California Court of Appeal Jan 14, 2016 No. D067539Unpublished
Filed 1/14/16 In re Zachary T. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re ZACHARY T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D067539 THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JCM235246)
v.
ZACHARY T.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Aaron H.
Katz, Judge. Reversed.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Allison V.
Hawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that 15-year-old Zachary T.
unlawfully used or was under the influence of methamphetamine, a misdemeanor. He
appeals, contending the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence
of statements he made to police that he ingested marijuana and methamphetamine as
having been taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
The juvenile court held a pretrial hearing to determine whether Zachary's
statements should be admitted at trial. At the hearing, Deputy Sheriff Marc Snelling
testified that on a morning in April 2014, police officers executed a search warrant at an
apartment in Lakeside. Police detained Zachary and several people inside the apartment.
Deputy Snelling testified that Zachary was not free to leave. Deputy Snelling observed
that Zachary had "crust in the corners of his mouth," was "trying to lift off his chair," and
"smacking his lips." He believed that Zachary might have been under the influence of a
stimulant such as methamphetamine.
Deputy Snelling asked Zachary to go around the corner of the apartment building,
where the adults could not see him, to conduct some field sobriety tests. After interacting
with Zachary for about 20 minutes, Deputy Snelling asked Zachary whether he had
recently used marijuana or methamphetamine. Deputy Snelling asked these questions
because "the department of endangered children" was there and he "needed to
know . . . for [Zachary's] welfare where to place [him] . . . ." After Zachary admitted
using marijuana and methamphetamine, Deputy Snelling arrested him for being under the
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influence of a controlled substance and advised Zachary of his constitutional rights.
Deputy Snelling could not recall whether Zachary had been in handcuffs, but stated
Zachary may have not been handcuffed because he was a juvenile. Zachary was not a
subject of the search warrant, but his mother was a resident of the apartment.
After hearing from Deputy Snelling, the juvenile court addressed whether
Zachary had been detained for questioning or in custody and whether Deputy Snelling's
questions were investigatory or accusatory. The juvenile court denied the motion to
suppress on the ground Deputy Snelling's questions following the sobriety tests were
investigatory rather than accusatory.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
A criminal suspect's statements to police during a custodial interrogation will be
excluded under Miranda if the suspect is not first advised of specific Fifth Amendment
rights. (People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 432; People v. Whitfield (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 947, 953 (Whitfield).) For Miranda to apply, the suspect must be in
"custody," and the questioning must meet the legal definition of "interrogation."
(Whitfield, at p. 953.) "The prosecution has the burden of proving that a custodial
interrogation did not take place." (Ibid.)
"Custody consists of a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest. [Citations.] When there has been no formal
arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have
understood his situation. [Citation.] All the circumstances of the interrogation are
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relevant to this inquiry, including the location, length and form of the interrogation, the
degree to which the investigation was focused on the defendant, and whether any indicia
of arrest were present." (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 394-395.) A child's age
can be relevant to the custody determination for purposes of Miranda warnings. (J.D.B.
v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. ___, ___ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 2402-2403].)
The custody inquiry presents a mixed question of law and fact. (People v. Moore
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395.) The trial court's factual findings regarding the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation are reviewed for substantial evidence and we
independently decide whether, given those circumstances, a reasonable person in minor's
position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave. (Ibid.) " 'Interrogation'
consists of express questioning, or words or actions on the part of the police that 'are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' " (People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 993, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S.
291, 301 (Innis).) " ' "The police may speak to a suspect in custody as long as the speech
would not reasonably be construed as calling for an incriminating response." ' " (People
v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 198.) The determination of whether an action is
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response focuses primarily on the perceptions
of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. (Innis, at p. 301.)
We review the erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda for prejudice under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. (In re Z.A.
(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1422.) Under this standard, reversal is required unless the
People establish that the court's error was " 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' "
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(Ibid.) The appropriate inquiry is whether the verdict actually rendered was " 'surely
unattributable to the error.' " (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 621.)
II. Analysis
Zachary asserts he was in custody when Deputy Snelling asked him if he had
recently used marijuana or methamphetamine and that the question was intended to elicit
an incriminating statement. Because the question was asked prior to Miranda warnings,
he contends that his statements should have been suppressed. We agree and find the error
was not harmless.
A. A Custodial Interrogation Occurred
As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether the juvenile court found Zachary
was in custody or had merely been detained. Miranda does not come into play unless a
custodial interrogation has occurred. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.)
Thus, if the custody prong is not satisfied, the court need not address the interrogation
prong. Here, the juvenile court addressed the interrogation issue, finding no interrogation
occurred because Deputy Snelling's questions were investigatory in nature. Accordingly,
the juvenile court necessarily found that Zachary had been in custody. After our
independent review, we agree.
While executing a search warrant on a residence the police may detain the
occupants to prevent flight, minimize the risk of harm to the officers, facilitate orderly
completion of the search and determine the relationship of an individual to the premises.
(Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 702-703, 705; People v. Glaser (1995) 11
Cal.4th 354, 365.) Here, Zachary had been detained with a number of other people to
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allow officers to execute a search warrant. While Zachary's mother lived at the
apartment, it is unknown whether she was one of the individuals detained. During that
detention, Deputy Snelling observed Zachary and, based on those observations, believed
Zachary might be under the influence of methamphetamine.
Deputy Snelling then moved Zachary away from the adults to perform sobriety
tests. During this time, Deputy Snelling was presumably in full uniform and carrying a
weapon. It is unknown whether Deputy Snelling touched Zachary or what tone of voice
he used. It appears Deputy Snelling never told Zachary that he was free to leave and was
not obligated to answer questions. Rather, Deputy Snelling testified that the people
detained outside were not free to leave; thus, Zachary was presumably not free to leave
after being singled out by Deputy Snelling. Isolating a suspect is considered to be a
common interrogation technique. (In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568, 579.)
There is nothing in the record suggesting Zachary was particularly sophisticated or
whether he had any prior confrontations with the police.
In our view, a reasonable 15 year old in Zachary's position would not have felt free
to leave or refuse to answer questions. Under these circumstances, Zachary was in
custody for Miranda purposes.
Additionally, based on Deputy Snelling's observations of Zachary and his
subjective belief that Zachary was under the influence of a stimulant, Deputy Snelling
should have known it was reasonably likely Zachary would provide an incriminating
response when he asked Zachary about recent marijuana or methamphetamine use.
Significantly, the question was highly relevant to Zachary's subsequent arrest for
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unlawfully using or being under the influence of methamphetamine. The relationship of
the question asked to the crime suspected is highly relevant to whether an interrogation
occurred. (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 637.) Thus, under the controlling test,
the question was interrogation. We conclude the juvenile court erred in finding that
Zachary had not been interrogated.
C. Prejudice
As we shall explain, the admission of Zachary's statements taken in violation of
Miranda was not harmless.
At trial, Deputy Snelling testified that Zachary's enlarged pupils, rapid heart rate
and test results suggested Zachary was under the influence of a central nervous system
stimulant. After observing Zachary's physical symptoms, Deputy Snelling asked Zachary
whether he had recently used marijuana. Zachary admitted smoking marijuana the night
before. Deputy Snelling also asked Zachary whether he had ingested methamphetamine,
which Zachary denied. In response, Deputy Snelling asked, "this is what I'm seeing
going on with you physically . . . Is that what you really want to tell me?" Zachary then
admitted that he smoked methamphetamine "a few hours prior to [their] contact." Deputy
Snelling arrested Zachary for being under the influence of methamphetamine, but did not
obtain a blood or urine sample for a toxicology analysis.
The prosecution asked its expert a lengthy and compound hypothetical reciting
Deputy Snelling's observations and field sobriety test results and asked for an expert
opinion as to whether or not the subject had ingested methamphetamine recently or was
under the influence of methamphetamine. The prosecution expert responded
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affirmatively, but also acknowledged that a neurological problem, ingestion of an energy
drink, personal issues such as attention deficit disorder and "things like that" could mimic
or duplicate the symptoms described in the prosecution's hypothetical. The prosecution
expert believed this case was the first time he had been called upon to render an opinion
without any toxicology results. He agreed that Deputy Snelling had not determined
whether or not Zachary was taking any medication or was ill.
A defense expert testified that physical signs and symptoms can be consistent with
intoxication with a substance, but that a toxicology screen is necessary to determine that
the substance used was illegal because many over-the-counter substances can produce the
same physical findings. The defense expert stated that it could not be determined
whether a person was or was not under the influence of methamphetamine without a
laboratory test.
Based on this testimony, the juvenile court found the evidence insufficient to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Zachary had been under the influence of an illegal
substance. The juvenile court then addressed the issue of whether or not Zachary used a
controlled substance within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11550,
subdivision (a). In finding this allegation true, the juvenile court relied upon the
testimony of Deputy Snelling, the prosecution expert and Zachary's statement as proof
that Zachary had used a controlled substance.
Without Zachary's confession that he had recently used methamphetamine, the
testimony of Deputy Snelling and the prosecution expert would have been insufficient to
prove Zachary had indeed used methamphetamine versus a noncontrolled substance that
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mimicked the effects of methamphetamine. The prosecution expert testified that personal
issues or a noncontrolled substance could duplicate the symptoms described in the
prosecution's hypothetical. Deputy Snelling, however, never determined whether
Zachary was taking any medication or was ill. Accordingly, we conclude that the true
finding rendered in this case was attributable to the erroneous admission of Zachary's
statements taken in violation of Miranda and reverse.
DISPOSITION
The true finding is reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with
directions to dismiss the underlying petition.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
NARES, J.
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AI Brief
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Holding. The court held that the juvenile was subjected to a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings and that the admission of his resulting statements was not harmless error, necessitating reversal.
Issues
Whether a 15-year-old was in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned by police during a search warrant execution.
Whether police questioning regarding drug use constituted an interrogation likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Whether the erroneous admission of the juvenile's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“In our view, a reasonable 15 year old in Zachary's position would not have felt free to leave or refuse to answer questions. Under these circumstances, Zachary was in custody for Miranda purposes.”
“We conclude that the true finding rendered in this case was attributable to the erroneous admission of Zachary's statements taken in violation of Miranda and reverse.”