California Court of Appeal Jan 29, 2016 No. E061841Unpublished
Filed 1/29/16 P. v. Steiner CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E061841
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1405748)
HARLAN RUSSELL STEINER, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Edward D. Webster,
Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed.
Paul E. Zellerbach, District Attorney and Natalie M. Lough, Deputy District
Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Robert D. Salisbury for Defendant and Respondent.
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The trial court granted the petition of defendant, Harlan Russell Steiner, for a
certificate of rehabilitation and pardon under Penal Code section 4852.01.1 The People
appeal, claiming the trial court erred in granting that petition because defendant is
ineligible. We agree with the People and therefore reverse the trial court’s order granting
Lexis 3706].) The appellate court held that the Legislature’s amendment of section
4852.01 eliminated the equal protection concerns in its earlier opinion and ruled that
section 288, subdivision (a) offenders are ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation.
(Tirey II, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1263.)
In Johnson, the California Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to
mandatory sex offender registration for persons convicted of oral copulation with a minor
4
(§§ 288a, 290, subd. (c)) even though persons convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse
with a minor are subject to only discretionary sex offender registration (§§ 261.2,
290.006). (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 888.) Most relevant here, the court stressed
that the “Legislature is afforded considerable latitude in defining and setting the
consequences of criminal offense.” (Id. at p. 887.) Given Johnson and the subsequent
new opinion in Tirey II, we conclude that the trial court erred when it relied on the initial
opinion in Tirey I over the specific prohibition in section 4852.01, subdivision (d), to
conclude that defendant was not statutorily ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation and
pardon.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting defendant’s petition is reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
MILLER J.
CODRINGTON J.
5
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that individuals convicted of violating Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) are statutorily ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon under Penal Code section 4852.01, subdivision (d).
Issues
Whether Penal Code section 4852.01, subdivision (d) violates equal protection by prohibiting section 288 offenders from seeking a certificate of rehabilitation.
Disposition. Reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The People appeal, claiming the trial court erred in granting that petition because defendant is ineligible. We agree with the People and therefore reverse the trial court’s order granting the petition.”
“the Legislature’s amendment of section 4852.01 eliminated the equal protection concerns in its earlier opinion and ruled that section 288, subdivision (a) offenders are ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation.”