DeMichael-Lucas v. Nelson CA4/2 (2016) · DecisionDepot
DeMichael-Lucas v. Nelson CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jan 12, 2016 No. E061578Unpublished
Filed 1/12/16 DeMichael-Lucas v. Nelson CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
LAUREL DEMICHAEL-LUCAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E061578
v. (Super.Ct.No. MCC1301863)
STACY L. NELSON et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Gloria Trask, Judge.
Affirmed.
Laurel DeMichael-Lucas, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Freeman, Freeman & Smiley, John P. Godsil and Tracy R. Mattie-Daub for
Defendants and Respondents.
I
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Laurel DeMichael-Lucas appeals from a judgment entered
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after the trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)1 brought
by defendants and respondents Stacy Nelson and Steven Nelson. The dispute between
the parties involves the ownership of residential real property in Temecula, formerly
owned by Laurel’s husband, Hendrick Lucas,2 as his sole property. After the property
subdivision (b), are “‘equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.’” (Briggs, at p.
1115.) Both SLAPP protection and the litigation privilege apply to statements made in
connection with pending litigation. (A.F. Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino
Electric Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1128; Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39
Cal.4th 299, 322.)
Each of Laurel’s causes of action against the Nelsons arise from statements or
communications that Laurel alleges the Nelsons made in connection with their purchase
of the Temecula property in 2011 and Hendrick’s 2012 lawsuit against them. Although
the complaint is 99 pages and includes 140 pages of exhibits, it makes some specific
allegations about the Nelsons and their purported conduct, not against Laurel, but against
Hendrick: “NELSONS knowingly decided to go against Plaintiff’s attempts to keep his
home, and committed acts in conjunction with their fellow co-conspirators to make a
concerted effort to cover up and conceal Plaintiff’s factual evidence to make certain that
Plaintiff’s case and the extensive fraud involved, is not heard by the Court, Plaintiff
discovered that his case was dismissed only due to Lack of Standing NOT A HEARING
ON THE MERITS. . . . Defendants and/or Co-Conspirators have taken advantage of
Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the law and inexperience, first when the Lis Pendens was
expunged (by Plaintiff’s procedural mistake), and then by attempting to convince
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Plaintiff that his case has already been decided on ‘the merits’ instead of ‘Standing’ is
another act of FRAUD which all the perpetrators seem to have no fear of the
consequences.” Other similar allegations are present throughout the complaint.
The litigation privilege “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to
achieve the objects of litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to
the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) The litigation privilege “is
intended to encourage parties to feel free to exercise their fundamental right to resort to
the courts for assistance in the resolution of their disputes, without being chilled from
exercising this right by the fear that they may subsequently be sued in a derivative tort
action arising out of something said or done in the context of the litigation.” (Aronson v.
Kinsella (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 254, 262.)
Laurel’s claims are against the Nelsons because they recorded documents showing
they were owners of the property and because they successfully defended themselves in
Hendrick’s 2012 lawsuit. Therefore, the Nelsons’ actions are privileged statements made
in connection with litigation and are protected under the SLAPP statute.
B. Probability of Prevailing
As for the probability of prevailing, the second prong of the SLAPP analysis, an
opposing party is “required both to plead claims that were legally sufficient, and to make
a prima facie showing, by admissible evidence, of facts that would merit favorable
judgment on those claims, assuming plaintiff’s evidence were credited.” (1-800
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Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568, 584.) Laurel cannot make the
required showing because all of her claims fail on the grounds that: (1) she lacks
standing to assert Hendrick’s claims; (2) res judicata bars her claims; (3) her claims arise
from privileged actions; and (4) she has failed to state a viable claim against the Nelsons
in her complaint and she cannot amend the complaint.
Laurel lacks standing because she never had an interest in the property which was
owned by Hendrick as “his Sole and Separate Property.” Except as otherwise provided
by statute, “[e]very action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest, . . .” (§ 367.) The real party in interest is the person who holds title to the claim
or property involved, as opposed to one who may be interested or benefitted from the
litigation. (Gantman v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1566.) The
purpose of the real party in interest requirement is “to save a defendant, against whom a
judgment may be obtained, from further harassment or vexation at the hands of other
claimants to the same demand.” (Giselman v. Starr (1895) 106 Cal. 651, 657; O’Flaherty
v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1062.)
Laurel bases her claim on an unrecorded assignment of the WAMU trust deed,
executed in August 2013, long after the foreclosure sale in November 2010 and after the
Nelsons purchased the property in December 2011 free of any other liens. (§ 726; Civ.
Code, § 2910; Dover Mobile Estates v. Fiber Form Products, Inc. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
1494, 1498, citing Carpenter v. Smallpage (1934) 220 Cal. 129, 133; Ralph C. Sutro Co.
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v. Paramount Plastering, Inc. (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 433, 437-438.) Laurel has no
standing related to the property or the WAMU trust deed.
Additionally, res judicata defeats Laurel’s effort to state a claim. The doctrine of
res judicata “rests upon the ground that the party to be affected . . . has litigated, or had an
opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and
vexation of his opponent. Public policy and the interest of the litigants alike require that
there be an end to litigation.” (Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d
636, 637.)
In each of his three previous lawsuits, Hendrick sought to set aside the trustee’s
sale and to regain possession of the property. The issues decided in the earlier lawsuit
were the same as those presented here and resulted in final judgments on the merits.
(Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 321, 323; Goddard v. Security
Title Ins. & Guarantee Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 52.) Laurel is in privity with her
husband, Hendrick. (Mueller v. J. C. Penney Co. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 713, 723.) Res
judicata bars Laurel’s effort to relitigate the same matters. (Fairchild v. Bank of America
(1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 477, 482.)
Finally, we hold there is no viability to any of Laurel’s claims because Laurel
never owned the property and because all her claims are predicated on the alleged
“wrongful” foreclosure of the property, which the trial courts have repeatedly held was
not wrongful. The Nelsons purchased the property in 2011 from L & L Enterprises more
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than a year after the legal trustee’s sale in 2010. As already discussed, the Nelsons’
actions are also protected by the litigation privilege.
IV
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. In light of our conclusions, we do not need to discuss
any additional issues raised by Laurel. The Nelsons are entitled as prevailing parties to
recover their costs and attorney’s fees on appeal. (Lucky United Properties Investment,
Inc. v. Lee (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 125, 138-139.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
KING J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff's complaint was subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because it arose from the defendants' protected petitioning activity and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her claims due to lack of standing, the application of res judicata, and the litigation privilege.
Issues
Whether the plaintiff's complaint arose from the defendants' exercise of their right to petition or free speech under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Whether the plaintiff demonstrated a probability of prevailing on her claims to defeat the anti-SLAPP motion.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court further found that Laurel had no probability of succeeding on any of her claims because she had no ownership in the property and no standing.”
“The Nelsons’ actions are privileged statements made in connection with litigation and are protected under the SLAPP statute.”