"Moreover, there must be a 'substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification' under
10
the ' " 'totality of the circumstances' " ' to warrant reversal of a conviction on this ground."
(Ibid.)
B. Curbside Lineup
Defendants, who were identified by Abraham at the curbside lineup, but not by
Daniel, argue the lineup was unduly suggestive because within six hours after Daniel and
Abraham were robbed, police called them, advised them that they had caught the robbers,
and took them to a curbside lineup. Like the trial court, we do not find that the
circumstances under which the lineup was conducted were unduly suggestive.
1. Rationale for Curbside Lineups
"[A]lthough a one-person showup may pose a danger of suggestiveness, such
showups 'are not necessarily or inherently unfair. [Citations.] Rather, all the
circumstances must be considered.' [Citation.]" (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th
694, 753.) For an identification procedure to violate a defendant's due process rights,
"the state must, at the threshold, improperly suggest something to the witness—i.e., it
must, wittingly or unwittingly, initiate an unduly suggestive procedure." (People v.
Ochoa (1998) 19 Ca1.4th 353, 413.) However, "[s]ingle-person show-ups for purposes
of in-field identifications are encouraged, because the element of suggestiveness inherent
in the procedure is offset by the reliability of an identification made while the events are
fresh in the witness's mind, and because the interests of both the accused and law
enforcement are best served by an immediate determination as to whether the correct
person has been apprehended. [Citation.] The law permits the use of in-field
11
identifications arising from single-person show-ups so long as the procedures used are
not so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of
misidentification." (In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 372, 387, italics omitted; see
In re Richard W. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 960, 970; People v. Irvin (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d
747, 759.)
2. Witness Testimony
On direct examination, Abraham explained that police called his home and told
him that "they had caught the guys." However, at that point, Abraham was not told that
he would be asked to identify anyone at a curbside lineup. Later, a police officer came to
Abraham's house and explained that she was going to take him to a curbside lineup.
After Abraham and his mother were in the officer's patrol car, but before leaving
Abraham's home, the police officer read him an admonishment, which advised Abraham
that he should not infer any guilt just because someone had been detained, that he did not
have to identify anyone and that it was just as important to free an innocent person as
identify someone involved in a crime.3
According to Abraham, he understood that he was going to the curbside lineup so
3 The officer read the admonishment from a card provided to her by the Escondido Police Department. The card stated: "I want you to look at someone we have detained. Don't conclude from the fact that we have detained someone that he or she is the guilty party. "You are not obligated to identify anyone. It is just as important to free an innocent person as it is to identify the involved party. "Be aware that sometimes people who commit crimes will try to disguise their appearance by changing clothes, wearing hats, sunglasses or wigs. "Don't say anything or make any gestures by nodding or pointing, et cetera, until you have totally viewed the person. Do you understand?" 12
that he could "[n]otify the cops if those were the correct guys." (Italics added.) Abraham
stated that he was able to identify Mendoza as the one who stole his cell phone based on
his recollection of the robber's facial features, clothes, height and weight and physical
build; Abraham was able to identify Garcia as the one who robbed Daniel based on his
recollection of the second robber's clothes and height; and Abraham was able to identify
Guzman as the getaway driver based on his recollection of the driver's long straight hair.
Daniel testified that he also received a call from Escondido police officers in
which he was told that the police had stopped some people they thought might be
involved in the robbery. Daniel was given the same admonishment provided to
Abraham. As we have indicated, Daniel was unable to identify any of the defendants as
one of the robbers, but he did recognize the Honda as the getaway car.
3. Analysis
In sum, before asking the two victims to identify the defendants, each victim was
admonished that they were not to infer guilt from the fact that any of the individuals were
detained and that they were not obligated to identify anyone. The admonishment was
effective with both Abraham, who testified that he understood his role was to notify the
police "if they were the correct guys," (italics added) and Daniel, who plainly felt no
suggestion or pressure because he was unable to identify any of the defendants as
suspects but did recognize the Honda as the getaway car. Given these circumstances in
the record, which show that the witnesses acted independent of any suggestion or
pressure that may have been expressed or inherent in the circumstance, defendants did
13
not meet their burden of showing that the statements the police made to the witnesses
before the lineup were unduly suggestive or that the identification Abraham made six
hours after the robbery was in any way unreliable.
C. Six-pack Photo Lineup
1. The Lineup
Six of the victims at the Mi Pueblo Market robbery were shown three separate six-
pack photo lineups (six-pack); each six-pack included a picture of one of the defendants.
The six-packs were prepared with the assistance of a computer program that selected
photographs of individuals with physical characteristics similar to each of the defendants
and organized the photographs randomly.
The six-packs were shown to the six victims at Ruben's house. Ruben testified
that he was told by the police that they had recovered various items and that three people
were in custody. However, each victim was admonished that they did not have to
identify anyone in the lineup and that they should not assume that anyone whose picture
was in the lineup was in custody. Each victim was shown the six-packs separately.
Three of the victims—Ruben, Jonathan, and Carlos—were able to identify Guzman; only
two of the victims—Ruben and Carlos—were able to identify Mendoza; none of the
victims was able to identify Garcia.
2. Analysis
Guzman argues that because only one other person in the six-pack, which included
his photograph, had long hair, it was unduly suggestive. "However, 'there is no
14
requirement that a defendant in a lineup be surrounded by people nearly identical in
despite the existence of similar or greater disparities among the lineup participants.
[Citation.]" (People v. Wimberly (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 773, 790; see People v. Brandon
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1052-1053.) Because the Guzman six-pack included one
other person with long hair and only three of the victims were able to identify him,
plainly the lineup was not unduly suggestive.4
The fact that Mendoza was only identified by two of the six victims also strongly
suggests that neither the six-pack that included him nor the circumstances surrounding
the identification were in any manner suggestive. With respect to the overall
circumstances in which the six-packs were presented, and any statements the police made
with respect to the status of any of the perpetrators, the fact that none of the six victims
identified Garcia further demonstrates that those circumstances and statements were in no
sense overly suggestive.
In sum, defendants did not meet their burden with respect to the six-pack lineup
identification.
III.
Trial Court Instructions on Gang Enhancement
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 252 and 1401, which
4 Because the Guzman six-pack was not overly suggestive, Ruben's later use of it when he eventually identified Guzman at trial, after initially being unable to do so, did not in any manner infringe on Guzman's due process rights. 15
taken together advised the jury that the gang enhancements under section 186.22,
subdivision (b) required proof that in committing the robberies the defendants acted with
the specific intent to "promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang members."
Contrary to defendants' argument on appeal, the enhancements alleged under section
186.22, subdivision (b) do not require a showing that defendants also knew they were
assisting gang members. Rather, by its terms, the only mens rea required to establish the
gang enhancement is proof of an intent to promote, further or assist a crime or crimes
committed by gang members.
In this sense, the enhancement set forth in section 186.22, subdivision (b), which
requires proof that an underlying crime was related to gang activity and proof of an intent
to assist in committing the crime, is to be distinguished from the substantive crime of
active gang participation, proscribed by section 186.22, subdivision (a), which by its
terms requires knowledge by a defendant that he or she has been assisting the criminal
conduct of a gang with a pattern of street crime. (See People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55
Cal.4th 1125, 1138 (Rodriguez).)
We recognize that in People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 54-59 (Albillar), the
court held that under section 186.22 subdivision (a) knowledge that participants in a
crime are members of a criminal street gang must be established, but no proof that a
particular crime was gang related is required. However, nothing in Albillar imports into
the separate enhancement set forth in section 186.22 subdivision (b) a scienter or
knowledge requirement.
16
IV.
Jury Instructions Regarding Intent and Motive
The trial court instructed the jury with a version of CALCRIM No. 1401, which
required that in order to find true the gang enhancement, the jury was required to find that
the predicate crime or crimes were committed for the benefit of or in association with a
gang and that the defendant intended to assist criminal conduct by gang members. The
trial court also provided the jury with a version of CALCRIM No. 1403, which limited
the use of gang-related evidence to the issues of: intent, purpose and knowledge required
to prove the gang-related enhancements and a motive for commission of the underlying
substantive crimes. Finally, over the objection of defendants, the jury was instructed with
CALCRIM No. 370, which stated that the prosecution did not have to prove defendants
had any motive for committing the charged crimes but that, in reaching their verdict, the
jury could consider whether the defendants had a motive.5
5 The version of CALCRIM No. 1401 that was provided to the jury stated: "If you find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 1 through 9, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant committed each of those crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. "To prove this allegation, the People must prove that: "1. The defendant committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang; "AND "2. The defendant intended to assist, further, or promote criminal conduct by gang members. "A criminal street gang is any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal: "1. That has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol; "2. That has, as one or more of its primary activities, the commission of Robbery or Attempted Robbery (Penal Code section 211), Assault with a Deadly Weapon or Force 17
Likely to Cause Great Bodily Injury (Penal Code section 245), Attempted Murder (Penal Code section 664/187). "AND "3. Whose members, whether acting alone or together, engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. "In order to qualify as a primary activity, the crime must be one of the group's chief or principal activities rather than an occasional act committed by one or more persons who happen to be members of the group. "A pattern of criminal gang activity, as used here, means: "1. The commission of, or attempted commission of, or conspiracy to commit, or solicitation to commit, or conviction of: "any combination of two or more of the following crimes, or two or more occurrences of one or more of the following crimes: Robbery or Attempted Robbery (Penal Code section 211), Assault with a Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Cause Great Bodily Injury (Penal Code section 245), Attempted Murder (Penal Code section 664/187).; "2. At least one of those crimes was committed after September 26, 1988; "3. The most recent crime occurred within three years of one of the earlier crimes; "AND "4. The crimes were committed on separate occasions or were personally committed by two or more persons. "The crimes, if any, that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity, need not be gang-related. "The People need not prove that the defendant is an active or current member of the alleged criminal street gang. "If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case, you may consider that crime in deciding whether one of the group's primary activities was commission of that crime and whether a pattern of criminal gang activity has been proved. "You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity unless all of you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these requirements were committed, but you do not have to all agree on which crimes were committed. "The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved."
The version of CALCRIM No. 1403 that was provided to the jury stated: "You may consider evidence of gang activity only for the limited purpose of deciding whether: "The defendant acted with the intent, purpose, and knowledge that are required to prove the gang-related enhancements charged; "OR "The defendant had a motive to commit the crimes charged. 18
Defendants objected to CALCRIM No. 370 on the grounds that, given in
conjunction with CALCRIM No. 1403, it would cause the jury to confuse the intent
required to prove the gang enhancements with the separate mental state of motive. (See
People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 504.) They renew this argument on appeal.
Like the court in People v. Fuentes (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139-1140, we find no
merit in this argument. The instructions, as given, adequately distinguish the intent the
jury must find from evidence of motive that might be relevant in determining whether the
defendant acted with the required intent. (See ibid.)
V.
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Gang Enhancements
A. Background
Defendants allege the prosecution failed to present substantial evidence to support
the true findings with respect to the gang enhancement allegations under section 186.22,
You may also consider this evidence when you evaluate the credibility or believability of a witness and when you consider the facts and information relied on by an expert witness in reaching his or her opinion. "You may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. You may not conclude from this evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crime."
The version of CALCRIM No. 370 that was provided to the jury stated: "The People are not required to prove that the defendant had a motive to commit any of the crimes charged. In reaching your verdict you may, however, consider whether the defendant had a motive. "Having a motive may be a factor tending to show that the defendant is guilty. Not having a motive may be a factor tending to show the defendant is not guilty."
19
subdivision (b). At the time they were arrested, Garcia was a documented member of the
Eastside gang in San Diego, California. Guzman and Mendoza were documented
members of the Diablos gang in Escondido, California.
Gang experts testified that not all Hispanic criminal street gangs in San Diego
County are rivals. The experts testified that both the Eastside gang in San Diego and the
Diablos in Escondido are "eastside" Hispanic street gangs. Escondido Police Detective
Gregory Clark testified specifically regarding the Diablos gang. He testified that the
Diablos frequently use a cement flood control channel in the city to move around and
evade police. The robbery at the Mi Pueblo Market occurred near the Escondido flood
control channel.
Clark testified the Diablos frequently commit crimes against members of the
public in their home turf and tend to do this more frequently than other Escondido street
gangs. He testified such crimes benefit the gang by instilling fear within the surrounding
community. Members of the Diablos gang are expected to automatically back up their
fellow gang members if a member decides to commit a crime of opportunity against a
member of the public. No orders are given, and no words are necessary for the backup to
occur. Citing to specific examples of crimes committed by Diablos gang members, Clark
opined that the primary purpose and activity of the Diablos gang is to commit crimes
such as robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and making criminal threats.
In response to hypotheticals modeled after the charged robberies and assaults,
Clark testified the crimes benefited the Diablos gang because they were a continuation of
20
the Diablos's campaign of victimizing persons on their home turf and spreading fear of
the gang in the area. Clark also said the individual gang members would benefit by
increasing their reputation within their gangs for their willingness to commit violent
crimes.
Significantly, the presence of a San Diego Eastside gang member among the trio
did not change Clark's opinion that the crime benefited the Diablos gang. In Clark's
opinion, this was evidence the Eastside gang member was aligned with the Diablos, that
the Diablos gang members he was working with could count on him and that he was
working to benefit the Diablos gang.
B. Standard of Review
On review, the question of whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence
to support a gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) is a question of
fact reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (People v. Ortiz (1997) 57
Cal.App.4th 480, 484.) When applying the substantial evidence standard, "the reviewing
court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible
and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.
[Citations.] The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on
circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the jury's duty to acquit a defendant if
21
it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of
which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that
must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ' "If
the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the
reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]" ' [Citation.]"
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054.)
C. Gang Enhancement
Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) enhances the sentence of " 'any person who is
convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members.' " (Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1138-1139,
italics added.) Thus, "[t]he enhancement set forth in section 186.22(b)(1) does not
. . . depend on membership in a gang at all. Rather, it applies when a defendant has
personally committed a gang-related felony with the specific intent to aid members of
that gang." (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 67-68, italics added.) In Albillar, the court
reached this conclusion in rejecting the defendants' contention that the prosecution had to
show that a defendant had the specific intent to aid the identified gang. Rather, the
prosecution is only required to show that the crime committed by a defendant was gang
related in the sense that it is committed at the direction of, in association with or for the
benefit of a criminal street gang. (Id. at p. 60.)
22
Committing a crime in concert with known gang members can be substantial
evidence that the crime was committed in "association" with a gang. (People v. Morales
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1198.) A crime is committed in association with a gang if
the "defendants relied on their common gang membership and the apparatus of the gang
in committing" the charged felonies. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.) For example,
three criminal street gang members who raped and sexually assaulted a 16-year-old girl
were found to have committed the crime in association with a gang because as fellow
gang members they were able to rely upon each other to help facilitate the sexual
assaults, they could expect their fellow gang members not to talk to the police, and they
relied upon their membership in the gang to intimidate the victim. (Id. at pp. 61-62.)
"Commission of a crime in concert with known gang members is substantial evidence
which supports the inference that the defendant acted with the specific intent to promote,
further or assist gang members in the commission of the crime." (People v. Villalobos
(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 310, 322 (Villalobos).) Importantly, the prosecution must prove
that the gang meets section 186.22, subdivision (f)'s definition of a criminal street gang.
"[T]he prosecution must prove that the gang (1) is an ongoing association of three or
more persons with a common name or common identifying sign or symbol; (2) has as one
of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in
the statute; and (3) includes members who either individually or collectively have
engaged in a 'pattern of criminal gang activity' by committing, attempting to commit, or
soliciting two or more of the enumerated offenses (the so-called 'predicate offenses')
23
during the statutorily defined period." (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617
(Gardeley).)
Generally, for the purposes of proving the gang enhancement, an expert witness is
permitted to testify regarding the culture, habits, and psychology of criminal gangs. The
expert, in response to a hypothetical question modeled after the alleged crime, may opine
as to the motivation for the defendant's actions if the opinion falls within the witness's
expertise regarding the culture of criminal gangs. (People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th
186, 210.) However, a "crime may not be found gang related . . . based solely upon the
defendant's criminal history and gang affiliations. The crime itself must have some
connection with the activities of a gang." (People v. Martinez (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th
753, 761, italics omitted.)
"Commission of a crime in concert with known gang members is substantial
evidence which supports the inference that the defendant acted with the specific intent to
promote, further or assist gang members in the commission of the crime." (Villalobos,
supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 322.) An expert's opinion that a crime benefited a gang by
enhancing its reputation for "viciousness" or violence may be sufficient to raise an
inference that the crime benefited the criminal gang. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63;
Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1138-1139; People v. Vazquez (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 347, 353.)
D. Discussion
To prevail under the substantial evidence standard, defendants must demonstrate
24
that no reasonable fact finder could have found true the alleged gang enhancement. To
prove the gang allegations, the prosecution had to demonstrate the existence of a criminal
street gang. As defined by statute " 'criminal street gang' means any ongoing
organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal,
having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts
. . . having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang
activity." (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) The prosecution must also show that the gang "includes
members who either individually or collectively have engaged in a 'pattern of criminal
gang activity' by committing, attempting to commit, or soliciting two or more of the
enumerated offenses (the so-called 'predicate offenses') during the statutorily defined
period." (Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
Here, Detective Clark provided testimony regarding the Diablos gang in
Escondido, including specific examples of predicate offenses committed by the gang.
Thus, with respect to the Diablos, the prosecution met its burden of showing that it was a
criminal street gang. However, expert witnesses did not testify to predicate offenses
committed by the Eastside gang in San Diego, and, thus, there was insufficient proof the
San Diego Eastside gang is a criminal street gang for the purposes of the gang
enhancement.
Having established the existence of a gang, the prosecution was then required to
show that the individual defendants committed felony crimes " 'for the benefit of, at the
25
direction of, or in association with [the] criminal street gang, with the specific intent to
promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.' " (Rodriguez,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1138-1139, italics added.) In this case, there is substantial
evidence to support an inference that defendants committed the crimes in association with
the Diablos street gang and that they had a specific intent to assist in criminal conduct by
Diablos gang members: Mendoza and Guzman were known members of the Diablos
gang, and there is sufficient evidence to draw an inference that they relied upon their
gang membership in conducting the robberies. It can be reasonably inferred based upon
expert testimony and the circumstances of the crimes that Mendoza and Guzman knew
that, as fellow Diablos gang members, they could count on each other to assist when
engaging in crimes of opportunity against victims in their territory and could count on the
other gang members' silence if confronted by the police.
While Garcia is a documented member of a different gang in a different part of
San Diego County, this fact would not prevent a reasonable fact finder from nonetheless
finding that he committed the armed robberies in association with and for the benefit of
the Diablos. Our state high court's recent ruling in People v Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59,
71-72 (Prunty)6 does not foreclose the possibility of such a conviction, because while
6 In Prunty the court stated: "[W]here the prosecution's case positing the existence of a single 'criminal street gang' for purposes of section 186.22(f) turns on the existence and conduct of one or more gang subsets, then the prosecution must show some associational or organizational connection uniting those subsets. That connection may take the form of evidence of collaboration or organization, or the sharing of material information among the subsets of a larger group. Alternatively, it may be shown that the subsets are part of the same loosely hierarchical organization, even if the subsets themselves do not communicate or 26
expert witnesses did not submit evidence proving that the Eastside gang is either a
criminal street gang or a subset of a larger criminal gang to which both Eastside and the
Diablos are associated, section 186.22, subdivision (b) does not require that a defendant
be a member of a criminal street gang, only that the defendant commits a felony either to
benefit a gang, or in association with a gang and that the defendant has a specific intent to
aid gang members in the commission of a felony. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 67-
68.)
Garcia worked with the Diablos gang members in the armed robberies, and they
apparently relied upon and trusted him as if he were one of them. An expert witness also
testified that there was a great deal of crossover between Hispanic criminal street gangs
in San Diego County. Given these facts, a reasonable jury could have inferred that
Garcia committed the armed robberies in association with and support of the Diablos
even if he was not formally a member of that organization. The fact that the armed
robberies occurred in Diablos territory and armed robbery of members of the public is a
work together. And in other cases, the prosecution may show that various subset members exhibit behavior showing their self-identification with a larger group, thereby allowing those subsets to be treated as a single organization. "Whatever theory the prosecution chooses to demonstrate that a relationship exists, the evidence must show that it is the same 'group' that meets the definition of section 186.22(f)—i.e., that the group committed the predicate offenses and engaged in criminal primary activities—and that the defendant sought to benefit under section 186.22(b). But it is not enough, as the Court of Appeal in this case held, that the group simply shares a common name, common identifying symbols, and a common enemy. Nor is it permissible for the prosecution to introduce evidence of different subsets' conduct to satisfy the primary activities and predicate offense requirements without demonstrating that those subsets are somehow connected to each other or another larger group." (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 71-72, fns. omitted.)
27
crime that was identified by an expert witness as one of the primary criminal activities of
the Diablos gang support a strong inference that all three defendants committed the
armed robberies with the intent of assisting Diablos gang members in conducting
criminal activity, thus satisfying both prongs of section 186.22, subdivision (b).
Because the record shows in a fairly convincing fashion that the Diablos is a
criminal street gang and, further, that all three defendants were acting on behalf of the
Diablos, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's true finding under section
186.22, subdivision (b).
DISPOSITION
The judgments of conviction are affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
IRION, J.
28
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to bifurcate gang enhancement allegations, that the pretrial identification procedures were not unduly suggestive, and that the jury instructions regarding gang enhancements and motive were proper.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancements?
Were the pretrial identification procedures unduly suggestive and prejudicial?
Did the jury instructions improperly allow jurors to equate motive with intent?
Was there sufficient evidence to support the gang enhancements?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Contrary to defendants' argument on appeal, the enhancements alleged under section 186.22, subdivision (b) do not require a showing that defendants also knew they were assisting gang members.”