California Court of Appeal Nov 16, 2015 No. E062802Unpublished
Filed 11/16/15 In re J.W. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E062802
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J256470 & J256471)
v. OPINION
B.W. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents;
J.W. et al.,
Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Christopher B.
Marshall, Judge. Affirmed.
Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellants.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel and Jamila Bayati, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent B.W.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent C.H.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent T.J.
San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removed C.H.
(daughter) and J.W. (son) from the custody of B.W. (mother), when they were 12 and 8
years old, respectively. The juvenile court determined it had jurisdiction over their
placement because the children are at risk of severe physical harm due to abuse by their
mother and her inability to provide adequate supervision and protection. (Welf. & Inst.
Code,1 § 300, subds. (a) & (b).)2 The juvenile court also determined reunification
services were not required because of the nature of their prior removal and the prior
removal of their brother. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(3) & (10).) The court nevertheless ordered
reunification services on the basis of its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that
reunification was in the best interest of the children. (§ 361.5, subd. (c).)
Son and daughter challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile
court’s finding that reunification is in their best interest. CFS submitted a letter brief
joining and adopting the brief submitted on behalf of the minors. (Cal. Rules of Court,
1 Further unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 The juvenile court also determined it had jurisdiction based on the fathers’ inability or unwillingness to provide adequate care. (§ 300, subd. (g).)
2
rule 8.200 (a)(5).) We hold the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion because the
evidence is sufficient to support its finding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 19, 2012, daughter, son, and their baby brother were removed from
the custody of their mother after the baby, then less than five months old, suffered severe
non-accidental trauma, with injuries including broken bones, retinal damage, and
subdural hematoma. Initially, the authorities accused mother and her then-boyfriend,
T.P. (boyfriend), of injuring the baby, but mother was exonerated of responsibility for the
baby’s injuries. She testified she does not know who hurt the baby, but she indicated
either her daughter or her boyfriend could be responsible. Eventually, the daughter
admitted to causing the baby’s injuries. However, months later she recanted and said she
did not know who had injured her baby brother. The juvenile court placed all three
children in foster care and ordered the mother to participate in reunification services.
On August 20, 2013, the juvenile court returned the daughter and son to the
custody of their mother. On February 26, 2014, the juvenile court returned their baby
brother to her custody and dismissed the daughter and son as dependents. At that time,
the juvenile court ordered mother not to leave the children unsupervised with her
boyfriend or allow him to provide care for the children. Mother also accepted a safety
plan for the baby requiring that she not leave him in the care of his siblings.
Mother violated those conditions. According to the social worker who testified at
trial, mother admitted she had left her daughter with the baby to take her son to school on
3
a few occasions when “[the baby] may be asleep, so she wouldn’t have to take him out in
cold weather or incidents such as that.” Mother testified this occurred on only two or
three occasions. Daughter told social workers that, between February and July 2014,
mother allowed her boyfriend to visit her family’s home on several occasions and
allowed daughter to visit the boyfriend’s home three times. Mother denies any such
visits occurred. Mother admits she took her son and baby to the boyfriend’s apartment on
July 1, 2014, and that she left them alone with the boyfriend while she took a nap.
The visit to the boyfriend’s apartment precipitated this removal action. According
to a July 1, 2014 police report, mother, son, and baby went to the boyfriend’s home for a
barbeque. Mother testified she visited only to pick up her possessions and the boyfriend
invited them to stay for a meal after they arrived. In any event, while at the boyfriend’s
home, mother had a couple of alcoholic drinks and became tired. She went to the
bedroom to take a nap and left the baby asleep on the couch and her son and boyfriend
playing video games. Sometime later, the baby began to cry. Mother and her son
reported that her boyfriend became upset, went into the bedroom, and started yelling at
her to take her baby and leave his apartment. Mother and her son claimed that, in the
presence of the children, the boyfriend pushed the mother down and then dragged her by
her hair out of the apartment. The boyfriend described the altercation differently. He
claimed he woke mother to take care of the baby, but she got upset at him and began
making a mess of his apartment. Mother denied these allegations. According to the
police report, son held the baby during the altercation and got him out of the apartment.
Mother suffered a cut during the altercation. Son and the baby were hit by a thrown
4
water bottle, and the baby suffered a bruise on his head. Mother called the police, who
arrested the boyfriend on a charge of domestic abuse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subds. (a) &
(b)).
Mother subsequently sought to end all contact with the boyfriend. At first, she
obtained a criminal restraining order against him. In September, she obtained a family
court restraining order that protected both herself and her children. At the time of the
hearing in this case, she had not seen the boyfriend outside of court since the events of
July 1, 2014 and was attending a domestic violence support group once a week. She also
began counseling in July 2014, after the domestic violence incident. Mother later
expressed remorse for violating the juvenile court order against allowing contact between
the boyfriend and her children and said she would not do so again.
After CFS learned of this incident, it removed the children from mother’s custody
and filed new dependency petitions for the daughter and son under Welfare and
reunification would not be in [the child’s] best interests” because “substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding”].)
Under substantial evidence review “we examine the whole record in a light most
favorable to the findings and conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to the lower
court on issues of credibility of the evidence and witnesses.” (Albert T., supra, 144
Cal.App.4th at p. 216.) “We must resolve all conflicts in support of the determination
and indulge all legitimate inferences to uphold the court’s order . . . [and] may not
substitute our deductions for those of the trier of fact.” (Ibid.) “[W]e must decide if the
evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the court’s order was proper based on clear and convincing evidence.” (Curtis
F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.)
The statutory scheme governing juvenile dependency “is designed to allow
retention of parental rights to the greatest degree consistent with the child’s safety and
welfare, and to return full custody and control to the parents or guardians if, and as soon
as, the circumstances warrant.” (In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 625.) Thus, in the
ordinary case where minors have been removed from the custody of their parents and
declared dependents, “child welfare services, including family reunification services,
12
must be offered.” (Id. at p. 626; see also § 361.5, subd. (a).) “When offered,
reunification services must be provided for at least six months unless earlier terminated
for cause (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2)), and for up to 24 months when it appears such extended
services will result in the dependent child’s return to the parent’s or guardian’s custody.”
(In re Ethan C., supra, at p. 626.)
In some situations, however, the parent can lose the presumption of reunification
services. Relevant to this case, subdivision (b)(3) of section 361.5 provides:
“Reunification services need not be provided to a parent . . . when the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence . . . [¶] . . . [t]hat the child or a sibling of the child has been
previously adjudicated a dependent . . . as a result of physical . . . abuse, . . . removed
from the custody of his or her parent or guardian, . . . returned to the custody of the parent
or guardian from whom the child had been taken originally, and . . . the child is [again]
being removed . . . due to additional physical . . . abuse.” The juvenile court correctly
determined that this provision applies to daughter and son.3
As a result, subdivision (c) of section 361.5 governs. It provides “[t]he court shall
not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in paragraph (3) . . . of
subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that
reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (Italics added.) In this case, the juvenile
3 The juvenile court also found that subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 applies to daughter and son. Subdivision (b)(10) is an alternate basis for holding reunification services are presumptively inappropriate. Because it does not change our analysis whether the juvenile court correctly determined mother overcame the presumption, we do not discuss that basis for imposing the presumption separately.
13
court properly applied section 361.5, subdivision (c), considered the evidence presented
at the hearing, and determined that mother had overcome the statutory presumption
against reunification services because clear and convincing evidence showed that
reunification with their mother would be in the best interest of the children.
In determining the children’s best interests, the juvenile “court should consider ‘a
parent’s current efforts and fitness as well as the parent’s history’; ‘[t]he gravity of the
problem that led to the dependency’; the strength of the bonds between the child and the
parent and between the child and the caretaker; and ‘the child’s need for stability and
continuity.’ ” (In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164, quoting In re William B.,
supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1220, 1228.) “[A]t least part of the best interest analysis
must be a finding that further reunification services have a likelihood of success.” (In re
G.L., supra, at p. 1164.)
We have reviewed the record and conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion when it found reunification is in the best interest of daughter and son. The
juvenile court made detailed findings, including that, notwithstanding her shortcomings,
mother was providing adequate care and had a generally good relationship with her
children. The juvenile court noted that Social Worker Hargis “indicated on the stand that
all the children would benefit from maintaining a relationship with the mother.” She also
reported that mother “was often involved with school and with medical appointments,”
“was taking good care of [the baby] and maintaining his [medical] appointments” and
that the other “children [went] to school regularly.” Hargis testified mother behaved
appropriately with the children during supervised visits, which the children “seem to
14
enjoy.” All this testimony, which has further support in the testimony of mother herself,
supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that mother had demonstrated a good degree of
parenting ability and “is fit to continue to parent these children.”
The juvenile court also found that mother had made reasonable efforts to address
the domestic violence issues that led to the removal of her children. This finding too was
supported by substantial evidence. The record shows that after the July 1, 2014 episode
of domestic abuse, which occurred in the presence of her son and baby, mother sought to
terminate her relationship with her boyfriend and protect herself and her children from
future exposure to his abuse. She reported the abuse to the police and obtained a criminal
protective order. In addition, mother accepted responsibility for exposing her children to
her boyfriend and was regretful for “allowing [him] into her life, [and] she recognized the
problem . . . [a]nd she’s now trying to deal with it.” As the juvenile court noted, mother
“put herself back into counseling after the July incident . . . on her own,” and without
prompting “g[o]t a protective order . . . to protect her children.” As of the date of the
hearing in juvenile court, mother had not seen the boyfriend outside of court for over five
months. The juvenile court reasonably concluded that the mother made reasonable
efforts to address the problems that led to the removal of her children.
The same evidence discussed ante supports the juvenile court’s findings that
mother has a significant bond with her children and “could offer a stable environment for
the children.” The finding that she has a significant bond with her children is supported
by her involvement in school and medical appointments, her conduct at supervised visits,
and the fact that the children enjoy the visits. In addition, based on the children’s foster
15
placement having lasted less than a year, the court found there was “not enough time for
there to be bonds with the foster parents,” and reasonably concluded mother’s bond was
stronger. The juvenile court’s finding that mother could provide a stable environment
was also supported by the same evidence, as well as the fact that “prior to their removal,
the children were in a stable relationship with the mother in a stable home.” The court
recognized that “the incidents of domestic violence . . . altered that to some degree.”
However, the court’s conclusion mother could again provide a stable home for the
children is supported by the evidence she took decisive steps after July 1, 2014 to exclude
the boyfriend from her life, obtain protection for her children, and engage in counseling.
It has further support in the evidence that under mother’s care the children were “well
groomed and appeared to have received appropriate care” and appeared to be healthy.
The minors contend the juvenile court erred because it did not give sufficient
weight to the gravity of the abuse. They point to her son’s statements about being
exposed to the boyfriend’s violence against mother and daughter’s statements that mother
drank excessively and had physical outbursts directed at both children. These statements
do not undermine the reasonableness of the juvenile court’s finding. The court noted that
the “overall problem in this case is that the mother got wrapped up in a relationship with
[the boyfriend] that was harmful to everyone, including herself, and certainly her children
. . . .” However, as discussed ante, after the incident of domestic abuse that triggered
these proceedings, mother took independent and decisive action to address that danger.
As of the hearing, mother had not seen the boyfriend outside of court since the July 1,
2014 incident. The allegations of excessive alcohol use are not supported. Social
16
Worker Hargis reported finding no indication of alcohol use in mother’s home and no
other evidence that mother abused alcohol, and the juvenile court dismissed alcohol
abuse as a reason to detain the children.
As for the abuse mother herself inflicted on her son and daughter, there is
conflicting evidence about its gravity. Mother admitted she had scratched her son when
she grabbed his shirt out of frustration and her son confirmed her testimony. Mother
admitted she had grabbed her daughter on a few occasions, but denied hitting her.
Daughter reported these incidents were more violent. Meanwhile, Social Worker Hargis
conceded she knew of only one incident of mother physically abusing son and agreed that
when he was taken into custody there were no signs of abuse other than “a minimal scar
on his neck.” She conceded he appeared healthy and “was well groomed and appeared to
have received appropriate care.” She also conceded that daughter had no scars, bruises,
or other marks that might indicate physical abuse, appeared to be healthy, and “was very
clean, [and] dressed appropriately.” Hargis reported that, according to the social worker
who worked with mother for a year, there were no signs of abuse during supervisory
visits. Given the conflicting testimony, the apparent health and well-being of the
children, and the fact that exposure to domestic violence was the principal reason for
removing the children, the juvenile court could reasonably have found reunification to be
in the children’s best interests despite the incidents of abuse by mother that formed part
of the basis for their detention.
The court also found that reunification is likely to succeed. That finding is
supported by the evidence that mother worked to maintain a close relationship with her
17
children during removal and, after the July 1, 2014 incident, voluntarily and immediately
got back into counseling and domestic violence counseling. A juvenile court exercising
its discretion has the “ability to evaluate whether the parent will utilize . . . services and
whether those services would ultimately inure to the benefit of the minor.” (In re Jesse
W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49, 66, 68.) We hold the juvenile court here had a
“reasonable basis to conclude” that mother will avail herself of reunification services and
that reunification will succeed. (See In re William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1228-1229.)
We conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding by
clear and convincing evidence under section 361.5, subdivision (c) that reunification is in
the best interests of the minors.
The minors argue there is evidence in the record supporting the opposite finding.
Even if that were correct, such evidence does not establish the court abused its discretion
in finding it was in their best interests to reunify with their mother. (In re G.L., 222
Cal.App.4th 1153, 1166.) An appellate court “will not disturb the [juvenile] court’s
determination unless the court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.” (In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 871, 881; see also In re G.L., supra, at p. 1166.) “When two or more
inferences reasonably can be deduced from the facts, [an appellate court has] no authority
to reweigh the evidence or substitute [its] judgment for that of the juvenile court.” (In re
G.L., at p. 1166.) We decline the minors’ invitation to reweigh the evidence in this case.
18
Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment that reunification is in the
best interests of the children.
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST J.
CODRINGTON J.
19
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering reunification services for the mother, as substantial evidence supported the finding that such services were in the children's best interest despite the statutory presumption against them.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for the mother under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (c).
Whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that reunification is in the best interest of the children.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We hold the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence is sufficient to support its finding.”
“A juvenile court has broad discretion when determining whether further reunification services would be in the best interests of the child under section 361.5, subdivision (c).”
“We hold substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s opinion and therefore affirm.”