California Court of Appeal Mar 7, 2016 No. E061947Unpublished
Filed 3/7/16 P. v. Ayala CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E061947
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. RIF1201379 and RIF1409704) BENJAMIN AYALA, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. David A. Gunn, Judge.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Helen S. Irza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Kristen
Chenelia, Parag Agrawal and Kristen A. Hernandez, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Defendant Benjamin Ayala appeals following his plea of guilty to possession of
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and transportation of
methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd (a)), and his admission of
to set conditions of probation in order to ‘foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety
pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.’ [Citations.] If it serves these dual purposes, a
probation condition may impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the
probationer, who is ‘not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other
citizens.’ [Citation.] [¶] However, the trial court’s discretion in setting the conditions of
probation is not unbounded. A term of probation is invalid if it: ‘“(1) has no relationship
to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in
itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to
future criminality.”’” (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624.)
“If a probation condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the
condition may ‘impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer,
who is “not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens.”’
[Citation.]” (People v. O'Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355.) “[W]here an
otherwise valid condition of probation impinges on constitutional rights, such conditions
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must be carefully tailored, ‘“reasonably related to the compelling state interest in
reformation and rehabilitation . . . .”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bauer (1989) 211
Cal.App.3d 937, 942 (Bauer).)
In Bauer, upon which defendant relies, the court struck a residence-approval
condition, which seemed designed to prevent the defendant from living with his parents
because they were overprotective. Nothing in the record suggested that the defendant’s
home life contributed to the crimes of which he was convicted (false imprisonment and
simple assault), or that his home life was reasonably related to future criminality. (Bauer,
supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 944.) The court concluded that the residence approval
condition impinged on the right to travel and freedom of association, and it was
extremely broad since it gave the probation officer the power to forbid the defendant
from living with or near his parents. (Ibid.)
The present case is distinguishable from Bauer. Defendant pled guilty to
possessing methamphetamine and transporting methamphetamine for sale. Further, he
admitted prior drug convictions and that the offenses violated his probation. Defendant
had an extensive history of prior drug-related convictions, including possession and
transportation of controlled substances. Under these circumstances, where he lives may
directly affect his rehabilitation. For example, without any limitations, he could choose
to live in a residence where drugs are used or sold. Thus, the state’s interest in
defendant’s rehabilitation is properly served by the residence-approval condition.
Moreover, probation conditions “should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a
reasonable, objective reader.’” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382.) We
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presume a probation officer will not withhold approval of a residence for an irrational or
capricious reason. (Id. at p. 383.)
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
conditions that defendant, as a term of his mandatory supervision, reside at a residence
approved by the probation officer and not move without the officer’s prior approval.
DISPOSITION
The booking fee imposed in case No. RIF1409704 is reversed, and the superior
court is directed to determine whether and in what amount to impose a booking fee.
In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J. We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court reversed the imposition of a booking fee because the record failed to establish the arresting agency, necessitating a remand for the trial court to determine the applicable statute. The court affirmed the mandatory supervision condition requiring probation officer approval of the defendant's residence, finding it reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation given his history of drug offenses.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred by imposing a booking fee without oral pronouncement and without establishing the statutory basis for the fee.
Whether the mandatory supervision condition requiring probation officer approval of the defendant's residence violates constitutional rights to travel and association.
Disposition. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We reverse the order imposing the booking fee, and we remand for further proceedings on the issue.”
“Because the record on appeal does not clearly indicate what agency executed the arrest and booking of defendant, we cannot know whether a booking fee is mandatory”
“We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the conditions that defendant, as a term of his mandatory supervision, reside at a residence approved by the probation officer”