California Court of Appeal Feb 25, 2016 No. D066956Unpublished
Filed 2/25/16 Stump v. Sierra Club CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JOHN STUMP, D066956
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00056415- CU-MC-CTL) SIERRA CLUB,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Katherine
A. Bacal, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert P. Ottilie for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Donahue Fitzgerlad and Michael S. Ward for Defendant and Respondent.
John Stump brought a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory
and injunctive relief against the Sierra Club, a nonprofit public benefit corporation.
Stump, a member of the Sierra Club, alleged that it improperly removed him from
various leadership positions. The trial court denied Stump any relief. Stump appeals,
contending the Sierra Club's decision to remove him from all leadership positions
violated the organization's bylaws and rules and was not supported by substantial
evidence. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Stump joined the Sierra Club in 2008 and has remained an active dues-paying
Stump argues the Sierra Club failed to comply with its own bylaws and rules when
it suspended his ability to volunteer in leadership positions. Specifically, he asserts the
Sierra Club violated its bylaws and rules by failing to resolve the matter informally and at
the local level, refusing to provide him with the evidence supporting its decision, and
failing to provide a fair appeal because Reyes was on the Panel that initially suspended
him and the Committee that considered his appeal. We reject these arguments.
A. Applicable Bylaws and Rules
The Sierra Club was governed by Bylaws and Standing Rules, which related to the
bylaws. The Standing Rules provided that "[t]he only membership rights of Club
members are the rights specifically provided by the Articles, Bylaws and the Corporation
Law."
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Standing Rule 2.2.6 set forth standards of conduct for members. That rule also
provided that "[s]erving in an appointed to elected position of leadership is a privilege
that can be lost either by ignoring the duty of loyalty expected of all Club leaders or by
violating the . . . affirmative standards of conduct." In regard to violations of the
standards of conduct, Standing Rule 2.2.6(c) provided that the "chair of the relevant Club
entity" should quickly resolve violations and any disputes "should be resolved at the most
local level, and informally whenever possible." Further, "[f]ormal actions under Standing
Rule 5.10.2 can be taken to remove, suspend or bar members from leadership positions."
Standing Rule 5.10.2 pertained to the termination of membership or suspension of
member privileges. That rule provided:
"(a) The Board has an obligation to protect the Club from harm, ensure a safe and productive working environment for members and staff, and foster a Club in which people want to participate in its mission. To assist in fulfilling this obligation, the Board delegates the authority for termination of Club membership or suspension of member privileges, including the privilege of serving in elected or appointed Club leadership positions, to the Executive Director, Club President, and chair of the Board Volunteer Leadership Advisory Committee. . . .
"[¶] . . . [¶]
"(d)(i) If the Executive Director, President and Board Volunteer Leadership Advisory Committee chair determine the request may warrant action, they will inform the member and those who have requested the investigation of that determination. . . .
"(ii) If they agree to take action, they will notify the member in writing of this decision, the reasons for it, and the effective date of the action. . . . This notice shall inform the member that the termination of membership or suspension of member privileges may be appealed in writing to the Volunteer Leadership Advisory Committee. . . .
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"(e) The Volunteer Leadership Advisory Committee shall review all timely appeals from members and decide whether to overturn the Panel's decision or let it stand."
B. Analysis
"The rights and duties of members of a private voluntary association, between
themselves and in their relation to the association, are measured by the terms of the
association's constitution and bylaws. [Citation.] However, in many disputes in which a
party's rights and duties in relation to an organization are at issue, the courts may decline
to exercise jurisdiction." (Berke v. Tri Realtors (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 463, 466-467.)
"One concern in such cases is that judicial attempts to construe ritual or obscure rules and
laws of private organizations may lead the courts into what Professor Chafee called the
'dismal swamp.' [Citation.] Another is with preserving the autonomy of such
organizations." (California Dental Assn. v. American Dental Assn. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 346,
353.) However, courts will intervene "when the aggrieved party can demonstrate ' "an
abuse of discretion, and a clear, unreasonable and arbitrary invasion of [its] rights. . . ." ' "
(Id. at p. 354.)
" '[W]hen a private voluntary organization plainly contravenes the terms of its
bylaws, the issues of whether and to what extent judicial relief will be available depend
on balancing (1) the interest in protecting the aggrieved party's rights against (2) the
infringement on the organization's autonomy and the burdens on the courts that will result
from judicial attempts to settle such internal disputes.' " (California Trial Lawyers Assn.
v. Superior Court (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 575, 579.) However, "the initial question in
determining whether judicial action is appropriate is whether the challenged action
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'plainly contravenes' the association's bylaws. Only then does the balancing test noted
above come into play." (Id. at p. 580.)
In light of the foregoing principles, the initial question before us is whether Stump
has shown that the Sierra Club's actions "plainly contravene" the organization's bylaws.
(California Trial Lawyers Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 579.) We
conclude he has not made this required showing. We address each of Stump's challenges
to the Sierra Club's Bylaws and Standing Rules in turn.
First, Stump asserts the Sierra Club violated its procedures in Standing Rule
2.2.6(c)(i) by failing to resolve the matter informally and at the local level. However,
that rule provides that the "chair of the relevant Club entity" should resolve disputes
informally at the local level "whenever possible." Here, Stump was the San Diego
Chapter's chair. He was initially suspended because the Sierra Club's director of human
resources had received complaints that Stump had threatened and harassed Miller, an
employee. Accordingly, resolution at the local level was not possible in this case.
Moreover, Standing Rule 2.2.6 also provides that formal action under Standing Rule
5.10.2 "can be taken to remove, suspend or bar members from leadership positions."
This is the process that took place in this case. Accordingly, Stump has not shown that
the Sierra's Club's action "plainly contravened" Standing Rule 2.2.6.
Stump next argues the Sierra Club violated Standing Rule 5.10.2(d) by refusing to
provide him with the evidence supporting its decision. Stump points to the language of
the rule, which provides that if the Panel decides to take disciplinary action against a
member, it shall notify the member in writing of its decision and "the reasons for it." The
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Panel provided Stump with a notice explaining the "reasons" for suspending him,
including that Stump threatened Miller's continued employment with the Sierra Club,
engaged in harassment in violation of employment policies, caused others to become
fearful and reluctant to participate in activities, and misdirected the organization's funds.
Nothing in the rule states that the Panel was required to provide Stump with the evidence
supporting its reasons for suspension. Rather, the rule merely states that the Panel must
provide its "reasons," which it did in this case. Thus, Stump has not shown the Panel
contravened the rule.
Lastly, Stump contends the Sierra Club violated Standing Rule 5.10.2 by failing to
provide him a fair appeal because Reyes was on the Panel that initially suspended him
and the Committee that considered his appeal. Stump's argument fails because Standing
Rule 5.10.2(d)(i) provided that the initial Panel reviewing a request for suspension was
comprised of the executive director, president, and chair of the Committee. Subsection
(e) of that rule provided that Stump could appeal the Panel's decision to the Committee.
As its chair, Reyes was part of the Committee. Thus, Standing Rule 5.10.2 expressly
allowed Reyes to serve on both the Panel and Committee. Nothing in the rule suggests
that Reyes was required to recuse herself from the process. In any event, after Stump
expressed concern about Reyes acting on both the Panel and the Committee, the Sierra
Club informed him that while Reyes would discuss Stump's appeal with other Committee
members, she would not vote on whether to reverse the Panel's permanent suspension
decision. Thus, Stump has not shown that Reyes's role on the Panel and the Committee
plainly contravened Standing Rule 5.10.2.
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III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Stump contends substantial evidence did not support the Sierra Club's decision to
suspend him. He discusses at length each of the Sierra Club's findings against him and
the evidence contradicting those findings. He asks this court by way of declaration,
mandamus, or injunction to vacate the Sierra Club's findings against him as they are not
supported by the evidence and to compel the Sierra Club to restore his ability to hold
leadership positions. We decline to do so.
As we have explained, "[o]ut of respect for a private association's autonomy and
special competence, courts generally will not interfere with the internal affairs of such an
organization or with the enforcement of its rules unless the determination of some civil or
property right is involved. [Citation.] 'It is true that courts will not interfere with the
disciplining or expelling of members of such associations where the action is taken in
good faith and in accordance with its adopted laws and rules. But if the decision of the
tribunal is contrary to its laws or rules, or it is not authorized by the by-laws of the
association, a court may review the ruling of the board and direct the reinstatement of the
member.' [Citation.] When a voluntary association disciplines one of its members,
'. . . the only function which the courts may perform is to determine whether the
association has acted within its powers in good faith, in accordance with its laws and the
law of the land.' " (Budwin v. American Psychological Assn. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 875,
879 (Budwin).)
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Stump is asking us to weigh in on the internal affairs of the Sierra Club. However,
he does not argue that some civil or property right is involved such that we should
interfere with the Sierra Club's enforcement of its bylaws and rules. (Budwin, supra, 24
Cal.App.4th at p. 879.) Moreover, he has not shown that the Sierra Club acted in plain
contravention of its bylaws and rules. In these circumstances, we exercise judicial
restraint and decline to substitute our judgment for that of a private organization on a
matter that is best left to the organization.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of relief to a Sierra Club member who challenged his suspension from volunteer leadership positions, holding that the organization did not violate its own bylaws or rules and that judicial intervention in such internal disciplinary matters is unwarranted absent a violation of civil or property rights.
Issues
Whether the Sierra Club's suspension of a member from volunteer leadership positions violated the organization's bylaws and rules.
Whether the trial court erred in declining to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the organization's internal disciplinary decision.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The rights and duties of members of a private voluntary association, between themselves and in their relation to the association, are measured by the terms of the association's constitution and bylaws.”
“we exercise judicial restraint and decline to substitute our judgment for that of a private organization on a matter that is best left to the organization.”