Stearn v. County of San Bernardino CA4/2 (2016) · DecisionDepot
Stearn v. County of San Bernardino CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jan 6, 2016 No. E060417Unpublished
Filed 1/6/16 Stearn v. County of San Bernardino CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
FREDERIC ELTON STEARN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, E060417
v. (Super.Ct.No. SCVSS142797)
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent;
GENERAL OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Brian S.
McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.
Sabine & Morrison, Randal R. Morrison for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
Gary S. Mobley for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
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Law Office of Pamela Lawton Wilson and Pamela Lawton Wilson; Rogers
Towers, William D. Brinton for Scenic America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Plaintiff Frederic Stearn (Stearn) opposed rezoning by the San Bernardino County
Board of Supervisors (County), of certain remote desert property along the Interstate 15
and 40 freeways, and granting General Outdoor Advertising’s (Outdoor) applications for
conditional use permits (CUPs) to erect billboards along those highways. Stearn filed an
action in the superior court alleging several causes of action, including a cause of action
for administrative mandamus to invalidate the billboard approvals, and a cause of action
for declaratory and injunctive relief, to declare the billboards illegal structures and to
force their removal. The trial court denied the petition for mandate, then granted
Outdoor’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the declaratory and injunctive
relief causes of action, and denied plaintiff’s motions for discovery and for summary
judgment. Plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously denied the petition for
writ of administrative mandamus, the cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief,
and plaintiff’s motion for discovery.1 We affirm.
1 In his reply brief, plaintiff asserted that the County had defaulted by failing to file a timely brief. However, Outdoor agreed to defend, indemnify, and hold the County harmless against any claim, action, or proceeding filed against the County to attack, set aside, void, or annul all or any part of the Project or related development approvals.
2
BACKGROUND
Beginning in 1999, Outdoor applied for rezoning and CUPs to erect 20 signs along
Interstate 15 and Interstate 40. After thorough evaluation of Outdoor’s submissions, it
was determined that six of the proposed signs did not meet criteria under both the County
Development Code and the Business and Professions Code, so Outdoor withdrew those
applications. The relevant codes require that billboards be located with 1,000 feet of an
established commercial use, and there must be 750 feet between signs.
Because the county’s Development Code only allows billboards on two land use
districts—General Commercial and Highway Commercial—Outdoor’s project included
proposed general plan amendments to rezone the properties for use as Highway
Commercial. The county notified 77 property owners, and received three letters in
opposition to the project, all of which expressed concern about the aesthetic impacts of
the project and potential violation of the Highway Beautification Act.
Outdoor, with input from the affected communities, formulated an Income Sharing
Program, by which it would dedicate a portion of the profits generated by the billboards
directly to the communities. Outdoor also agreed that the billboards would not contain
any sexually explicit copy, and would not be used to advertise brands of alcoholic
beverages, or tobacco products. Outdoor also agreed that four of the billboard faces
would be reserved to promote the communities and their services for free for three years.
Outdoor then circulated a petition which garnered support from the community in support
of the project. In the meantime, three independent studies were undertaken pursuant to
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), which determined that the project
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would not have any adverse impacts that would remain potentially significant with
appropriate mitigation measures.
On September 28, 2006, the planning commission issued a notice of determination
on Outdoor’s proposed project. The notice indicated that the county had determined the
project will not have a significant effect on the environment, a negative declaration had
been prepared for the project pursuant to CEQA, mitigation measures had been made a
condition of approval, and that the findings were made pursuant to CEQA.
The planning commission found that the general plan amendment was in the
public interest, that there would be a community benefit, and other existing and permitted
uses would not be compromised because the proposed change to Highway Commercial
allows for commercial opportunities in areas currently lacking such development. It
further found that the general plan land use district amendment was consistent with the
goals and policies of the general plan by providing a harmonious arrangement of land
uses that would generate sufficient tax revenues, encouraged balanced commercial
developments that were capable of strengthening the local economy, and provided
suitable locations for retail and service commercial establishments intended to meet the
daily convenience needs of the traveling public.
The commission recommended that the County adopt the mitigated negative
declaration and the general plan amendment, approve the CUPs and file the notice of
determination. Public hearings were conducted, and testimony was adduced. Plaintiff
and two others opposed the project, but there were several witnesses in favor of the
proposal. In addition to in person testimony, there was substantial correspondence from
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the affected communities, with three letters in opposition, in addition to plaintiff’s own
opposition, countered by overwhelming support for the project from the Newberry
Springs Community Services District, Property Owner’s Association, Property Owners’
Board of Directors, the Chamber of Commerce, Fire Department, Senior Services
Association, Southern California Fish Farmers Association, Silver Valley Gun Club, and
Daggett Community Services District, in addition to 520 individual signatures on a
petition supporting the project.
At the conclusion of the public hearing relating to the project, the commission
voted unanimously to approve it. The County conditionally approved the project on
September 12, 2006, to be effective on October 12, 2006. If the conditions were not
completed, and the use of the land had not taken place within 36 months of the date of the
conditional approval, the CUPs would become null and void.
On October 11, 2006, plaintiff filed suit to challenge the CUPs and rezoning
approvals, alleging causes of action declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and violation of
the Outdoor Advertising Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 5200, et seq.; Stearn v. County of
San Bernardino (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434, 438.2) Plaintiff amended the complaint
adding causes of action for traditional mandate and administrative mandamus. (Stearn v.
County of San Bernardino, supra, at p. 438.) On March 15, 2007, the court sustained
Outdoor’s demurrer to the first three causes of action (declaratory relief, injunctive relief,
and traditional mandate) on the ground that the land use decisions of a governmental
2We refer to our previous opinion for relevant procedural information not otherwise found in the appellate record.
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agency can only be reviewed by administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure, section 1094.5. (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino, at p. 439.) The trial
court also dismissed the fourth cause of action for administrative mandate on the ground
it was barred by the 21-day statute of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.8. (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino, at p. 439.)
Plaintiff appealed, and this court reversed the dismissal of the fourth cause of
action for administrative mandate on January 5, 2009, concluding that the expedited
review provided by statute was available only when the license applicant or the issuing
public agency filed an action challenging the grant or denial of a license for expressive
conduct, not when a third party such as the property owner did so. (Stearn v. County of
San Bernardino, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 442-443.) In the meantime, the California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans) granted billboard permits to Outdoor.
On remand, plaintiff sought leave to file a second amended complaint asserting
additional claims in light of the Court of Appeal’s decision, which was granted on June 6,
2011. Plaintiff no longer asserted the first cause of action for declaratory relief, the
second cause of action for injunctive relief, or the third cause of action for traditional
mandate. However, plaintiff added an amended fourth cause of action for administrative
mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, to invalidate the billboard
approvals, and added a fifth cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, to
compel removal of the billboards as illegal structures.
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In addition, plaintiff filed a motion for order allowing discovery and for judicial
notice of the court’s own files. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for discovery, but
did agree to take judicial notice of documents in the court file.
On May 24, 2013, the court heard arguments on the petition for writ of
administrative mandate. On June 18, 2013, the trial court denied the petition finding that
the administrative record convinced it that the agency’s actions were part of a
comprehensive zoning amendment, and did not constitute “phony zoning” to provide for
outdoor advertising.
On August 26, 2013, Outdoor filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to
the fifth cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The same day, plaintiff
filed a motion for summary judgment as to the same cause of action. On October 21,
2013, the court granted Outdoor’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground
that when the mandamus claim was decided, the case was over. On that same date, the
court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the moving party failed to
comply with Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c, subdivision (b).
Plaintiff appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Mandate Was Properly Denied Where There Is Substantial Evidence to Support the Agency Decision, Rendering Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Moot.
Plaintiff argues that the rezoning action violated the California Outdoor
Advertising Act, Business and Professions Code, section 5200 et seq. and the Federal
Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. section 131. Pointing to a declaration submitted
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in support of his motion for summary judgment in which an individual expressed the
view that the billboards, which were installed after the relevant planning board decision,
were illegal, he asserts the County’s action amounted to a wholesale rezoning of pristine
desert, and “phony zoning” for billboard purposes. We disagree.
The exclusive remedy for judicial review of administrative action affecting land
use is a proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5. (SP Star Enterprises,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 459, 469.) A trial court may issue a
writ of administrative mandate where an agency has (1) acted in excess of its jurisdiction;
(2) deprived the petitioner of a fair hearing; or (3) committed a prejudicial abuse of
discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) Abuse of discretion is established if
the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law, the order or decision is not
supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ.
On appeal, we review the administrative decision to determine if it is supported by
substantial evidence. (SP Star Enterprises v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th
at p. 469; Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1525-
1526.) Under the substantial evidence test, the agency’s findings are presumed to be
supported by the administrative record and that the appellant challenging them has the
burden to show they are not. (SP Star Enterprises, supra; JKH Enterprises, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1062.) We resolve all
evidentiary conflicts in the agency’s favor and indulge all legitimate and reasonable
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inferences to uphold the agency’s finding. (Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of
Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1114.)
This court’s task is not to weigh conflicting evidence to determine who had the
better argument, or whether an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more
reasonable. (Berkeley Hillside Preservation, supra, 60 Cal. 4th at pp. 1114-1115, citing
Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of the University of California (1988) 47
Cal.3d 376, 393.) When more than one inference can be reasonably deduced from the
facts, we cannot substitute our deductions for those of the superior court. (SP Star
Enterprises, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.)
Regarding plaintiff’s claim that the County’s action violated the Outdoor
Advertising Act, Business and Professions Code, section 5350, prohibits the placement of
any billboard within the areas affected by the Act, without first securing a permit from
Caltrans. (Traverso ex rel. Dept. of Transp. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204.)
CalTrans is the designated state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the
Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 5250, 5254.) An advertising display erected in compliance
with state laws and local ordinances at the time of their erection are lawfully erected.
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5216.1; West Washington Properties v. Dept. of Transp. (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1144.) The existence of a Caltrans permit thus creates a
rebuttable presumption that the billboards were lawful. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5216.1.)
The lack of permits may rebut the presumption of lawful erection if Caltrans establishes a
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permit was required for the display and none was sought or issued.3 (West Washington
Properties, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)
In the present case, a permit was issued by Caltrans, raising the presumption that
the erection of the billboards was in compliance with state law and local ordinances. This
compels the conclusion that the billboards did not violate the 23 U.S.C., section 131, the
Highway Beautification Act, in the absence of affirmative evidence to rebut that
presumption. (Evid. Code, §§ 604, 606.) Subdivision (a) of that section expresses
congressional purpose that the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs in
areas adjacent to the interstate system of highways promote the safety and recreational
value of public travel, and preserve natural beauty.
In ruling on plaintiff’s administrative mandate petition, the trial court found
substantial evidence supported the agency decision, and that plaintiff’s argument that the
rezoning was contrary to law was not supported by the record. The trial court’s ruling
was based on the agency findings that the action allowed for commercial opportunities in
areas currently lacking such development, it promoted the general plan by providing a
harmonious arrangement of land uses that would generate sufficient tax revenues,
3 As Gene K. Fong, Division Administrator for the U.S. Department of Transportation, advised plaintiff by letter dated April 13, 2006, if the County rezoned the areas in question after consideration of the public hearing proceedings and take other actions to provide local permits for billboards, applications for sign permits would need to be submitted to Caltrans for consideration. “Should the State determine that the intent of the rezoning was to circumvent the COAA [California Outdoor Advertising Act] and HBA [Highway Beautification Act] for the purposes of erecting outdoor advertising signs in controlled areas, the State should deny the application consistent with 23 CFR 750.708(b).” In other words, CalTrans review is considered as a second layer of review.
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encouraged balanced commercial developments that were capable of strengthening the
local economy, and provided suitable locations for retail and service commercial
establishments intended to meet the daily convenience needs of the traveling public.
Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence to contradict or undermine these findings
and thus has not demonstrated that the action of the planning commission and the County
in adopting the general plan amendment to rezone the affected property as Highway
Commercial is not supported by substantial evidence.
We now turn to the Highway Beautification Act claim. Subdivision (d) of section
131 provides that “[t]he States shall have full authority under their own zoning laws to
zone areas for commercial or industrial purposes, and the actions of the States in this
regard will be accepted for the purposes of this Act. Whenever a bona fide State, county,
or local zoning authority has made a determination of customary use, such determination
will be accepted in lieu of controls by agreement in the zoned commercial and industrial
areas within the geographical jurisdiction of such authority.” The Highway
Beautification Act clearly contemplates that the states will achieve compliance through
their inherent powers of zoning and condemnation. (23 U.S.C. § 131(d)-(g).)
California complies with the Highway Beautification Act through its Outdoor
Advertising Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §5200 et seq.) This act explicitly recognizes that
outdoor advertising is a legitimate commercial use of property adjacent to roads and
highways and provides that such advertising “should be allowed to exist in business
areas.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, §5226, subd. (b); People ex rel. Dep’t of Transportation v.
Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co.(1985) 38 Cal.3d 509, 516.) The act then provides for
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restrictions upon outdoor advertising pursuant to the Highway Beautification Act.
(People ex rel. Dep’t of Transportation v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co., supra.)
At oral argument, plaintiff and amicus argued that the rezoning and CUPs violated
federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the Highway Beautification Act. (23 CFR
§750.708(b).) That regulation acknowledges that signs may be erected and maintained
within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way within areas zoned industrial or
commercial under authority of State law (23 CFR §750.708(a)), but provides that action
which is not part of comprehensive zoning and is created primarily to permit outdoor
advertising structures is not recognized as zoning for outdoor advertising control
purposes. (23 CFR § 750.708(b).) Based on this regulation, and the fact that Outdoor
initiated the zoning action by seeking permits for billboards, plaintiff concludes the sole
purpose of the zoning action by the County was to permit billboards in violation of the
Highway Beautification Act.
This is not necessarily so. We agree that site approval and “spot zoning,” granted
solely to permit billboards, run afoul of federal regulations, because the zoning must have
Agency (1988) 44 Cal.3d 242, 248 (United Outdoor).) However, area zoned for
commercial or industrial use in a city or town need not actually have commercial
development on it to satisfy the statutory definition of “commercial or industrial zone.”
(Kunz & Co. v. State (UT Ct.App., 1996) 913 P.2d 765, 768 (Kunz I); see also, Kunz &
Co. v. State (UT Ct.App. 1997) 949 P.2d 763, 767 (Kunz II).) The primary purpose for
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which zoning is accomplished is the critical factor and determining such purpose is a fact
issue to be resolved by the trier of fact. (Kunz I, at p. 768; Kunz II, at p. 767.)
Here, notwithstanding plaintiff’s opposition to the rezoning action, no evidence
was presented to support the assertion that the primary purpose of the rezoning was to
accommodate the erection of billboards. To the contrary, in addition to the CUP to
Outdoor, the planning commission approved CUPs to an existing antique store and an
existing impound yard, so as to permit those commercial activities to continue in areas
then lacking appropriate designation. Subsequently, CalTrans granted permits, finding
no violation of the Code.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any of these findings lack evidentiary support.
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues the County’s action resulted in “wholesale rezoning of
pristine desert to allow billboards.” Plaintiff and amicus curiae rely heavily on the
holding of United Outdoor, supra, 44 Cal.3d 242. In that case, the plaintiff advertiser
sought and obtained “site approval” to erect billboards in an area zoned for “Desert
Living.” The California Supreme Court reversed an order granting plaintiff’s mandamus
petition for issuance of permits to erect the billboards because the parcels affected were
not in an area “zoned . . . [primarily] to permit commercial or industrial activities” within
the meaning of Business and Professions Code, section 5205. (Id., at pp. 249-250.)
At oral argument, both plaintiff and amicus curiae acknowledged that United
Outdoor did not involve a zoning question. Instead, the plaintiff in United Outdoor
circumvented the designated zoning issue by applying for “site approval,” which the
Supreme Court concluded was “no substitute for the deliberate implementation of the
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general plan, following community input, that zoning by the legislative branch of a local
government represents.” (United Outdoor, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 250.)
Here, the local government adopted a general plan, and the County determined
that the proposed rezoning of the affected parcels would promote that plan. The holding
of United Outdoor is therefore inapposite to this case. The entire record shows there was
no “phony” or “sham” zoning. Instead, the County determined that rezoning would
promote commercial development in underserved areas of the county. While Outdoor
sought the zone change to allow for billboards, that was not the County’s primary
purpose in approving it.
We have independently reviewed the administrative record and have determined
that the County’s findings supporting the adoption of the zoning amendment to the
general plan and issuance of the CUPs were supported by substantial evidence. The fact
that plaintiff and others disagreed with the findings and determinations does not
demonstrate a lack of sufficient evidence. Under the substantial evidence test, we do not
reweigh the evidence. (Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1328.) Disagreement with other agencies, or among
individuals, or even among experts, does not constitute grounds for reversal for
insufficient evidence. (Save Cuyama Valley v. County of Santa Barbara (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 1059, 1069; California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cordova
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603, 626.)
The planning commission recommended that the County adopt the general plan
amendment, approve the CUPs, and approve the tentative parcel map with a major
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variance. The County adopted the recommendations when it approved the project on
September 12, 2006. In approving the project, the County determined that (1) the project
will not have a significant effect on the environment; (2) a negative declaration was
prepared for the project pursuant to the provisions of CEQA; (3) mitigation measures
were made a condition of the approval of the project; (4) a statement of overriding
considerations was not adopted for this project; and (5) findings were made pursuant to
the provisions of CEQA.
The amendment to the general plan and CUPs also resolves all questions relating
to whether the billboards and their locations were lawful, because the amended general
plan permitted the approved billboards. As a consequence, the trial court determined that
the resolution of the administrative mandate petition ended the action. We agree with the
lower court’s conclusion. As such, the fifth cause of action for declaratory relief (seeking
a judicial declaration that any billboards were illegal structures) and injunctive relief
(seeking mandatory removal of the billboards), was rendered moot.
There is substantial evidence to support the judgment on the administrative
mandate and declaratory/injunctive relief causes of action.
2. Plaintiff Was Not Entitled to Discovery
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court wrongfully denied discovery. We disagree.
In an action for administrative mandamus, an order compelling discovery must
rest upon a showing such discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to evidence
admissible under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (e). This section
limits the admission of evidence in addition to the administrative record to relevant
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evidence, which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced or
which was improperly excluded at the hearing. (See Fairfield v. Superior Court of
Solano County (1975) 14 Cal.3d 768, 774-775.)
An administrative mandamus action reviews the administrative record which
should contain all evidence the parties consider necessary to the resolution of the
contested issues. (Fairfield v. Superior Court of Solano County, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p.
774, fn. 6.) Because Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (e) limits the
admission of evidence in administrative mandamus proceedings, it necessarily restricts
the scope of discovery in such actions. (Stardust Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of San
Buenaventura (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1190.)
Discovery statutes vest wide discretion in the trial court, and the exercise of that
discretion will be disturbed only when it can be said there has been an abuse of
discretion. (Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 74, 117.) Under the
abuse of discretion standard, the trial court’s ruling will be sustained on review unless it
falls outside the bounds of reason. (Ibid.; see also, Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 876, 881.)
Before filing his second amended complaint, plaintiff filed the motion for
discovery on the ground it was warranted to reach the potential issue of agency
misconduct in rezoning the areas in question, and in granting the CUPs, related to its
intended inclusion of causes of action for declaratory relief and injunctive relief. The
precise matters sought to be discovered were whether the County—and one supervisor in
particular—illegally issued CUPs.
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However, the second amended complaint alleges that the particular supervisor
engaged in wrongdoing in his capacity as county assessor, a position to which he was
allegedly elected in 2006. It did not allege he engaged in misconduct while serving on
the board of supervisors, and did not allege any other supervisor was engaged in
misconduct in issuing CUPs. Further, none of the members of the board of supervisors
were named, so there is no showing that the particular supervisor was in any way
involved in the decision, or that any improper activity led to the board’s decision.
Finally, the County was unanimous in approving the zoning amendments and
issuing the CUPs. Under no theory would discovery of one supervisor’s corrupt
activities, while he was not serving on the board of supervisors, be calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. There was no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent General Outdoor Advertising is entitled to
costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
KING J.
CODRINGTON J.
17
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the County's rezoning and issuance of conditional use permits were supported by substantial evidence and did not constitute improper "spot zoning," rendering the plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery, as the plaintiff failed to show the requested discovery would lead to admissible evidence.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in denying the petition for writ of administrative mandamus regarding the County's rezoning and billboard approvals.
Whether the trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings as to the causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for discovery.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The entire record shows there was no “phony” or “sham” zoning. Instead, the County determined that rezoning would promote commercial development in underserved areas of the county.”
“We have independently reviewed the administrative record and have determined that the County’s findings supporting the adoption of the zoning amendment to the general plan and issuance of the CUPs were supported by substantial evidence.”
“The amendment to the general plan and CUPs also resolves all questions relating to whether the billboards and their locations were lawful, because the amended general plan permitted the approved billboards.”