Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by
theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed
nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as
a misdemeanor . . . .”
4
Defendant asserts that the broad language of section 490.2 should apply to the
receipt of a stolen vehicle. He argues that receipt of a stolen vehicle valued at less than
$950 is a theft-related offense that should be subsumed in the broad definition of section
490.2. However, as noted ante, section 1170.18 subdivision (a), separately listed section
496 as an offense eligible for reclassification rather than including it under the new
umbrella definition of theft in section 490.2. We consider that strong evidence that the
voters did not consider receiving stolen property as a form of theft, and we therefore
reject defendant’s argument that section 490.2 should apply to section 496d.
Equal Protection
Defendant further argues that equal protection principles require application of the
same treatment to section 496d, buying or receiving a stolen vehicle or equipment, as
applies to receiving stolen property under section 496 and grand theft auto under section
487, subdivision (d)(1).
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution both guarantee equal protection
of the laws. Our Supreme Court has recently articulated the principles that guide our
analysis: “Where, as here, a disputed statutory disparity implicates no suspect class or
fundamental right, ‘equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no “rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental
purpose.”’ [Citations.] ‘This standard of rationality does not depend upon whether
lawmakers ever actually articulated the purpose they sought to achieve. Nor must the
underlying rationale be empirically substantiated. [Citation.] While the realities of the
5
subject matter cannot be completely ignored [citation], a court may engage in “‘rational
speculation’” as to the justifications for the legislative choice [citation]. It is immaterial
for rational basis review “whether or not” any such speculation has “a foundation in the
record.”’ [Citation.] To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must
‘“negative every conceivable basis ”’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.
[Citations.] If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its
‘“wisdom, fairness, or logic.”’ [Citations.]” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015)
60 Cal.4th 871, 881.)
Here, the People have posited several reasons that could conceivably support
treating the offense of receiving stolen vehicles differently from theft offenses and from
the offense of receiving other stolen property. For example, unlike other forms of stolen
property, stolen vehicles are often dismantled and sold for parts in “chop shops” which
can raise their worth above retail value. (See People v. Tatum (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d
179, 184 [“the ‘fence’ is more dangerous and detrimental to society than is the thief”],
abrogated by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 1157, 1165.) As another example, owners of vehicles are typically
dependent on those vehicles for necessities, which is not so frequently the case with theft
of other forms of property.
“‘[W]hen conducting rational basis review, [the courts] must accept any gross
generalizations and rough accommodations that the Legislature seems to have made.’
[Citation.] ‘A classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply because there is an
6
“imperfect fit between means and ends”’ [citations], or ‘because it may be “to some
extent both underinclusive and overinclusive”’ [citations].” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th
at p. 887.) Because there are plausible reasons for distinguishing between section 496d,
subdivision (a) offenses on the one hand and section 487, subdivision (d)(1) and
section 496, subdivision (a) offenses on the other hand, defendant has failed to establish
any violation of equal protection in failing to extend reclassification to section 496d,
subdivision (a) offenses. We conclude the trial court erred in redesignating defendant’s
offense as a misdemeanor, and we reverse the order. The People’s other contentions are
therefore moot.
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is reversed.
McKINSTER J. We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
7
Filed 11/24/15 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ORDER
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E063095
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI1200374)
JUSTIN AUSTIN PEACOCK,
Defendant and Respondent.
The request, filed November 4, 2015, for publication of a nonpublished opinion filed in the above matter on November 3, 2015, is GRANTED. The opinion meets the standards for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c)(2), (4), (6) and (7).
IT IS SO ORDERED that said opinion be certified for publication pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b).
McKINSTER J. We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle under Penal Code section 496d is not eligible for reclassification as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47.
Issues
Whether Penal Code section 496d is an offense eligible for reclassification under Proposition 47 (Penal Code section 1170.18).
Whether the exclusion of Penal Code section 496d from Proposition 47 relief violates equal protection principles.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Proposition 47 did not amend section 496d, and it is not listed in section 1170.18.”
“Because there are plausible reasons for distinguishing between section 496d, subdivision (a) offenses on the one hand and section 487, subdivision (d)(1) and section 496, subdivision (a) offenses on the other hand, defendant has failed to establish”
“any violation of equal protection in failing to extend reclassification to section 496d, subdivision (a) offenses.”