People v. Joy CA5

Filed 12/23/15 P. v. Joy CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, F068451 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SC084562A) v.

ERIC DARNELL JOY, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT* APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael G. Bush, Judge. Carol L. Foster, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo-

* Before Gomes, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Franson, J.

INTRODUCTION The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36) permits third strike offenders serving indeterminate life sentences for crimes that are not serious or violent felonies to petition for resentencing. (Pen. Code,1 § 1170.126 et seq.) If a petitioning offender satisfies the statute’s eligibility criteria, they are resentenced as a second strike offender “unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) Following the enactment of Proposition 36, defendant filed a petition for resentencing. Though defendant was statutorily eligible for resentencing, the superior court denied the petition on the grounds that defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. On appeal, defendant contends (1) Proposition 36 violates his equal protection rights by treating offenders sentenced before the effective date of Proposition 36 differently from offenders sentenced after that date, (2) defendant was entitled to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the issue of his current dangerousness, (3) the superior court erred by denying defendant’s petition for resentencing, and (4) even if not constitutionally required, a reasonable doubt standard of proof or, in the alternative, a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof should apply to dangerousness determinations. We affirm. FACTS2 On July 4, 2002, defendant was sought by police after defendant beat his ex- girlfriend unconscious and stole her cash and car. A short time later, police observed defendant driving the stolen vehicle, and initiated a traffic stop. Rather than comply with the officers’ orders to exit the vehicle, defendant sped away from the officers – running