California Court of Appeal Jan 22, 2016 No. E062562Unpublished
Filed 1/22/16 P. v. Martin CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E062562
v. (Super.Ct.No. HEF970426)
ROBERT LOUIS MARTIN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. James S. Hawkins, Judge.
Affirmed.
Sharon M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Scott C.
Taylor, and Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Robert Louis Martin’s criminal record began in 1965 when he was 14
years old. He has been incarcerated since 1998 for felony possession of .12 grams of
methamphetamine. He turned 65 years old in January 2016.
Instead, we hold substantial evidence amply supported the trial court’s finding of
dangerousness. (People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998.) The trial court
considered defendant’s “criminal history, disciplinary record while incarcerated, and . . .
other relevant evidence,” to determine whether he posed “‘an unreasonable risk of danger
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to public safety.’ (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)” (People v. Yearwood, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th
at p. 176.) Defendant was a career criminal with a history of predatory and violent
behavior and drug use. In prison, he continued to be antisocial, uncooperative, and
aggressive. A preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that he
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Even accounting for the mitigating
factors, the trial court did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner when it determined
that defendant’s criminal and prison history outweighed any mitigating evidence and
properly exercised its discretion to deny defendant’s petition.
D. The Hearing on Defendant’s Petition Under Section 1170.18
At the section 1170.18 petition hearing on March 12 and 13, 2015, the parties
submitted much of the same evidence presented at the December 2014 hearing under
section 1170.126. The prosecutor provided evidence of defendant’s criminal and prison
history, and documents and police reports of various charged and uncharged crimes.
Defendant again submitted letters of family support, medical records, and certificates of
course completion and recognition.
The victim testified about defendant’s 1979 rape offense. She was on her lunch
break in a park near where she worked when defendant called her into a women’s
restroom. He blocked her exit, pulled out a hunting knife, and warned her, “‘Don’t
scream or anything like that, or I’ll kill you.’” He removed her clothes and raped her.
Another person testified about a New Year’s Eve party in 1983. The witness was
the owner of a Los Angeles nightclub. When defendant grabbed the arm of a woman and
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pulled her away from her dance partner, the two men began yelling and pushing each
other. Defendant wielded a small knife. The nightclub owner grabbed his baseball bat
and told defendant to get out. They fought until the owner’s .45-caliber handgun slipped
out of his holster and defendant retrieved it. As the owner fled into the alley, defendant
fired the owner’s gun twice and struck him in the upper thigh.
Defendant also testified at the hearing that he has a lumbar spine injury requiring
pain medicine. Defendant wore a back brace to the hearing and explained that he
occasionally needs a wheelchair. Defendant testified that he took computer classes in
prison to increase his employment prospects upon release. He disputed the 1979 rape and
claimed it was consensual but the victim was angry because he did not pay her.
The trial court explained that it read all of the “voluminous” exhibits before the
hearing, including the exhibits from the December 2014 hearing. The court observed that
from 1965 until his life sentence in 1998, defendant continued to commit violent crime
“except when he was incarcerated.” Within a year of defendant being released from
incarceration, he harassed two teenage girls, attempting to get them into his car. The
court found defendant was not credible when he discussed the rape incident. The court
commented that defendant’s numerous prison incident reports were “excessive.”
Defendant also lied about his affiliation with the Bloods gang when he entered prison in
1998. The court observed that the medical evidence did not show defendant was wholly
disabled. The court acknowledged the mitigating factors: defendant’s age, his mild
disability, his computer classes and GED, and the years he has already served for a minor
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conviction after the appellate court dismissed the underlying violent assault.
The court again recognized that from 1965, when defendant was 14, he
continuously committed violent crimes except for when he was incarcerated. His crimes
involved “deadly weapons, guns, knives . . . [and] [a]s far as the victims are concerned,
they were shot, beaten, raped, psychological injuries, fractures.” Even if no conviction
resulted, defendant’s crimes were “the super strike type of crimes . . . [r]ape, attempted
murder, kidnapping, and most involved violence against women. . . .” In prison, he had
many incident reports.
The court ruled that releasing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk that he
would commit a new violent crime, including a “sexually violent crime, maybe a murder
or attempted murder, or a molestation of someone under the age of 18.” Because
defendant had three prior strikes, he might commit a serious or violent felony offense that
would result in a life sentence.
E. The “Unreasonable Risk of Danger” Standard as Defined in Section 1170.18
Defendant argues the trial court misinterpreted the meaning of “unreasonable risk
of danger,” as defined by 1170.18, subdivision (c), by evaluating whether he had the
potential to commit an additional serious or violent felony offense, which would result in
a life sentence because he is a second strike offender. Defendant also contends the court
erroneously believed that the misdemeanor offense of molesting a child under the age of
18 could disqualify him from resentencing.
Defendant has failed to rebut the presumption that the trial court understood the
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relevant law and appropriately applied it. Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the court
properly evaluated whether defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety. Under section 1170.18, subdivision (c), “unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety” means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony
within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).)
Among other so-called “super strikes,” which include several sexually violent or
egregious offenses, that subsection includes “[a]ny serious and/or violent felony offense
punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667, subd.
(e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII).)2
Defendant has three strike priors. (People v. Martin, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
1183-1184.) Therefore any commission of another serious or violent felony offense
would result in a life sentence under the terms of the Three Strikes Law. (§ 667, subd.
(e)(2)(A).) For the purposes of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII), any serious
or violent felony offense committed by a second strike offender would result in a life
sentence. Because defendant has three strike priors, the trial court correctly considered
the likelihood to reoffend because defendant has three strike priors, and any future
serious or violent felony conviction would result in a life sentence.
2 We note that the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in almost every published appellate case which addresses “dangerousness,” beginning with People v. Valencia (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 514, and ending most recently with People v. Delapena (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1414.
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Defendant protests that this interpretation would mean that a defendant with two
strikes who commits a third felony which is neither violent nor serious would never be
able to avail himself of resentencing. However, an inmate’s propensity to commit an
additional felony that is neither violent nor serious would not be sufficient to disqualify
him from resentencing under section 1170.18. Only the inmate’s propensity to commit
another serious or violent felony as defined by sections 667.5, subdivision (c), and
1192.7, subdivision (c), would be relevant to determining dangerousness under section
1170.18. The likelihood that an inmate with two strike priors would commit any other
nonserious or nonviolent felony would be irrelevant to the dangerousness determination
under section 1170.18.
Furthermore, defendant misrepresents the trial court’s comments when he argues
the trial court determined he posed a risk of dangerousness because he may have had a
propensity to commit the misdemeanor offense of molesting a child. (§ 647.6, subd.
(a)(1).) What the trial court actually said was, even though defendant is “in custody on a
minor crime, and he’s already served 18 years, that there is an unreasonable risk that he
will commit a new violent crime under 1170.18(a) and 667(c) (e) (4) [sic], that is a
sexually violent crime, maybe a murder or attempt murder, or a molestation of someone
under the age of 18.” The court did not mention misdemeanor child molestation.
“The general rule is that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of, and
followed the applicable law.” (People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496, citing
Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443; Evid. Code, §
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664.) The reviewing court presumes the trial court’s decision is correct. (Mosley, at p.
496.) An order is presumed correct and error must be affirmatively shown. (Ibid.) The
appellate court cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its face that
the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion. (See People v. White Eagle
(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1521-1523; People v. Davis (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 168,
170-173.) Here, the record does not establish on its face that the court believed it could
deny defendant’s petition if it found that defendant had the propensity to commit any
misdemeanor. Absent any indication to the contrary, defendant has not rebutted the
presumption that the trial court understood and followed the relevant law in determining
whether he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (Mosley, at p. 496.)
Just like with the section 1170.126 petition, the evidence amply supported the trial
court’s finding that defendant continued to pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.
Defendant did not establish he has been rehabilitated. From age 14 in 1965 until his life
sentence in 1998, defendant continuously committed violent crimes except for when he
was incarcerated. Many of defendant’s crimes were serious and violent, “the super strike
type of crimes . . . [r]ape, attempted murder, kidnapping, and most involved violence
against women, whether it was his wife or women that he picked up off the streets.” The
numerous prison incidents were “excessive.” Defendant still refuses to accept culpability
for the 1979 rape conviction.
The trial court’s determination was hardly so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it. Defendant exhibited little remorse and accepted
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no responsibility for his crimes. Considering all the evidence of defendant’s violent
criminal history, his lengthy disciplinary history in prison, and his failure to accept
culpability, the trial court unquestionably properly exercised its discretion to deny
defendant’s section 1170.18 petition. Even without considering defendant’s propensity to
commit serious or violent felony offenses, the evidence presented at the petition hearing
overwhelmingly demonstrated that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety within the meaning of section 1170.18.
IV
DISPOSTIION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s section 1170.126
and 1170.18 petitions. It properly analyzed defendant’s potential for dangerousness.
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's petitions for recall of sentence under Penal Code sections 1170.126 and 1170.18, as the evidence supported the finding that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The court correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the dangerousness determination.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under Penal Code sections 1170.126 and 1170.18.
Whether the standard of proof for determining dangerousness under Penal Code section 1170.18 is beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Absent any statutory indication, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.”
“The denial of resentencing based on dangerousness is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
“A preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”