing constitutes a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes.
Whether the plaintiff may collaterally attack a prior judgment of dismissal in a subsequent action.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court sustained WFB’s general demurrer, without leave to amend, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice on the ground it was barred by res judicata.”
“We agree that the complaint is barred by res judicata, and affirm the judgment of dismissal.”
“[F]or purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata . . . a dismissal with prejudice is the equivalent of a final judgment on the merits, barring the entire cause of action.”