Friends of Riverside's Hills v. City of Riverside CA4/2 (2016) · DecisionDepot
Friends of Riverside's Hills v. City of Riverside CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jan 29, 2016 No. E061821Unpublished
Filed 1/29/16 Friends of Riverside’s Hills v. City of Riverside CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
FRIENDS OF RIVERSIDE’S HILLS,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E061821
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC446628)
CITY OF RIVERSIDE, OPINION
Defendant;
ASHTON RANCH ESTATES, LLC,
Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Gloria Trask, Judge.
Reversed with directions.
Lester & Cantrell, Mark S. Lester, David Cantrell, and Matthew J. Kraus for Real
Party in Interest and Appellant.
Johnson & Sedlack, Raymond W. Johnson, Abigail A. Smith, Kimberly A. Foy,
and Kendall Holbrook for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff and respondent, Friends of Riverside’s Hills, brought a motion in the
superior court to enforce a written settlement agreement against real party in interest and
446628 and 426544) respondent brought under the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA). (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) At the parties’ request, the superior
court in case No. 446628 entered an order retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of
the settlement agreement before entering a judgment of dismissal.
Years later, the parties reached impasse on disputes over performance of the
settlement agreement and respondent filed a motion asking the superior court to construe
and enforce several specific provisions of the agreement. The superior court declined to
reach the issues respondent raised and instead entered a second judgment, which adopted
the terms of the settlement agreement. The judgment indicated the superior court would
“resolve issues of enforceability of particular terms of the Settlement Agreement post-
judgment, as such issues arise.” Instead, Ashton Ranch appealed the judgment.
Ashton Ranch contends the superior court committed reversible error by entering
judgment based on settlement terms that: (1) obligate it to dedicate a public trail
easement on private property owned by third parties; (2) obligate it to obtain consent
from a third party to accept dedication of a trail head; (3) obligate the homeowner’s
association to work closely with a third party land conservancy to monitor open space
1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Code of Civil Procedure.
areas. Appellant also contends the superior court erred by entering judgment without first
determining whether the settlement terms were valid and enforceable.
We decline to reach these issues because the superior court did not rule on them.
Instead, because the second judgment is a nullity, we reverse and remand for the superior
court to address those issues in the first instance.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties’ written settlement agreement, entered on June 15, 2006 between
respondent on one side and appellant and other real parties in interest2 on the other side,
settled two cases brought under CEQA challenging the adequacy of the environmental
review for two residential development projects in the City of Riverside, tract map 29628
and tract map 32270.
As part of the settlement, the parties agreed to file the signed settlement agreement
with the superior court in case No. 446628 and “to submit themselves to the continuing
jurisdiction” of that court to enforce the provisions of the agreement. As permitted by
section 664.6, the parties filed a stipulation requesting that the superior court retain
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement after dismissal of the two underlying
actions. The stipulation attached the signed settlement agreement as an exhibit. On June
23, 2006, the superior court entered an order agreeing to retain jurisdiction to enforce the
2 The other real parties in interest named in the settlement agreement are Hawarden Development Corporation, Executive Home Builders of Riverside, and A&T Partners LLC.
settlement agreement. As required by the agreement, respondent then requested
dismissal with prejudice of case No. 446628. On August 16, 2006, the superior court
entered a judgment of dismissal in that case.3
Seven and a half years later, on February 5, 2014, respondent returned to the
superior court and filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement under section
664.6. Respondent contended the real parties in interest had failed, among other things,
to perform duties to: (1) dedicate a trail easement to the City of Riverside, (2) dedicate
an access point to the trail, and (3) work closely with the Riverside Land Conservancy to
maintain open space areas. Respondent asked the superior court to order the real parties
in interest to “substantially perform the duties required under the Settlement Agreement.”
Appellant contended in the superior court that the provisions of the settlement agreement
cannot be specifically enforced under section 3390 because the terms are indefinite or
performance is impossible or beyond their control.
On March 7, 2014, the superior court held a hearing on the motion to enforce.
Near the outset of the hearing, the court announced, “I think that all you’re going to get is
a judgment. I’ll be happy to give you a judgment. But the court is not going to compel
specific performance.” The court explained, “We’ll argue over the form of the judgment
for several months. And once we finally get a judgment that I decide upon based upon
3 At the time of the settlement, case No. 426544 was on appeal in this court as case No. E040522. The parties agreed to seek dismissal of the appeal and the underlying superior court action. The record does not establish that the parties achieved those dismissals. We take judicial notice that we dismissed the appeal in case No. E040522 on July 19, 2006. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
briefing and et cetera, we’ll have a judgment; and then [respondent] will attempt to
enforce that judgment, and then I will rule on it because I maintain jurisdiction.”
According to the superior court, respondent would “have to move for however they want
to enforce [the settlement agreement], and the court will rule once they have the
judgment. That’s how I see it playing out.” The superior court directed “plaintiff’s
counsel [to] prepare a judgment pursuant to CCP Section 664.6 in accordance with the
settlement agreement, . . . submit a copy to . . . defense counsel” and then “[s]ubmit it to
the court.” The superior court did not take evidence or hear argument concerning the
specific enforcement issues raised in respondent’s motion. Nor did the superior court
rule on those issues.
On June 18, 2014, the superior court signed a judgment enforcing the settlement
agreement. The judgment provides: “Pursuant to the terms of Code of Civil Procedure
Section 664.6, the court hereby enters judgment pursuant to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. The court retains jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement
agreement.” The judgment reserved resolving “issues of enforceability of particular
terms of the Settlement Agreement post-judgment,” until “such issues arise.” On August
29, 2014, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
Section 664.6 provides parties to a settlement agreement a summary procedure to
enforce the agreement. Before 1993, section 664.6 read in full: “If parties to pending
litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or
orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion,
may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” In 1989, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held this procedure could be invoked only while a case was still pending
in the trial court and that once the case had been dismissed, the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement unless the parties first moved to set
aside the dismissal under section 473. (Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217
Cal.App.3d 200, 207.)
In response, the Legislature amended section 664.6 to, among other things, add the
following sentence: “If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over
the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the
settlement.” (§ 664.6; see also Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 439
(Wackeen) [discussing history and amendment of section 664.6].) “The effect of that
amendment is to provide courts with continuing jurisdiction over parties and their
litigation, for the purpose of enforcing their settlement agreement, despite a suit’s having
been dismissed after the execution of the agreement.” (Wackeen, supra, at p. 433.) To
obtain the superior court’s limited enforcement jurisdiction, “the request must be made
(1) during the pendency of the case, not after the case has been dismissed in its entirety,
(2) by the parties themselves, and (3) either in a writing signed by the parties or orally
before the court.” (Id. at p. 440.) We exercise de novo review in assessing the superior
court’s interpretation and application of section 664.6. (Wackeen, supra, at p. 437.)
The parties in this case properly availed themselves of section 664.6 to ensure the
superior court retained jurisdiction. On June 15, 2006, the parties signed a settlement
agreement that specified “[t]he Parties agree to be bound by the terms of the Stipulated
Settlement Agreement and to submit themselves to the continuing jurisdiction of the
Court . . . to specifically enforce the provisions of this Settlement Agreement and the
order and judgment thereon.” On June 20, 2006, the parties submitted a stipulation to the
court, which provided: “The Parties agree that the Court shall reserve and retain full
jurisdiction, power, and authority to enable the Court upon noticed motion of Petitioners
or Real Parties in Interest, to make such further orders or directions to enforce, protect, or
preserve the rights of the Parties consistent with the terms of this Agreement. . . .
Petitioner and Real Parties in Interest agree to be bound by the terms of the Stipulated
Settlement and to submit themselves to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court in the
Action to specifically enforce the provisions of this Agreement.”4 The parties attached
the signed settlement agreement as an exhibit to the stipulation. On June 23, 2006, the
superior court entered an order stating it “shall retain jurisdiction over the settlement
agreement entered into between Petitioner Friends of Riverside’s Hills and Real Parties in
4 Appellant argues for the first time in a supplemental letter brief that its consent to continuing jurisdiction under section 664.6 was ineffective because counsel, not the parties, signed the stipulation to continue jurisdiction. Appellant did not raise this theory in its opening brief, and has therefore forfeited the contention. (Inyo Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo County Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14, fn.2 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) In any event, the parties signed the settlement agreement, which explicitly requests that the trial court retain jurisdiction, and submitted the agreement with signatures as an exhibit to their stipulation to continue jurisdiction. That submission is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the parties themselves make the request. (Wackeen, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.)
Interest Hawarden Development Corporation and Ashton Ranch Estates.” Only after the
superior court retained jurisdiction did the parties request and obtain dismissal of the
underlying lawsuit. As a result, the superior court had jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement agreement by resolving the disputes respondent raised in its motion filed on
February 5, 2014.
As we noted in part I, however, the superior court did not address those disputes,
but instead entered a judgment purporting to adopt the terms of the settlement agreement.
We sought and obtained supplemental briefing from the parties on the issue whether the
judgment under review was a nullity because it constituted a second judgment. We have
considered the parties’ arguments and conclude the superior court did not have
jurisdiction to enter its judgment because it had already dismissed the case on August 16,
2006. That dismissal constituted entry of judgment. (See § 581d [“All dismissals
ordered by the court . . . shall constitute judgments and be effective for all purposes
. . .”].) By entering judgment, the superior court exhausted its jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit and the parties, except to the extent preserved by the order
retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. (See White v. White (1900)
130 Cal. 597, 599-600 [after entry of judgment “the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the suit and the parties was exhausted, unless preserved in the mode
authorized by statute”]; Barry v. Superior Court (1891) 91 Cal. 486, 488 [“The first
judgment was final, and the only authority of the court thereafter, in the matter concluded
thereby, was the power to enforce the judgment according to its terms”].) Accordingly,
we conclude the second judgment of the superior court was a nullity and therefore reverse
the judgment.
Our conclusion does not imply the superior court lacked jurisdiction to decide
respondent’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On the contrary, section 664.6
explicitly allows the superior court to retain jurisdiction for the limited purpose of
enforcing the terms of the agreement until they have been satisfied. As we have
discussed, the parties properly invoked the superior court’s enforcement jurisdiction.
Thus, the superior court had the authority to resolve the disputes respondent raised by
motion. (See In re The Clergy Cases I (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1236.) However,
the judgment entered by the superior court did not address those disputes. On the
contrary, the superior court specifically reserved ruling on them. We conclude the issues
raised by respondent’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement are not ripe for
appellate review. (See Plancich v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
308, 316 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) We therefore remand to the superior court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On remand, the superior court shall hear and decide respondent’s motion to
enforce the settlement agreement, resolving the specific issues respondent raised in the
original motion concerning appellant’s performance of its obligations. The superior court
may hold a hearing to take evidence and entertain argument related to any such disputes.
(Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.) It may also make factual findings
and legal rulings necessary to resolve them. (Ibid.) Though a postjudgment order
resolving those disputes will not take the form of a judgment, this court would
nevertheless have jurisdiction to hear any appeal that may arise from such an order.
(§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2); see also Osumi v. Sutton, supra, at p. 1360.)
III
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the superior court and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
In the interests of justice, the parties will bear their respective costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER J.
KING J.
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court's second judgment was a nullity because the court had already exhausted its jurisdiction upon entering the initial judgment of dismissal, except for the limited authority to enforce the settlement agreement. The case was remanded for the trial court to resolve the specific enforcement disputes raised in the plaintiff's motion.
Issues
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter a second judgment after the underlying action had been dismissed.
Whether the trial court erred by failing to rule on the merits of the motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
Disposition. Reversed and remanded
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the second judgment of the superior court was a nullity and therefore reverse the judgment.”
“the superior court had the authority to resolve the disputes respondent raised by motion.”
“On remand, the superior court shall hear and decide respondent’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement, resolving the specific issues respondent raised”