David v. City of Santa Monica CA2/8

Filed 12/15/15 David v. City of Santa Monica CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

SHARON DAVID, B257674

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC508509) v.

CITY OF SANTA MONICA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Gregory Alarcon, Judge. Affirmed.

Sharon David, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Marsha Jones Moutrie, City Attorney, and Karen S. Duryea, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent City of Santa Monica.

Meller & Floyd and Eric Meller for Defendants and Respondents Universal Management, LLC and Bob Badiyan.

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Defendants and respondents City of Santa Monica (City), Universal Management, LLC (Universal), and Bob Badiyan (Badiyan) successfully demurred to plaintiff and appellant Sharon David’s first amended complaint for breach of contract. Plaintiff now appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court’s ruling on the demurrers, contending the court erred in refusing to allow her another opportunity to cure the defects in her pleading. We conclude the demurrers were properly sustained without leave to amend, and therefore affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, our review is de novo. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967 (Aubry); accord, Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.) For the limited purpose of reviewing the propriety of the trial court’s ruling, we accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the operative complaint, as well as any facts that may be reasonably implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Aubry, at pp. 966-967; accord, Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) We do not “however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Aubry, at p. 967.) Our factual summary is drawn from the allegations of the operative first amended complaint, including the attached exhibits, according to this well-established standard. (See Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[T]o the extent the factual allegations conflict with the content of the exhibits to the complaint, we rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits”].) The operative pleading is unclear and ambiguous in many aspects, so we have included in our factual summary some of the material facts from the original complaint that aid in understanding the amended complaint. In 1997, defendant City entered into a written agreement with defendant Badiyan in his capacity as trustee for the S.T.B. Family Trust (the “Agreement”). The trust owned a parcel of real property located on 16th Street in the City, and the Agreement covered