Webb v. Desert Bermuda Development Co. CA4/2 (2015) · DecisionDepot
Webb v. Desert Bermuda Development Co. CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Dec 14, 2015 No. E061826Unpublished
Filed 12/14/15 Webb v. Desert Bermuda Development Co. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MICHAEL L. WEBB,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E061826
v. (Super.Ct.No. INC081422)
DESERT BERMUDA DEVELOPMENT OPINION COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John G. Evans, Judge.
Affirmed.
Eisenberg Law Firm and Mark W. Eisenberg for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Office of Doug Griffith and Doug Griffith for Defendant and Appellant
Desert Bermuda Development Company.
This lawsuit arises out of an airplane crash at the Bermuda Dunes Executive
Airport (Airport) that killed a flight instructor, Timothy D. Cleary (Cleary), and injured a
student pilot, plaintiff and appellant Michael L. Webb. Defendant and appellant Desert
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Bermuda Development Company (Desert Bermuda) operates the Airport. Plaintiff
alleges that the accident was caused by Cleary being intoxicated at the time of the
accident. He further alleges that Desert Bermuda negligently failed to protect plaintiff
from the danger presented by the circumstance that Cleary “was known to drink before
flying, and was known to provide flight lessons to members of the public, including
plaintiff, while intoxicated.”
Desert Bermuda sought summary judgment on two grounds: (1) under Business
and Professions Code section 25602, “only Cleary was legally responsible for the
injurious effects of his intoxication”; and (2) the preemptive effect of the Federal
Aviation Act (FAA). The trial court found Business and Professions Code section 25602
inapplicable, but granted summary judgment in favor of Desert Bermuda on federal
preemption grounds.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that California law is not preempted by the FAA on the
facts of this case. He also contends Desert Bermuda’s motion for summary judgment
should have been denied because the separate statement in support of the motion failed to
comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d).1 Desert Bermuda has cross-
appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding Business and Professions Code
section 25602 inapplicable.
We find Desert Bermuda was properly granted summary judgment in its favor,
and affirm.
1 Further undesignated references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
2
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
As the trial court noted, the facts on which Desert Bermuda’s motion for summary
judgment is based are not in dispute. Plaintiff, a student pilot, was injured, and his flight
instructor, Cleary, was killed, in a plane crash that occurred during an instructional
training flight at the Airport on October 28, 2007. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint, and
Desert Bermuda has not disputed, at least for purposes of its motion for summary
judgment, that Cleary was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
Desert Bermuda operates the Airport under a lease from the owner of the property.
The Airport is a general aviation facility, with no airline operations or scheduled
commercial passenger service. Cleary was not an employee of, or otherwise affiliated
with, Desert Bermuda. Except for aircraft refueling service, which is run by Desert
Bermuda, the various concessions at the airport—including Twin Palms Aviation, the
flight school that employed Cleary, and of which plaintiff was a customer— are owned
and operated by commercial tenants, to whom Desert Bermuda rents out space.
Approximately one month before the accident, Cleary was terminated from Twin
Palms Aviation because he smelled of alcohol while on the job. Twin Palms Aviation
shared this information with Desert Bermuda. Plaintiff contends that Desert Bermuda
should have excluded Cleary from the premises of the airport on the basis of this
information, and is liable in negligence for having failed to do so.
2 An exhaustive factual and procedural history is unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal. We confine our discussion here to matters that are directly relevant, or useful for context.
3
Plaintiff initially filed this action on October 27, 2008. The case was removed to
federal court by Twin Palms Aviation—then a defendant in the action, but since
dismissed from the case (along with all other defendants, with the exception of Desert
Bermuda). After substantial litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and ordered the matter remanded to
state court. The only cause of action remaining at issue in the case is defendant’s second
cause of action for negligence, asserted against Desert Bermuda as the operator of the
airport.3
Desert Bermuda filed its motion for summary judgment on February 24, 2014.
The trial court heard oral argument on May 16, 2014, and issued a minute order granting
the motion on May 20, 2014. Judgment was entered in favor of Desert Bermuda on
July 8, 2014.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Desert Bermuda Was Properly Granted Summary Judgment.
Desert Bermuda argued on summary judgment that defendant’s negligence claim
against it failed, because plaintiff cannot show that Desert Bermuda violated any federal
air safety standards. The trial court agreed, as do we.
The well-known principles generally governing appellate review of an order
granting a motion for summary judgment are as follows: “A trial court properly grants
3 Initially, the complaint mistakenly named Bermuda Dunes Airport Corporation as the operator of the airport and therefore the target of plaintiff’s second cause of action; this error was apparently corrected by amendment, though the document that did so was not designated for inclusion in the record of this appeal.
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summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] We review the trial court’s decision
de novo, considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion
(except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the
evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.] In the trial court, once a moving defendant has
‘shown that one or more elements of the causes of action, even if not separately pleaded,
cannot be established,’ the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable
issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials
of its pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable
issue of material fact exists as to that causes of action . . . .’” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
Nevertheless, the FAA does not create a federal cause of action for personal injury suits.4
Rather, state law causes of action may be invoked where violation of the federal
standards regarding aviation safety results in personal injury or death. (Booth, supra, at
p. 1181.)
On the undisputed facts, Cleary certainly violated federal standards regarding
aviation safety by flying and supervising a student pilot while under the influence of
alcohol. (See 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a) (2015) [forbidding any person from acting as a crew
member of any civil aircraft “[w]hile under the influence of alcohol”; 14 C.F.R. § 91.13
(2015) [“No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another.”].) Under the FARs, however, the burden of
complying with standards relating to alcohol consumption and flying a civil aircraft is
squarely on the pilot (or other “crewmember of a civil aircraft”), not the airport out of
which the aircraft is flying. (14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a) (2015).) As such, plaintiff cannot
show a violation of the federal standards regarding aviation safety by Desert Bermuda.
Indeed, plaintiff has never alleged or argued otherwise.
Instead, plaintiff attempts to reframe the issue from one of aviation safety to one
of premises liability. While aviation safety is a field that is entirely preempted by federal
standards, premises liability on the part of the owners or operators of airports is not.
Thus, where a plaintiff is injured by a dangerous condition of the airport premises—a
tripping hazard, say—the normal standards of state law personal injury actions apply.
4 Hence the Ninth Circuit’s finding of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction at an earlier stage in this litigation, and order remanding the matter to state court.
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(See, e.g. Gray v. America West Airlines, Inc. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 76, 80, 82-89
[applying state law standards regarding personal claim based on allegedly negligent
maintenance of property at ticket counter of an airport, resulting in trip and fall injury].)
According to plaintiff, Desert Bermuda was negligent because it failed to provide
adequate security on the grounds of the Airport, failing thereby to prevent Cleary—
allegedly known to be unsafe to fly, because of his alcohol use—from entering the
airport, and in particular giving plaintiff a flying lesson.
We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s attempt to shoehorn his claim against Desert
Bermuda into a premises liability framework. Plaintiff was injured by Cleary’s decision
to fly an aircraft while intoxicated, not any condition of the Airport premises. Plaintiff
has not cited any case in which an airport operator—let alone a general aviation airport
operator—has been held liable for failing to prevent a pilot from violating federal
aviation standards by flying while intoxicated, nor have we discovered any such case.
Case law involving injuries more directly caused by the condition of airport property,
such as negligent maintenance of the floors in a terminal building (Butcher v. City of
Houston (S.D. Tex. 1993) 813 F.Supp. 515, 518) or tripping hazards near airport ticket
counters or baggage areas (Gray, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 80; Garrett v. American
Airlines, Inc. (5th Cir. 1964) 332 F.2d 939, 941) is simply inapposite. We see no
appropriate basis to extend the common law proprietary duties of those who operate and
control airport premises for the safety of patrons on the grounds of the airport to duties to
monitor and at least indirectly control pilots’ safe operation of airplanes in flight,
particularly in light of the complete federal preemption of the field of aviation safety.
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Similarly, the right of a municipality that operates an airport to establish reasonable noise
ordinances for aircraft, or to control the number and type of airplanes that are welcome to
fly out of the facility, has little if anything to do with the present case. (See, e.g., Santa
Monica Airport Ass’n. v. City of Santa Monica (9th Cir. 1981) 659 F.2d 100.)
In short, the undisputed facts show plaintiff was injured by Cleary’s reckless
violation of federal aviation safety standards by flying while intoxicated, which resulted
in a crash. Plaintiff cannot, however, show that Desert Bermuda has any responsibility
for Cleary’s actions, either under federal aviation safety regulations, which impose no
such responsibility, or state tort law standards, which are preempted from the field of
aviation safety. As such, summary judgment in favor of Desert Bermuda was properly
granted.
B. Plaintiff’s Contention that Procedural Defects Mandate Denial of Desert
Bermuda’s Motion Is Without Merit.
Plaintiff contends that Desert Bermuda’s motion for summary judgment should
have been denied because its Separate Statement of Material Facts was procedurally
defective. He argues that Desert Bermuda failed to comply with the mandate of rule
3.1350(d), because its Separate Statement of Material Facts did not separately identify
“each cause of action, claim, issue of duty, or affirmative defense, and each supporting
material fact claimed to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action, claim,
issue of duty, or affirmative defense.” (Rule 3.1350(d).)
This argument fails, because the format used by Desert Bermuda is the one
described in rule 3.1350(h). The requirement for separately identified issues applies only
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for “[s]upporting and opposing separate statements in a motion for summary
adjudication . . . .” (Rule 3.1350(h); see also rule 3.1350(b).) Because Desert Bermuda’s
motion “sought summary judgment, rather than summary adjudication of a subissue, [its]
statement met the requirements of rule 3.1350 without the necessity of separately listing
subissues as to which summary adjudication was sought.” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181
Cal.App.4th 102, 118 (Truong).) The trial court was correct to reject plaintiff’s claim
that the motion was procedurally defective.
Moreover, “the court’s power to deny summary judgment on the basis of failure to
comply with [rule 3.1350] is discretionary, not mandatory.” (Truong, supra, 181
Cal.App.4th at p. 118.) Plaintiff has failed to explain how any purported deficiency in
Desert Bermuda’s separate statement impaired his ability to marshal evidence in
opposition to the motion, particularly given that the facts at issue are relatively
straightforward, and undisputed. Even if plaintiff had demonstrated procedural error on
the part of Desert Bermuda—and he did not—it would have been well within the trial
court’s discretion to resolve the motion on the merits nevertheless.
C. Desert Bermuda’s Cross Appeal Is Moot.
In light of our conclusion that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of
Desert Bermuda for the reasons discussed above, Desert Bermuda’s cross-appeal,
challenging the trial court’s finding that Business and Professions Code section 25602 is
inapplicable to the facts of this case, is moot. (People v. J.S. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
163, 170 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [“as a general matter, an issue is moot if ‘any ruling by
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[the] court can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief’”].) We
therefore need not, and do not, discuss the issue.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Desert Bermuda is awarded its costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J. We concur:
MCKINSTER J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that an airport operator is not liable for a pilot's intoxication-related crash because federal aviation safety standards preempt the field and do not impose a duty on airport operators to monitor or control pilot conduct.
Issues
Whether an airport operator is liable for a pilot's intoxication-related crash under a premises liability theory.
Whether the Federal Aviation Act preempts state law claims regarding aviation safety.
Whether the defendant's motion for summary judgment complied with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d).
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Under the FAA, federal standards—specifically those set in Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration, acting under the authority granted to it by the Act— “‘displace all state law on the subject of air safety.’””
“We see no appropriate basis to extend the common law proprietary duties of those who operate and control airport premises for the safety of patrons on the grounds of the airport to duties to monitor and at least indirectly control pilots’ safe operation of airplanes in flight”
“In short, the undisputed facts show plaintiff was injured by Cleary’s reckless violation of federal aviation safety standards by flying while intoxicated, which resulted in a crash.”