In re Joseph S. CA4/3

Filed 2/4/16 In re Joseph S. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re JOSEPH S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, G050790 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. DL049350) v. OPINION JOSEPH S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Julian W. Bailey, Judge. Affirmed. Gail Ganaja, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Sabrina Y. Lane-Erwin and Adrianne S. Denault, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Joseph S., a minor, appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court terminated his participation in a Deferred Entry of Judgment (DEJ) program (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790, subd. (a); all further undesignated statutory references are to this code). Appellant was found to have committed felony arson of property (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (d), misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594 subd. (a), (b)(2)(A), and misdemeanor resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant had been in his DEJ program for only two months when he pulled a fire alarm at his high school while classes were in session – an act he concedes was “thoughtless,” “risky” and “inexcusable.” Appellant nonetheless argues it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to terminate his participation in the DEJ program because there was evidence he was otherwise benefitting from the program. We cannot agree. Termination of a DEJ is appropriate under three circumstances, one of which is when the court concludes “the minor . . . is not complying with the terms of the minor’s probation.” (§ 793, subd. (a).) In this case, one of the terms of appellant’s probation was that he obey all laws, and the juvenile court expressly found that his act of pulling the fire alarm was a violation of law. Appellant does not dispute that point on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.