California Court of Appeal Mar 3, 2016 No. E063539Unpublished
Filed 3/3/16 Sprengel v. Mohr CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JEAN E. SPRENGEL, M.D.,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E063539
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1110934)
LANETTE S. MOHR, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Donald R. Alvarez,
Judge. Affirmed.
Reid & Hellyer and Michael G. Kerbs for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rosenberg Mendlin & Rosen, Joyce S. Mendlin, Roger M. Rosen and Janelle
Menges for Defendant and Respondent.
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I
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Jean E. Sprengel, M.D. (Sprengel), and her cousin,
defendant and respondent Lanette S. Mohr (Mohr) formerly were partners in a publishing
venture, Purposeful Press, LLC (Purposeful Press), a California limited liability
company. The company marketed an informational booklet, authored by Sprengel, for
patients undergoing chemotherapy treatment. Sprengel appeals from the trial court’s
citing Williams v. Saunders, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) Nevertheless, even if we
apply an independent standard of review, we agree with the trial court as we discuss
below.
IV
TAX PREPARATION EXPENSE
As already mentioned, the parties changed the original typed settlement agreement
to eliminate a provision that specifically made Mohr responsible for preparation of the
amended return. Nevertheless, Sprengel asserts that, based on section 6.3 of the
settlement agreement, Mohr was responsible for paying for the tax preparation expenses
for both 2013 and 2014.
In its ruling on the settlement agreement, the trial court commented on the
legibility of the settlement agreement: “The Court did its best on what the handwritten
portions state.” The trial court then quoted exactly the language of the settlement
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agreement but inserted the bracketed commas: “Mohr will be responsible for having
Purposeful Press 2014 tax returns prepared[,] including payment for preparation[,] and
amendment of prior year [returns] to accurately reflect actual distributions . . . .”
Sprengel argues the trial court changed the meaning of the agreement by inserting the
commas. We disagree.
In a supporting declaration, Sprengel stated: “At the mediation, there was a
discussion regarding the preparation of both amended tax returns and ongoing tax returns.
At that time, I offered to use my own accountant to prepare all tax returns and pay that
expense personally. However, Mohr chose instead to use an accountant of her choosing
for the tax returns and agreed to personally pay for the preparation of the tax returns.”
Mohr argues both parties were responsible for payment of the 2013 expenses.
Because we must resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable
inferences to support the trial court’s finding, we may conclude the trial court rejected
Sprengel’s declaration as proof of the meaning of the settlement term. Even without the
inserted commas, based on the substantial evidence standard of review, it was entirely
reasonable for the trial court to decide that “including payment for preparation” referred
to the 2014 tax return and not to the amended returns. (Osumi v. Sutton, supra, 151
Cal.App.4th at p. 1360.)
We reach the same conclusion based on our independent review. The trial court
made a factual determination that the subject sentence is composed of two components:
“Mohr will be responsible for having Purposeful Press 2014 tax returns prepared
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including payment for preparation,” followed by “and amendment of prior year
[returns].” The trial court’s interpretation was bolstered by the parties’ omission of the
term expressly making Mohr responsible for payment for preparation of the amended
return. Since that term was omitted, the parties apparently meant to have joint
responsibility for the cost of the 2013 return although Mohr would pay for the cost of the
2014 return. Therefore, based also on our independent review, we uphold the trial court’s
determination that both parties were responsible for the preparation costs of the 2013 tax
return.
Furthermore, Sprengel argues the court’s ruling about tax preparation costs
affected its calculation that no money was owed to Sprengel. Specifically, the trial court
determined that Sprengel was entitled to 50 percent of at least $1,647.08, even after
additional expenses were paid out of Purposeful Press’s bank account. The trial court
ruled that Mohr was not obligated to pay all the cost of the preparation of the 2013 tax
return. As a result, the court found that the use of Purposeful Press funds to pay that
expense was proper and there were no funds remaining to be paid to Sprengel. Because
the court did not err in this respect, Sprengel cannot claim any amount is due to her or
that Mohr breached the settlement agreement by not paying her.
V
BOOK INVENTORY
The trial court also decided against Sprengel on the issue of the return of the book
inventory. Sprengel argues that Mohr had failed to return a substantial number of books,
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as required by section 6.7 of the settlement agreement. The inventory list attached to
Sprengel’s declaration contained information regarding the total number of books that
were printed; the total number of books that were sent to Mohr; the number of books that
had been sent to Sprengel; and the total number of 1,948 unaccounted books. The same
information is summarized in the body of the declaration, except the total number of
missing books is listed as 2086. In opposition, Mohr submitted her declaration attesting
that she returned all books in her possession to Sprengel as required by the settlement
agreement.
In the trial court’s ruling on the motion, the court mentioned the actual accounting
(Exhibit D) was not attached to the motion and: “[Sprengel’s] evidence is conjecture on
her part with no support of where she comes up with the various figures for the books
printed, and books sent to Mohr. . . . Furthermore, it is unclear in the accounting
provided by Sprengel if she is including any of the books Emerald City was instructed to
return to her. All Sprengel has is her belief that more books are out there that she is
entitled to. Yet her belief is not proof that Mohr violated §6.7 of the Settlement
Agreement. Therefore, Sprengel fails in her burden of establishing Mohr in breach
of failing to provide all Chemo-Companion books and/or establishing that she is
entitled to an accounting/explanation under the Settlement Agreement provisions.”
Sprengel argues the trial court committed legal error because it did not consider
Exhibit D, the accounting attached to her declaration. The premise of Sprengel’s
contention is wholly unsupported by the appellate record. The clerk’s transcript showed
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the exhibit was attached as part of Sprengel’s motion and the same information was
contained in the body of the motion. Furthermore, the same information and accounting
were submitted to the court several times. Later, during the reconsideration motion, the
court clarified that it had considered all the exhibits when it ruled on the motion to
enforce the settlement. We conclude no legal error occurred to justify our independent
review. However, we must resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the trial court’s finding on the issue of the return of the book
inventory. We hold substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding about the
book inventory.
VI
ATTORNEY’S FEES
The settlement agreement provided that the prevailing party on a motion brought
under section 664.6 was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The
trial court’s determination on the issue of which party prevailed on a motion for
attorney’s fees is controlled by an abuse of discretion standard of review. (Jackson v.
Homeowners Assn. Monte Vista Estates-East (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 773, 789.)
As noted, the trial court determined that “Mohr obtained the greater relief” on
some of the issues raised by Sprengel and as a result thereof, Mohr was the prevailing
party on the motion. In Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877, the court held that “in
determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form, and to
this extent should be guided by ‘equitable considerations.’ For example, a party who is
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denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be a prevailing party if it is
clear that the party has otherwise achieved its main litigation objective.” The court
determines the prevailing party only when the contract claims have been finally resolved
and only by a comparison of the extent to which each party has succeeded and failed to
succeed in its contentions. (Id. at p. 876.)
Here, Sprengel initiated the proceedings (1) to dissolve Purposeful Press, (2) to
determine tax preparation costs, (3) to return books to Sprengel, and (4) to pay funds to
Sprengel. Sprengel contends her motion was successful, particularly based upon the
entry of judgment for purposes of enforcing the settlement agreement. Sprengel submits
that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Mohr.
Mohr argues the trial court found she did not breach the settlement agreement for
any of the three reasons asserted by Sprengel. We agree that Mohr obtained the greater
relief and Sprengel cannot be said to have achieved her main litigation objective, entitling
her to an award of attorney’s fees. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to award
fees to Mohr.
VII
DISPOSITION
Based on substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s factual rulings, and our
independent review where appropriate, we hold the trial court did not err or abuse its
discretion. We affirm the trial court’s ruling in every respect.
In the interests of justice, we order the parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
McKINSTER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's order enforcing a settlement agreement, finding that the trial court correctly interpreted the parties' obligations regarding tax preparation costs, book inventory, and attorney's fees. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual findings and that there was no legal error or abuse of discretion.
Issues
Whether the trial court correctly interpreted the settlement agreement regarding responsibility for the costs of preparing an amended 2013 income tax return.
Whether the trial court erred in finding that the defendant did not breach the settlement agreement regarding the return of book inventory.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the defendant as the prevailing party.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court’s factual findings on a motion to enforce a settlement pursuant to section 664.6 ‘are subject to limited appellate review and will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.’”
“We hold substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding about the book inventory.”
“We agree that Mohr obtained the greater relief and Sprengel cannot be said to have achieved her main litigation objective, entitling her to an award of attorney’s fees.”