California Court of Appeal Feb 10, 2016 No. E063471MUnpublished
Filed 2/10/16 P. v. States CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, E063471 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. FVI1303081) v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION CHARLES LEWIS STATES, [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT
The opinion filed in this matter on February 2, 2016 is modified as follows:
On page 1, change the first full sentence from:
Defendant Charles Lewis States pleaded guilty to
unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle
Filed 2/2/16 P. v. States CA4/2 (unmodified version)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E063471
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI1303081)
CHARLES LEWIS STATES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Miriam Ivy
Morton, Judge. Affirmed.
Valerie G. Wass for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Eric A. Swenson,
Lynne G. McGinnis and Kristine A. Gutierrez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Defendant Charles Lewis States pleaded guilty to unlawfully taking or driving a
vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (section 10851(a)).
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Thereafter, Proposition 47 went into effect. Proposition 47 allows certain defendants
convicted of specified theft or drug-related felonies to petition to have those convictions
treated as misdemeanors. The trial court denied defendant’s petition under Proposition
47, on the ground that Proposition 47 does not apply to a conviction for unlawfully taking
or driving a vehicle.
Defendant appeals. He contends that Proposition 47 must be construed as
applying to a conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. Alternatively, he
contends that, if Proposition 47 does not apply to a conviction for unlawfully taking or
driving a vehicle, it violates equal protection.
We reject both contentions and we will affirm.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful taking or driving of a
vehicle (Pen. Code, § 664, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and admitted one
“strike” prior conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). He was sentenced
to a total of two years (double the midterm) in prison. He allegedly served that sentence.
In 2014, Proposition 47 went into effect. (See People v. Garness (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 1370, 1372 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
In 2015, defendant filed a petition to have the conviction redesignated as a
misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18. The trial court denied the petition.
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It ruled that defendant was not eligible for resentencing because unlawful taking or
driving of a vehicle is not one of the crimes specified in Penal Code section 1170.18.
II
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF PROPOSITION 47
A. General Background Regarding Proposition 47.
In general, Proposition 47 reduced certain theft-related offenses — provided they
involve property worth $950 or less — and certain possessory drug offenses from
felonies (or wobblers) to misdemeanors, unless the defendant is otherwise ineligible.
(Couzens & Bigelow, Proposition 47: “The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act” (Aug.
2015) pp. 24-28, available at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop-47-
Information.pdf>, as of Jan. 22, 2016.) It also allowed persons previously convicted of
one of the specified offenses as a felony to petition to reduce the prior conviction to a
misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.)
In particular, as relevant here, Proposition 47 enacted Penal Code section 490.2,
subdivision (a) (section 490.2(a)), which provides: “Notwithstanding Section 487 or any
other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the
value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred
fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a
misdemeanor . . . .”
It also enacted Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a) (section 1170.18,
subdivision (a)), which provides: “A person currently serving a sentence for a conviction
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. . . of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under th[is] act
. . . had this act been in effect at the time of the offense may petition . . . to request
resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and
Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those
theft with a prior, lists “auto theft under Section 10851(a)” as one of the prior convictions
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that elevate a petty theft to a wobbler. (Pen. Code, § 666, subd. (a).) He also notes that
Proposition 47 amended section 666. He then argues that this shows that it was the intent
of Proposition 47 to treat a violation of section 10851(a) as theft. However, the words
“auto theft under Section 10851(a)” long predate Proposition 47. As defendant admits,
they were added to section 666 in 1986. (Stats. 1986, ch. 402, § 1, p. 1622.) Thus, they
shed no light on the intent behind Proposition 47.
Finally, defendant relies on certain uncodified findings and declarations in
Proposition 47. Section 2 states that Proposition 47 was enacted, in part, “to maximize
alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime . . . .” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec.
(Nov. 4, 2014) Text of Proposed Laws, p. 70.) Section 3 states: “In enacting this act, it
is the purpose and intent of the people of the State of California to: [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
Require misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty
theft and drug possession . . . .” (Ibid.) Section 15 states: “This act shall be broadly
construed to accomplish its purposes.” (Id. at p. 74.) And section 18 states: “This act
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.” (Ibid.) “However, [a] rule of
liberal construction . . . should not be used to defeat the overall statutory framework and
fundamental rules of statutory construction.” (Nickelsberg v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 288, 298; see also People v. Jernigan (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1198,
1207 [“The voters mandated that Proposition 36 be liberally construed . . . . It is
established, nonetheless, that in interpreting a voter initiative, we apply well-settled rules
of statutory construction.”].)
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was correct: Proposition 47 does not
allow a defendant who has served a sentence for unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle
in violation of section 10851(a) to petition to have that conviction reduced to a
misdemeanor.
C. Equal Protection.
Defendant also contends that, if Proposition 47 does not apply to a conviction for
unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle in violation of section 10851(a), it violates equal
protection.
Defendant forfeited this contention by failing to raise it below. (People v.
Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14.)
Separately and alternatively, we also reject this contention on the merits.
Applying rational basis scrutiny, the California Supreme Court has held that “neither the
existence of two identical criminal statutes prescribing different levels of punishments,
nor the exercise of a prosecutor’s discretion in charging under one such statute and not
the other, violates equal protection principles.” (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th
821, 838.) Similarly, it has long been the case that “a car thief may not complain because
he may have been subjected to imprisonment for more than 10 years for grand theft of an
automobile [citations] when, under the same facts, he might have been subjected to no
more than 5 years under the provisions of section 10851[(a)] of the Vehicle Code.”
(People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 197.) The same reasoning applies to Proposition
47’s provision for the possibility of sentence reduction for a limited subset of those
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previously convicted of grand theft (those who stole an automobile or other personal
property valued $950 or less), but not those convicted of unlawfully taking or driving a
vehicle in violation of section 10851(a). Absent a showing that a particular defendant
“‘has been singled out deliberately for prosecution on the basis of some invidious
criterion,’ . . . the defendant cannot make out an equal protection violation.” (Wilkinson,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 839.) Defendant here has made no such showing.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) is not eligible for reduction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47.
Issues
Whether a conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851(a) qualifies for reduction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47.
Whether the exclusion of Vehicle Code section 10851(a) convictions from Proposition 47 relief violates equal protection.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Proposition 47 does not allow a defendant who has served a sentence for unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle in violation of section 10851(a) to petition to have that conviction reduced to a misdemeanor.”