California Court of Appeal Dec 7, 2015 No. E060462Unpublished
Filed 12/7/15 Humphrey v. Johnson CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DOUGLAS HUMPHREY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E060462
v. (Super.Ct.No. INC1207805)
RICHARD L. JOHNSON, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John G. Evans, Judge.
Affirmed.
Christopher Kelley; Aron C. Movroydis; and Matthew DeArmey for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Allione & Associates and Paul R. Allione for Defendant and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant, Douglas Humphrey, appeals from a judgment of dismissal
following the trial court’s sustaining of the demurrer of defendant and respondent,
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Richard L. Johnson, as to plaintiff’s first amended complaint for quiet title, partition, and
declaratory relief. Although plaintiff raises arguments under several headings, all of his
arguments are based on the position that a stipulation attached to his first amended
Johnson cites Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 789-790
for the proposition that a plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss its action without prejudice
under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2) after a demurrer is
sustained with leave to amend. That case is inapposite. Plaintiff did not move to dismiss
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his action without prejudice; he requested entry of judgment and then took his appeal
from the judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer. We therefore
conclude the judgment was appealable.
C. Johnson’s Standing
Plaintiff claims Johnson lacks standing to challenge plaintiff’s title to the property
because Johnson had no interest in the property, and the “minor property tax payments”
that Johnson made on the property after Johnson improperly and “falsely” changed the
property tax billing statement address to that of his agent, without the permission of the
property’s “rightful owners,” does not “confer on Johnson standing in connection with
the property.” Plaintiff points out that in his demurrer reply, Johnson stated: “While it is
completely irrelevant for purposes of demurrer, to satisfy any curiosity the court might
have, Mr. Witte was Defendant Johnson’s agent who made payments on behalf of
Johnson and performed other administrative acts for this and other ventures.”
The purpose of a general demurrer is to determine the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) In his first amended complaint, plaintiff
added Johnson as a named defendant. Plaintiff alleged that Johnson claimed an interest
in the property and sought a judicial declaration that Johnson had no interest in the
property.
Code of Civil Procedure section 762.010 requires the plaintiff in a quite title action
to “name as defendants in the action the persons having adverse claims to the title of the
plaintiff against which a determination is sought.” In order to have standing to sue any
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person to quiet title to property, the plaintiff must have an interest in the property. (Chao
Fu, Inc. v. Chen (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 48, 58-59.) Whether the defendant’s adverse
claim has merit is what the quiet title action seeks to determine. Indeed, in his first
amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that Johnson had an adverse claim to the property
but no interest in the property, and sought a judicial determination that Johnson had no
interest in the property. Plaintiff’s claim that Johnson lacks standing to challenge
plaintiff’s title to the property, because Johnson has no interest in the property, does not
defeat Johnson’s claim that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
D. Contrary Allegations in Prior Pleadings
Johnson claims we may consider contrary allegations in plaintiff’s original
complaint and judicially noticeable matters in reviewing the trial court’s ruling on his
demurrer, including prior allegations establishing that the statute of limitations had run on
plaintiff’s claims.
1. Additional Background
As recounted above, in his original complaint plaintiff alleged that he claimed title
“by way of abandonment and as an equitable remedy as an heir to the Estate of Diana
Janelunas.” He further alleged he claimed title as “the successor of the individual who
paid the taxes on property taxes [sic] for over 13 years and for preventing the property
from going to auction for those years. Any adverse possession claim which Diana
Janelunas had, passed to Plaintiff, who was the sole heir of her estate.” He identified the
defendants as “‘All Persons Unknown, Claiming any Legal or Equitable Right, Title,
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Estate, Lien or Interest in the Property . . . adverse to Plaintiff’s title,’” and he alleged that
“[d]efendants have abandoned any interest in the property and have manifested no
intention to return to ownership in the property.” Plaintiff alleged: “The rights of the
dispossessed owners and their testate and intestate successors to recover the land are
time-barred and title to their estate is extinguished since the statute of limitations has run
and the right to dispossess Plaintiff has passed.”
Then, in his later-filed first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that at the time of
his death, Val owned the property in fee simple; that Val died intestate, unmarried, and
without children; and that the Janelunas heirs were Val’s intestate successors and the only
persons who asserted an interest in the property.
2. Analysis
“‘“Generally, after an amended pleading has been filed, courts will disregard the
original pleading. [Citation.] [¶] However, an exception to this rule is found . . . where
an amended complaint attempts to avoid defects set forth in a prior complaint by ignoring
them. The court may examine the prior complaint to ascertain whether the amended
complaint is merely a sham.” [Citation.] . . . Moreover, any inconsistencies with prior
pleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the
inconsistent allegations. [Citation.] Accordingly, a court is “not bound to accept as true
allegations contrary to factual allegations in former pleading in the same case.”
[Citation.]’” (Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343.)
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Here, plaintiff originally pleaded that Joseph and Val had abandoned the property;
that plaintiff’s deceased wife Diana had acquired the property through adverse
possession; that plaintiff had succeeded to her rights; and that the rights of all other
persons were barred by the statute of limitations. “No action for the recovery of real
property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it
appear[s] that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed
of the property in question, within five years before the commencement of the action.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 318.) An action to quiet title is an action for the recovery of real
property within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 318, and the plaintiff has
the burden of proof to show that he or his predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed
of the property within five years before the commencement of the action. (Haney v.
Kinevan (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 343, 344; see also Safwenberg v. Marquez (1975) 50
Cal.App.3d 301, 311-312.)
Having alleged in his original complaint that the claims of all other persons to the
property had been extinguished by abandonment or adverse possession and were time-
barred, plaintiff could not, without explanation, assert in his first amended complaint that
he had succeeded to the rights of the Janelunas heirs. (Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs,
Inc., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 343.) We therefore conclude the trial court did not err
in sustaining defendant’s demurrer to the first amended complaint.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
KING J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's quiet title action, holding that the plaintiff failed to state a valid claim and could not ignore inconsistent, damaging allegations from his original complaint regarding the statute of limitations.
Issues
Whether the judgment of dismissal following a sustained demurrer is appealable when the plaintiff elects not to amend.
Whether a plaintiff may ignore inconsistent factual allegations from a prior complaint in an amended pleading.
Whether the plaintiff sufficiently established standing to quiet title.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“a court is “not bound to accept as true allegations contrary to factual allegations in former pleading in the same case.””