California Court of Appeal Feb 10, 2016 No. E062889Unpublished
Filed 2/10/16 Wang v. Lin CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CHING YUN WANG,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E062889
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1312524)
TONY LIN, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Gloria Connor Trask,
Judge. Affirmed.
Kenny Tan, Adam Hussein and Tiffany Garrick for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Cindy N. Tran and Cindy N. Tran for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Ching Yun Wang appeals the trial court’s order granting the
motion to set aside default filed by defendant and respondent Tony Lin. Wang had filed
a breach of contract action against Lin in regards to a lease agreement for property
located in Corona. A default judgment was entered against Lin when he failed to
respond. Lin filed his motion for relief from default or to set aside the default pursuant to
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Code of Civil Procedure section 473.51 (motion) insisting he never received actual notice
“A motion to vacate a default and set aside a judgment . . . ‘is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse . . . the
exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.’ [Citations.] The appropriate
test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.”
(Anastos v. Lee, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1318-1319.)
“When as here an issue is tried on affidavits the rule of appellate review is that
those favoring the contentions of the prevailing party establish not only the facts stated
therein but also all facts which reasonably may be inferred therefrom; and when there is
substantial conflict in the facts presented by way of affidavits, the determination of the
controverted facts by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal.” (Goya v. P.E.R.U.
Enterprises, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at p. 891.) “‘[A] trial court order denying relief is
scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits.’” (Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981.)
Here, Lin declared that he was never served with the summons and complaint. He
also claimed he had no knowledge of the lawsuit until he received the letter from Tan in
July 2014. That letter was sent to his West Covina Property as opposed to all of the
previous notices, which were served at the Upland Property. In his report to the police,
Lin claimed that he never signed the lease agreement. The trial court could reasonably
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rely on Lin’s declaration and police report. Further, the trial court properly relied upon
the fact that Lin’s actions after he claimed he received actual notice—filing a claim of
identity theft with the Upland police and seeking counsel—were consistent with Lin
having received notice in July 2014.
Wang insists that Lin was properly served with the notice of entry of judgment at
the Upland Property because it was his last known address. As such, Lin did not comply
with the 180-day time limit provided in section 473.5. However, this presumes that Lin
signed the lease agreement for the Corona Property and provided the Upland Property as
his last known address. Lin provided evidence to the contrary, including that a renter was
living in the Upland Property at the time he supposedly signed the lease agreement.
Further, this does not explain why Wang sent a letter to Lin’s West Covina Property once
he wanted to collect on the judgment, but did not serve the notice of entry of default at
that address. The trial court reasonably concluded that Lin was not served with the
complaint, and that the mailing of the notice of entry of default to the Upland Property
did not provide notice of the lawsuit to Lin.
Furthermore, we will not disturb the trial court’s finding that once Lin received
actual notice of the default judgment he filed his motion within a reasonable time. The
trial court determined that Lin’s actions once he discovered the default were consistent
with someone who did not have actual notice of the lawsuit. Lin contacted the police and
searched online for the lawsuit. The trial court reasonably determined that Lin was
diligent in investigating and filing the motion. The reasoning of the trial court is
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supported by the record and the granting of Lin’s motion did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's order setting aside a default judgment, finding that the defendant did not receive actual notice of the lawsuit and acted with reasonable diligence in filing his motion for relief once he became aware of the judgment.
Issues
Whether the defendant was properly served with notice of entry of default to trigger the 180-day filing deadline under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5.
Whether the defendant filed his motion to set aside the default judgment within a reasonable time after receiving actual notice of the lawsuit.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court reasonably concluded that Lin was not served with the complaint, and that the mailing of the notice of entry of default to the Upland Property did not provide notice of the lawsuit to Lin.”
“The trial court reasonably determined that Lin was diligent in investigating and filing the motion.”