The facts concerning defendant‟s crime are taken from the transcript of the
preliminary hearing. On September 1, 2012, defendant entered a bank in Moreno Valley
and attempted to cash a check for $587.64. The check was made out to defendant and
was drawn on the account of Innovative Design Concepts.2 A sheriff‟s deputy spoke to
an employee at Innovative Design Concepts. The deputy described some of the
characteristics of the check defendant attempted to cash to the employee. The deputy
was told that the sequence number of the company‟s check would be green in color and
would show the company‟s emblem. The check defendant presented was blue and lacked
the emblem. The employee further notified the deputy that she was not acquainted with
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2The record contains numerous variations of the company‟s name: “Innovative Design Concepts,” “Innovative Designs,” “Design Concepts,” and “Innovation Designs.”
2
defendant, and that he was not an employee of the company. Defendant admitted the
check was not legitimate.
Defendant was charged with second degree burglary (§ 459—count 1) and check
forgery (§ 475, subd. (c)—count 2). The information also alleged a prison prior (§ 667.5,
subdivision (b)) and a strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
Defendant pleaded guilty to count 1 and admitted the prior allegations. The trial court
sentenced him to three years eight months in state prison.
On November 20, 2014, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1170.18, subdivision (a). Over the People‟s objection on the ground that
defendant was not eligible for resentencing, the trial court granted the petition,
resentenced defendant for a misdemeanor violation of section 459.5, and gave him credit
for time served.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
When interpreting a voter initiative, “we apply the same principles that govern
statutory construction.” (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685.) We first look “„to
the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.‟” (Ibid.) We
construe the statutory language “in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall
statutory scheme.” (Ibid.) If the language is ambiguous, we look to “„other indicia of the
voters‟ intent, particularly the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot
pamphlet.‟” (Ibid.)
3
Proposition 47 and Statutory Amendments
Overview of Proposition 47 and Section 1170.18
On November 4, 2014, voters approved Proposition 47, which went into effect the
next day. (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089.) Proposition 47
reduced certain drug- and theft-related crimes from felonies or wobblers to misdemeanors
for qualified defendants and added, among other statutory provisions, Penal Code section
1170.18. Penal Code section 1170.18 creates a process through which qualified persons
previously convicted of crimes as felonies, which would be misdemeanors under the new
definitions in Proposition 47, may petition for resentencing. (See generally People v.
1170.18, subdivision (a), provides: “A person currently serving a sentence for a
conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty
of a misdemeanor under [Proposition 47] that added this section . . . had [Proposition 47]
been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the
trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request
resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and
Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those
sections have been amended or added by [Proposition 47].”
Defendant Was Ineligible for Resentencing
Defendant was convicted of a violation of section 459, which provides, “Every
person who enters any . . . building . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or
any felony is guilty of burglary.” (Italics added.) The trial court found that defendant
4
was eligible for resentencing under the shoplifting statute created by Proposition 47,
specifically, section 459.5, subdivision (a), which provides, “Notwithstanding Section
459, shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit
larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of
the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty
dollars ($950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit
larceny is burglary.” (§ 459.5, subd. (a).) By its terms, section 459.5 did not redefine
second degree burglary; that new statute is limited to entry into a commercial
establishment during regular business hours with the intent to commit larceny under
$950. Thus, entry with intent to commit any other felony remains second degree burglary
under section 459.
A defendant seeking resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18 bears the
burden of demonstrating that his underlying offense fell within that statutory scheme.
(People v. Sherow (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 875, 879.) The People argue that defendant
did not enter the bank to commit larceny but to commit the crime of identity theft, also
described as unlawful use of personal identifying information of another person.
(§ 530.5, subd. (a); People v. Barba (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 214, 220 (Barba).)
Section 530.5, subdivision (a), provides, “Every person who willfully obtains
personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55, of
another person, and uses that information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain,
or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or medical information without
the consent of that person, is guilty of a public offense . . . .” Personal identifying
5
information includes “any name, address, telephone number, . . . checking account
number [and] unique electronic data including information identification number
assigned to the person, address or routing code . . . .” (§ 530.55, subd. (b).)
In Barba, the court held that the defendants could be held to answer for the crime
of identity theft when the evidence at the preliminary hearing showed they had used a
company‟s personal identifying information when they cashed stolen checks, which
information included the “name, address, telephone number, checking account and
unique electronic data for addresses or routing codes” for the company. (Barba, supra,
211 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) Here, defendant‟s conduct, although unsuccessful, was
substantially similar: he presented a check bearing the name and identifying information
of Innovative Designs and attempted to cash it.
Defendant argues that the only crime he intended to commit when he entered the
bank was felony check forgery (§ 475, subd. (c)), a crime that was charged but dismissed
pursuant to his plea to second degree burglary. The Barba court noted that while the
crimes of identity theft and forgery had “some overlap,” “the statutes are concerned with
remedying two different wrongs.” (Barba, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 225.) Thus, the
crime of forgery is committed when a person possesses either a real or a fictitious check.
Section 475, subdivision (c), defining forgery, provides, “Every person who possesses
any completed check, money order, traveler‟s check, warrant, or county order, whether
real or fictitious, with the intent to utter or pass or facilitate the utterance or passage of
the same, in order to defraud any person, is guilty of forgery.”
6
In ruling that defendant was eligible for resentencing, the trial court appears to
have confused the crime of identity theft and forgery. The trial court stated that the
identity theft was “probably happening before they even get into the bank. They filled
out that person‟s information before. They stole a check, or it‟s a legitimate check, but
they made it look different through forgery. I see those distinct things. I see this as going
into the bank to get money and whether it‟s by, Hi, I‟m John Doe, and this is my check or
whatever, it is the purpose of going into the bank is the theft of the money. The identity
theft part is already perfected. They‟re out in the parking lot having gone into the bank,
they‟ve already committed the identity theft. You don‟t have to go into the bank to
commit identity theft. I see it as plain old theft of money by false pretenses.” The trial
court reiterated that the crime of identity theft was “completed out in the parking lot or
some other time,” and the entry into the bank was for the purpose of cashing the check.
The trial court misunderstood the elements of the crime of identity theft. Section
530.5, subdivision (a), provides that the crime is committed when a person obtains
personal identifying information of another and “uses that information for any unlawful
purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or
medical information without the consent of that person . . . .” (Italics added.) Thus, the
crime of identity theft was not committed “in the parking lot” before defendant entered
the bank.
7
Defendant points out that forgery was the only crime charged other than the
second degree burglary to which he pled, and under Proposition 47, the forgery of a
check less than $950 is a misdemeanor. However, the People were not required to
separately charge the felony of identity theft that defendant entered with intent to commit
because burglary is complete upon entry with the requisite criminal intent. (People v.
Brownlee (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 921, 930.) The record of defendant‟s conviction,
including the preliminary hearing transcript, shows that defendant entered the bank with
the intent to commit identity theft.
Defendant further argues that any conduct that fits within the definition of
shoplifting under section 459.5 must be charged as shoplifting. (§ 459.5, subd. (b) [“Any
act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting. No person
who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same
property”].) We disagree. The act of entering a bank with the intent to commit identity
theft is not the act identified in section 459.5, subdivision (a), i.e., entry with intent to
commit petty theft.
We conclude that defendant failed to establish his eligibility for resentencing.
Because we determine that defendant did not meet his burden of showing his crime of
second degree burglary should be reduced to a violation of section 459.5, we need not
address the People‟s additional contention that a bank is not a commercial establishment
within the meaning of section 459.5.
8
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is reversed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
McKINSTER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J.
9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A defendant who enters a bank with the intent to commit identity theft is not eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 459.5, as that statute is limited to entry with the intent to commit larceny.
Issues
Whether a defendant convicted of second degree burglary for entering a bank to cash a fraudulent check is eligible for resentencing as a misdemeanant under Proposition 47's shoplifting statute.
Whether the crime of identity theft is completed prior to entering a commercial establishment for the purpose of using stolen identifying information.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“By its terms, section 459.5 did not redefine second degree burglary; that new statute is limited to entry into a commercial establishment during regular business hours with the intent to commit larceny under $950.”
“The act of entering a bank with the intent to commit identity theft is not the act identified in section 459.5, subdivision (a), i.e., entry with intent to commit petty theft.”
“We conclude that defendant failed to establish his eligibility for resentencing.”