California Court of Appeal Nov 9, 2015 No. D067230Unpublished
Filed 11/9/15 P. v. Hiles CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D067230
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF33154)
BRIANNE HILES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Donal B.
Donnelly, Judge. Reversed.
Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Seth Friedman and Karl T. Terp,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Brianne Hiles pleaded guilty to battery with serious bodily injury.
(Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d).)1 The trial court sentenced Hiles to three years in prison
and denied her motion to terminate a criminal protective order, prohibiting her from
contact with her mother—the victim of the battery—issued under section 136.2. The
People contend that Hiles's crime is within the definition of domestic violence (Fam.
Cal.2d 388, 393; Jones v. Union Oil Co. (1933) 218 Cal. 775, 777; cf. In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746.) When the Legislature has not made its intent clear, the
Legislature's generally applicable declaration, " '[n]o part . . . is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared,' " is applied. (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319; Civ.
Code, § 3.)
Here, Hiles committed a crime of domestic violence against her mother on May
19, 2014. However, at the time of her crime, section 136.2, subdivision (i), defined
domestic violence with reference only to section 13700—not that of Family Code section
6211—on which the People rely. Section 13700 subdivision (b), does not encompass a
crime of domestic violence between a mother and daughter because "cohabitant" is
defined as "two unrelated adult persons." (§ 13700, subd. (b).) The People rely heavily
on People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461 for the proposition that in 2011,
the Legislature recognized the broad definition of "victim" within section 136.2 and did
not intend to enact any provision that would narrow the scope of a postconviction
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protective order. This reliance is misplaced. In Beckemeyer, the court had to determine
whether a postconviction protective order could remain after the victim's ex-boyfriend
went to prison. The court relied on the definition of domestic violence based on section
13700—not Family Code section 6211. (Beckemeyer, at pp. 465-466.) Section 13700
applied because the abuse committed was against an adult "with whom the suspect . . .
has had a dating or engagement relationship." (§ 13700, subd. (b).)
We have no record of the termination hearing to indicate whether the trial court
extended the protective order under the domestic violence exception in section 136.2,
subdivision (i). In our review of the 2014 legislative history, we find no indication that
the Legislature intended the new reference to Family Code 6211 to apply retroactively.
As stated, it is a time-honored principle that absent such express intent a statute only
applies prospectively. If the trial court extended the order under this subdivision, it did
so without authority. At the time of Hiles's offense, the exception in section 136.2,
subdivision (i), did not encompass domestic violence as defined in Family Code section
6211, and the definition set forth in section 13700 did not apply.
The court also did not have jurisdiction to impose the order beyond sentencing
under section 136.2, subdivision (a). The record contains no reference to the criminal
protective order as a part of Hiles's plea agreement to justify its continuation.
Furthermore, the trial court lost jurisdiction after sentencing Hiles to serve three years in
state prison because the court instituted the order under section 136.2. Outside of
subdivision (i), the statute "authorizes injunctions only by courts with jurisdiction over
criminal proceedings and is aimed at protecting only 'victim[s] or witness[es],' an
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indication of its limited nature and focus on preserving the integrity of the administration
of criminal court proceedings and protecting those participating in them." (People v.
Stone, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 159.) Absent any specified time during a proceeding,
section six of the "Warnings and Notices" provisions within the criminal protective order
clearly states that "Orders under Penal Code section 136.2 . . . are not valid after
imposition of a state prison commitment." (Judicial Council Forms, Form CR-160.) We
conclude the trial court did not have jurisdiction to extend Hiles's criminal protective
order under section 136.2.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court with directions
to terminate the criminal protective order issued under section 136.2 barring Hiles from
any contact with her mother. The court shall prepare an amended abstract of the
judgment reflecting the termination and forward the amended abstract to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
McDONALD, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
AARON, J.
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AI Brief
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Holding. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to maintain a criminal protective order under Penal Code section 136.2 after sentencing the defendant to state prison, as the domestic violence exception in effect at the time of the offense did not apply to the defendant's relationship with the victim.
Issues
Whether a trial court has jurisdiction to maintain a criminal protective order under Penal Code section 136.2 after a defendant is sentenced to state prison.
Whether the 2014 amendment to Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i), incorporating Family Code section 6211, applies retroactively to the defendant's case.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“a trial court has jurisdiction to issue protective orders that apply during the pendency of a criminal matter, but has no authority to issue a protective order extending beyond the pronouncement of judgment.”
“Orders under Penal Code section 136.2 . . . are not valid after imposition of a state prison commitment.”
“We conclude the trial court did not have jurisdiction to extend Hiles's criminal protective order under section 136.2.”