First-Citizens Bank & Trust v. North County Church of Christ CA4/1 (2015) · DecisionDepot
First-Citizens Bank & Trust v. North County Church of Christ CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Dec 29, 2015 No. D065167Unpublished
Filed 12/29/15 First-Citizens Bank & Trust v. North County Church of Christ CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST-CITIZENS BANK & TRUST D065167 COMPANY,
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant (Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00050771- CU-OR-NC) v.
NORTH COUNTY CHURCH OF CHRIST,
Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Earl H.
Maas III, Judge. Reversed.
Anderson Hilbert & Parker, John Forest Hilbert, Jeffrey N. Garland and Whitney
R. Blackhurst; Garrett & Tully, Ryan Christopher Squire and Zi Chao Lin, for Plaintiff
and Appellant First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company.
Schwartz Semerdjian Ballard & Cauley, James Ballard and Kevin T. Cauley;
Schwartz Semerdjian Cauley & Moot and Kevin T. Cauley; Higgs, Fletcher & Mack,
John Morris and Victoria Fuller, for Defendant and Appellant North County Church of
Christ.
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company (First-Citizens) sued North County Church
of Christ (Church), seeking to establish the validity of a deed of trust on the Church's
property securing a loan issued by Temecula Valley Bank (TVB). First-Citizens
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Sav., F.S.B. (3d Cir. 1994) 28 F.3d 376, 392-394
(National Union).) "However, a court must look beyond the nomenclature of a request
for relief to ascertain whether it is a true affirmative defense or is, in actuality" a
counterclaim. (American First, supra, at p. 1264.) "Whether a request for relief is titled
an affirmative defense or a counterclaim is not dispositive to the question of subject
matter jurisdiction." (Ibid.) "Courts should not allow parties to avoid the procedural bar
of [section] 1821(d)(13)(D) by simply labelling what is actually a counterclaim as a
defense or affirmative defense." (National Union, supra, 28 F.3d at p. 394.) The
administrative exhaustion requirement applies if "the remedy sought by a party,
16
regardless of its label, . . . is in reality a claim against the assets or actions of the failed
institution . . . ." (American First, supra, at pp. 1264-1265.)
There is no bright-line rule for distinguishing between a counterclaim for which
the FIRREA exhaustion requirement applies and an affirmative defense for which the
requirement does not apply. And the cases have not always been consistent. But on our
review of the federal and state decisions and our consideration of the congressional intent
underlying the rule, we are satisfied the proper focus of the analysis is to determine
whether the party asserting an "affirmative defense" had an independent basis for
bringing the claim in the administrative arena. If so, the claim is barred if the party did
not exhaust administrative remedies. (See Rundgren, supra, 760 F.3d at pp. 1063-1064;
Midwest Federal, supra, 36 F.3d at p. 793 [party may successfully assert affirmative
defenses without exhausting FIRREA administrative procedures if the party "had no
[prior] independent basis for filing a claim against" the receiver]; Resolution Trust Corp.
v. Schonacher (D.Kan. 1994) 844 F.Supp. 689, 694; FDIC v. Martini (D.Md. 1995) 1995
WL 168139, [5].) This independent-grounds test implements congressional intent to
strictly provide the FDIC with the initial opportunity to assess and resolve all claims
identified in section 1821(d)(13)(D) before the claim may be asserted in the courts, while
ensuring parties retain the right to assert defenses that could not have been foreseen or
effectively brought until an affirmative claim is asserted against the party.
This test was satisfied in this case. The Church's counterclaims and affirmative
defenses were identical. Both sought to remove the encumbrance from the Property
based on TVB's alleged wrongful conduct in approving the loan and in failing to inquire
17
regarding the scope of Winter's authority. The Church could have (and in fact did)
independently assert this challenge before First-Citizens brought its declaratory relief
action. In September 2009, the Board was aware the Property had been transferred to
WCF, and a deed of trust had been placed on the Property securing a $3.8 million credit
line. About one year later, the Church demanded that First-Citizens take action to
reconvey the Deed of Trust to remove it as an encumbrance on the Property, asserting
Winter's lack of authority as a basis for this demand and claiming a right to obtain
affirmative relief.
In later raising this challenge as an affirmative defense, the Church did not seek
merely to prevent the purchasing bank from relying on its security interest because of a
legal or procedural infirmity with the claim. Rather, it affirmatively sought to reduce the
value of the FDIC's former assets (the secured loan) by removing the encumbrance from
the Property. If the Church had first filed its own action alleging the invalidity of the
Deed of Trust and seeking its removal, this claim would clearly be covered by the
administrative exhaustion rule. Likewise, if First-Citizens had dismissed its complaint,
leaving only the Church's cross-complaint to adjudicate, there would be no question but
that the claim would be barred by the rule.
Under FIRREA's language and purpose, the applicability of the exhaustion
requirement in this case does not depend on which party filed the initial pleading. The
Church was required to characterize its allegations as "affirmative defenses" because of
the procedural posture of the case. But this label did not alter the fact that the substance
of the challenges was an independent affirmative claim challenging the actions of the
18
failed institution that functionally could have been resolved in the administrative process,
without First-Citizens first filing a lawsuit. The Church's affirmative defenses were thus
subject to the administrative exhaustion rule under section 1821(d)(13)(D). (See
Rundgren, supra, 760 F.3d at p. 1064;2 LNV Corp. v. Harrison Family Bus., LLC (D.Md.
2015) 2015 WL 5836903, [10] [administrative exhaustion bar applied to affirmative
defenses where "defenses are, in substance, repackaged counterclaims"]; FDIC v. Soliz
(M.D.Fla. 2015) 2015 WL 1138421, [4]-[5]; Centerstate Bank of Florida v. John
Emmons' Taekwondo, Inc. (M.D.Fla. 2015) 2015 WL 310607, [3].)
The circumstances here are distinguishable from the cases relied upon by the
Church. For example, in National Union, supra, 28 F.3d 376, the court found the
administrative exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable to the party's contract rescission
defense, noting that because "a party cannot know what her defense is until she hears the
claim leveled against her, it seems it would be nearly impossible for a party to submit
future hypothetical defenses to the administrative claims procedure . . . ." (Id. at p. 395.)
In this case, the Church's claims were not unknown or dependent on the nature of First-
Citizens' claims. It was the Church that repeatedly and affirmatively sought to remove
the Deed of Trust from its property; its claim regarding TVB's lack of due diligence in
approving the loan was, in substance, an affirmative claim and not an affirmative defense.
2 In Rundgren, the debtors filed the action first, but the crux of the court's reasoning was that labels are not controlling and the debtors' claim seeking to forestall a foreclosure action was not in substance an affirmative defense. (Rundgren, supra, 760 F.3d at pp. 1061-1064.) 19
2. Notice Requirement
The Church contends it was excused from the exhaustion requirement because it
failed to receive adequate notice of the receivership and/or the bar date. We reject this
contention because the lack of notice does not permit a party to avoid the administrative
exhaustion bar. Further, the undisputed facts show the Church had adequate prior notice.
2.a. Applicable Notice Principles
FIRREA requires the FDIC to provide two different kinds of notice. First, the
FDIC must mail a notice to any known creditor shown on the failed institution's books at
the time of the initiation of the receivership. (§ 1821(d)(3)(C)(ii).) Second, the FDIC
must promptly publish notice regarding the receivership and of the bar date.
(§ 1821(d)(3)(B)(i),(ii).)
Despite the importance of these notices, it is settled that the FDIC's failure to
comply with these notice requirements does not excuse a plaintiff from filing a claim
with the FDIC. (McCarthy, supra, 348 F.3d at p. 1081 ["[the Ninth Circuit has] already
held that failure to give notice does not render the [FIRREA] administrative claims
process inapplicable"]; Freeman, supra, 56 F.3d at p. 1402 [FDIC's failure to provide
proper notice " 'does not relieve the claimant of the obligation to exhaust administrative
remedies, because the statute does not provide for a waiver or exception under those
circumstances' "]; Saffer, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1258-1260.)
To avoid the harshness of these rules, FIRREA provides limited relief under
certain narrow circumstances. (§ 1821(d)(5)(C)(ii).) Under the statutory exception, the
FDIC may consider a late claim (one filed after the bar date) if the claimant shows it did
20
not have timely notice of the receivership. (Saffer, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259;
Intercontinental, supra, 45 F.3d at p. 1285.) The absence of notice of the receivership is
the relevant fact; the lack of notice of the bar date is not material. (Saffer, supra, 225
Cal.App.4th at p. 1259; see RTC Mortg. Trust 1994-N2 v. Haith (8th Cir. 1998) 133 F.3d
574, 579.) If the claimant knows of the FDIC's involvement, it must file a timely claim.
(Ibid.) Additionally, the exception applies if the events underlying the claims took place
after the bar date. (See Potter v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (C.D.Cal. 2013) 2013 WL
1912718 (Potter).) This exception focuses solely on the date of the relevant events, and
not on the party's claimed knowledge or lack of knowledge of these events. (Ibid.) The
Potter court explained:
"[R]ecognizing a broad exception for claimants without knowledge of their claims prior to the bar date runs contrary to FIRREA's purpose of empowering the FDIC to expeditiously resolve claims against a failed bank's assets without placing an undue burden on federal district courts. Determining whether a claimant knew or should have known about a claim prior to the bar date is potentially a complex, fact intensive determination. Requiring courts to make this determination would burden both the courts and the FDIC with significant litigation over claims filed after the claims bar date. This result would undermine . . . both the meaningfulness of the statutorily imposed claims bar date and FIRREA's purpose . . . . In contrast, the existing rule—which focuses on whether a claim is based on events taking place after the bar date—is more easily administrable. While it may not always be clear whether a claim arises out of pre-bar date events or post-bar date events, this inquiry is . . . more straightforward than an inquiry complicated by taking into account a plaintiff's knowledge. A rule limited to claims that could not possibly have been filed prior to the bar date is therefore more closely in accord with FIRREA's purpose." (Id. at p. [9].)
Further, even assuming the claimant can establish the applicability of this statutory
exception (§ 1821(d)(5)(C)(ii)), the exception does not excuse the administrative
21
exhaustion requirement—it merely allows a party to file a late claim with the FDIC.
(Saffer, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1260-1261; see Freeman, supra, 56 F.3d at p. 1402
["only statutorily-specified exemption from the strict requirements of the administrative
claims process is provided if 'the claimant did not receive notice of the appointment of the
receiver in time to file . . . [a] claim . . . , and even in that case the only consequence is
that the FDIC 'may' consider a late-filed claim, provided the claim is filed 'in time to
In this case, the FDIC takeover occurred on July 17, 2009. On that date, the
Church was not a known creditor on TVB's books. The Church was a debtor, not a
creditor, and its claim against TVB had not yet been asserted. On these facts, the FDIC
was not required to mail notice of the receivership and bar date to the Church. (See
McCarthy, supra, 348 F.3d at p. 1081.) Likewise, First-Citizens had no duty to notify the
Church of the administrative exhaustion requirement. It is the FDIC and not the
successor entity that is responsible for providing the requisite notice.
The FDIC's bar date for claims against TVB was October 20, 2009. First-Citizens
did not present evidence in the proceedings below that it published the required notices of
this bar date. However, on appeal, First-Citizens requests that we take judicial notice of
this fact.3 We grant this motion. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (h); Saffer, supra,
3 The opposed judicial notice request includes a declaration from an FDIC official authenticating documents showing the FDIC published the receivership notices on 22
225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244, fn. 2 [Court of Appeal granting judicial notice request of
FDIC's published notices of bar date].)
Although reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not
presented to the trial court, an exception may apply in exceptional circumstances if the
matters to be judicially noticed are not reasonably open to dispute, there is a reasonable
basis for the party's failure to submit the evidence below, and there is no prejudice. (See
People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 134-135; People v. Belcher (1974) 11 Cal.3d 91,
94, fn. 2.) These circumstances are present here. Based on the statutory proofs of
publication and the official governmental nature of the documents, the fact these FDIC
notices were published in the three newspapers on the specified dates is not reasonably
open to dispute. (See Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743,
752-753; Saffer, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244, fn. 2; Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting
Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807, fn. 5.) Additionally, the record shows First-
Citizens did not submit these documents during trial because the fact that Church
officials were aware of the FDIC's receivership did not initially appear to be disputed,
and it was only on the last day of trial that one Church Board member retracted his earlier
testimony, creating a potential factual challenge on the notice issue. When First-Citizens'
counsel expressed concern to the court that he might need to introduce further evidence
on this issue after hearing the changed testimony, the court indicated no additional
specific dates in July, August, and September 2009. The notices identify the October 20 bar date and state the failure to file claims by that date "will result in disallowance by the Receiver" and the "disallowance will be final." The documents include statutory proofs of the publications from The Press-Enterprise (Riverside), The San Diego Union-Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times. 23
evidence would be necessary because it was satisfied the Church was aware that the
FDIC had taken over the bank, even if the evidence was disputed on the issue whether the
Church had actual notice of the existence of administrative remedies.
But even assuming this new evidence is not considered, First-Citizens presented
unrefuted evidence that at least two Church officials—Winter and Anderson—had actual
notice of the FDIC's takeover in time to file the claim. Winter testified that in July 2009,
he was handling the banking for the Church and he was aware the FDIC took over TVB,
although he did not know the "exact date." He also testified he was aware that First-
Citizens reopened the bank and took over management of the Church's accounts.
Armstrong (who handled financial matters for the Church) similarly indicated that he
learned of the "bank changeover" at some time "around" September 2009, and that he
learned in an email from Winter that "First-Citizens Bank had taken over through the
FDIC."
On this record, the Church had actual notice of the FDIC's receivership before the
bar date. Notice to an entity is accomplished by providing notice to officers or those in a
management capacity. (Moore v. Phillips (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 702, 709.) To the
extent Winter did not sufficiently convey the notice to other Church members or to the
Board, the Church would possibly have a potential claim against him, but not against
First-Citizens, who was not responsible for the notice. Additionally, the testimony of
Armstrong corroborates that Winter did communicate this notice and therefore confirms
the notice.
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The Church argues that even if it had adequate notice of the FDIC takeover, this
notice was not sufficient to permit it to file a claim because it was unaware of the facts of
Winter's fraud and the Bank's "complicity" with that fraud before the bar date. The
argument does not support an exception to the exhaustion requirement.
First, the court specifically found that "after learning of the transfer and the note
[in September 2009], the [Board members] met, confirmed Winter had permission to
proceed as he had . . ." and that "in the weeks and months following the revelation of the
transfer and encumbrance, the current and/or previous [Church] Elders . . . stated publicly
to the membership that, the transfer had been authorized . . . ." At that point, it was
undisputed the Church officials knew (or had the information in their possession)
regarding what documents were or were not used to authorize this transfer and
encumbrance at the time, and thus were at least on inquiry notice of TVB's actions with
respect to the credit line and Deed of Trust.
More important, even assuming the Church did not learn the full extent of its
claims until after the bar date, this fact does not excuse the administrative exhaustion
requirement under FIRREA. If the events giving rise to the claim occurred before the bar
date and the claimant had notice of the receivership, the bar date remains the deadline
regardless of the knowledge of the claim. (Potter, supra, 2013 WL 1912718.)
Additionally, as explained above, lack of notice may provide a basis for filing a late
action with the FDIC, but does not create jurisdiction in the courts to consider the claims
in the first instance.
25
To the extent the Church argues its due process rights were violated because of the
claimed lack of adequate notice, the courts have rejected similar arguments. First, the
courts have found constructive notice through the publication process is consistent with
due process principles. (Saffer, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259; see Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 317.) Additionally, the courts have
found the statutory scheme includes the necessary due process because it provides a
forum for considering a party's claims, including late claims. The due process
requirement seeks to ensure a party is "given an opportunity for a hearing before [it] is
deprived of any significant property interest . . . ." (Freeman, supra, 56 F.3d at p. 1403,
italics omitted; Feigel v. FDIC (S.D.Cal. 1996) 935 F.Supp. 1090, 1099-1100.) In this
case, the Church had notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the claimed
deprivation. The Church had an opportunity to present its claims to the FDIC, and to
have those claims resolved through the administrative claims process, subject to de novo
judicial review in the district court. The availability of this administrative process (with
judicial review rights) avoids any constitutional infirmity. (See McCarthy, supra, 348
F.3d at p. 1081; Dobbins v. Dobbins (W.D.Okla. 2015) 2015 WL 3952737, [4].)
3. Fraud-Based Claim
As a central theme of its appellate briefing, the Church contends the jurisdictional
rules are inapplicable because they do not apply to "fraud-based" claims. The argument
is without merit.
First, the Church's claim against First-Citizens is not "fraud-based." The Church
did not assert a fraud claim against First-Citizens. Instead, in its cross-complaint, it
26
sought to invalidate the Deed of Trust based on TVB's negligent conduct. The fact that
Winter may have misrepresented facts to the Board about the safety or security of the
proposed investments, or intentionally failed to inform the Board of the transfer and
encumbrance, means (as the court found) that Winter may have engaged in fraudulent
conduct against the Church. But it does not mean the Church has a viable fraud claim
against First-Citizens.
Equally important, there is no authority supporting the Church's contention that the
administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply to a fraud-based claim. FIRREA's
exhaustion requirement applies to any claim or action concerning the assets of a failed
institution for which the FDIC has been appointed receiver. (McCarthy, supra, 348 F.3d
at p. 1081; accord, Westberg v. FDIC (D.C.Cir. 2014) 741 F.3d 1301, 1303.) FIRREA
" 'bars judicial review of any non-exhausted claim, monetary or nonmonetary, which is
"susceptible of resolution through the claims procedure." ' " (Rundgren, supra, 760 F.3d
at p. 1061.)
Under this broad rule, the courts have applied the administrative exhaustion bar to
claims asserting fraud and other forms of intentional misconduct. (See, e.g., Rundgren,
supra, 760 F.3d at pp. 1059, 1064 [administrative exhaustion doctrine barred borrower's
claim challenging enforceability of secured loan agreement and mortgage based on a
failed bank's "deceptive and fraudulent actions to induce them to enter into a loan
agreement"]; Benson, supra, 673 F.3d at pp. 1208-1209; see also Farnik, supra, 707 F.3d
at p. 719.) Further, there is no basis for finding the Church's claims were not susceptible
of resolution through the claims procedure.
27
We also find unpersuasive the Church's contention the FIRREA statutory scheme
is inapplicable because the grant deed transferring the Property from the Church to WCF
was "void." In support of this contention, the Church relies on Langley v. FDIC (1987)
484 U.S. 86, which concerned an interpretation of a different federal statute codifying the
D'Oench Duhme doctrine. (§ 1823(e).) The Langley court held the D'Oench Duhme
doctrine applies to voidable instruments, but not to void documents because the latter
documents have no legal effect. (Langley, at pp. 93-94.) Langley noted that a void
document results from "fraud in the factum—that is, the sort of fraud that procures a
party's signature to an instrument without knowledge of its true nature or contents,"
whereas a document is "voidable" if it results from "fraud in the inducement." (Id. at p.
94.)
California law recognizes a similar distinction between void and voidable
contracts. When a party is unaware he or she has signed a contract and/or did not intend
to enter into a contract, the contract is void. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities
Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 415.) But if the party is induced to sign a contract by fraud,
the contract is voidable, and not void. (Ibid.; Schiavon v. Arnaudo Bros. (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 374, 380.) Likewise, a contract intentionally signed by an agent without
authority to enter into the contract is generally voidable, and not void. (See Streetscenes
v. ITC Entertainment Group, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 233, 242; 3 Witkin, Summary
of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency & Employment, § 139, p. 184; Civ. Code, §§ 2307,
1588; see also Rest. 2d Contracts, § 7; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005)
Contracts, § 2, p. 60.) A voidable contract may be ratified and is not a transaction that
28
lacks legal effect. (See Civ. Code, § 1588; Fergus v. Songer (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th
552, 571.)
Under these principles, the property transfer from the Church to WCF and the
execution of the secured loan documents were at most voidable and not void. The court
found the Church gave Winter the authority to act on its behalf with respect to its
financial affairs, but Winter intentionally abused this authority to accomplish a transfer of
the Church's assets to his own entity. With TVB's assistance, Winter was able to obtain a
secured loan on the Property. The Church Board members later made a deliberate
decision to affirm this transfer based on Winter's false assurances.
These factual findings show wrongful conduct on the part of Winter, and that
Winter may have acted beyond his authority in transferring the Property and obtaining
the secured loan. But they do not support that Winter had no authority to engage in
financial transactions on behalf of the Church or that he did not know what he was
signing. Based on the court's factual findings, the deed transfer was potentially voidable
if the Church had sued Winter or WCF, but the transfer was not a void transaction in the
sense that it had no legal effect. Although the court characterized the transactions as
"void," this legal conclusion was not supported by its factual findings. Thus, even
assuming Langley's void/voidable distinction applies to FIRREA, Langley is inapplicable
because the challenged instruments were voidable, not void.
Because the Church did not exhaust its administrative remedies under section
1821(d), the court had no jurisdiction to consider the Church's claims that Winter's and/or
TVB's conduct established the invalidity of the Deed of Trust.
29
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment. The court is ordered to enter a new judgment in favor
of First-Citizens on its declaratory relief claim and on the Church's cross-complaint. The
Church to bear First-Citizens' costs on appeal.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MCINTYRE, J.
O'ROURKE, J.
30
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Church's challenges to the validity of the deed of trust because the Church failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under FIRREA.
Issues
Whether the court had jurisdiction to consider the Church's challenges to the validity of the deed of trust given the failure to exhaust administrative remedies under FIRREA.
Whether the Church's challenges to the deed of trust constituted affirmative defenses exempt from FIRREA's administrative exhaustion requirement.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We determine the court had no jurisdiction to consider the Church's challenges to the validity of the deed of trust because the Church failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under FIRREA.”
“The failure to exhaust these FIRREA administrative remedies deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“The administrative-exhaustion jurisdictional bar applies to claims against successor banks (and not just against the FDIC) when the claim is based on the conduct of the failed institution.”