California Court of Appeal Nov 2, 2015 No. D068485Unpublished
Filed 11/2/15 P. v. Soto CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D068485
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF1200514)
JUAN CARLOS SOTO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Angel M.
Bermudez, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward J. Haggerty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Adrianne Denault, and Sharon L.
Rhodes, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Juan Carlos Soto of two counts of aggravated sexual assault on a
child under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(5)1 [sexual penetration]) and six
counts of forcible lewd acts on a child under 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)). Soto
appeals the judgment on various grounds. He contends: (1) the trial court erred by
admitting portions of a detective's testimony into evidence; (2) the court erred by failing
to sua sponte instruct the jury on impermissible uses of the detective's testimony; (3)
Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions CALCRIM No. 1111, regarding
forcible lewd acts, is biased toward the prosecution; (4) there was insufficient evidence of
"force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury" to
support Soto's convictions under section 288, subdivision (b)(1); and (5) the court erred
by not holding an evidentiary hearing on an allegedly sleeping juror.2 We reject Soto's
contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2001, the victim, Jane,3 was six years old and the youngest girl in her home.
She lived with her parents, four minor siblings (two older sisters, two younger brothers),
and 21-year-old Soto. Soto is Jane's cousin, but was called her "uncle" because he had
been raised as a brother to Jane's father. Soto had moved from Mexico the year before
1 Unless otherwise indicated, further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Soto withdrew his claim of error that sexual penetration of a minor under 14 (§ 289, subd. (j)) is a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault (§ 269, subd. (a)(5) [sexual penetration]) based on the statutes in effect at the time the offenses were committed. Accordingly, we do not address that issue.
3 "Jane Doe" was the name used at trial to protect the victim's true identity. 2
and had his own room in the garage of the family home. When Jane's parents were at
work or in Mexico for the weekend, Soto was the only adult present and generally left "in
charge" of the children. He was a grown man, taller and stronger than Jane, and worked
in construction when he could find work.
At trial, with the record reflecting that she was rocking herself, sobbing, or
shaking during the vast majority of her testimony, 18-year-old Jane recalled three major
sexual incidents involving Soto between 2001 and 2004, among numerous other instances
of sexual touching she could not recall in detail. The first time she could remember, Jane
and Soto were in the living room when she heard an ice cream truck. Jane followed Soto
into his bedroom, where he put money on top of his closet out of her reach and indicated
she must try and get the money. Then, Soto lifted Jane up at the waist, and as she was
trying to reach for the money, he used his fingers to touch and/or rub her vaginal area
over her clothes, for at least several minutes. Jane kicked and tried to push Soto away,
and eventually, he put her down. Outside, Jane told her 12-year-old friend Michelle what
had happened, but Michelle did not believe her.
The next incident that Jane could remember occurred when she was seven. While
standing in Soto's bedroom, he held Jane in front of the mirror (her back against his
chest), pulled her legs open with each hand, lifted up her dress to the middle of her
stomach, reached one hand underneath her underwear, used his fingers to penetrate her
vagina, and moved his fingers around in a circle. Jane did not understand what was
happening until Soto began touching her; she tried to close her legs, but he used one hand
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to hold them open while digitally penetrating her with his other hand. He stopped when
the voice of Jane's older sister could be heard outside the room.
The next incident was described as the "big" incident during trial. Jane was nine
years old and her parents were out of town for the weekend. She was sitting on her
mother's bed when Soto approached and said there was a butterfly inside the house. He
led Jane into her brother's room, indicating that the butterfly had gone in there. He then
picked her up, pulled down her pants, touched her vagina with his hands, began licking
her ear, and whispered softly to her in Spanish. Soto next took Jane into his own
bedroom, where she felt him penetrate her anus with something, and it hurt. Jane was
scared, did not understand what was happening, and wanted him to stop, but she did not
try to speak or move. Soto then flipped Jane over onto her back, put a blanket over her
face, and she felt him put his mouth on her bare crotch and lick her vagina for several
minutes. Finally, she felt him penetrate her vagina, which hurt more than the previous
digital penetration. The next day, the bottom half of Jane's body was in significant pain
like she had gotten "beat," it hurt her to urinate, she was sore, and she could barely sit.
Soon after the "big" incident, Jane told Michelle about what had happened, and
Michelle told Jane's mother, Kelly. Kelly recalled occasions when Jane's vaginal area
had been extremely red after being left with Soto, and concluded that Jane was telling the
truth. Kelly kicked Soto out of the house shortly thereafter and never let him back in.
She wanted to call the police, but her husband (Jane's father) told her not to—a dispute
that almost ruined their marriage. For years afterwards, Jane tried to hurt herself and
suppress memories of the abuse, until finally, she attempted suicide. Jane revealed to a
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therapist that she had tried to kill herself because of what Soto had done to her, and the
therapist mandatorily reported the suspected sexual abuse to the police.
The police helped Jane make a recorded "pretext" call to Soto, during which she
confronted him and he admitted to touching her in a sexual way. Then, in a custodial
interrogation, Soto admitted to several instances of inappropriately touching Jane's
breasts, buttocks, and vagina, when he had been living with her. He further admitted that
he had touched Jane's vagina underneath her clothes, but denied any acts of penetration or
sex, stating that penetrative acts were "too serious." He told police that he knew what he
had done to Jane was wrong.
DISCUSSION
I. Admissibility and Instructions Regarding Detective's Testimony
A. Admissibility
The last witness of the People's case-in-chief was Detective Ryan Deanne
(Detective), the officer who worked with Jane on her pretext call to Soto and
subsequently interrogated Soto and obtained his confession. Soto contends Detective
provided expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) by
testifying about "delayed disclosures" of abuse, and the testimony should be inadmissible
for all purposes in California trials. He concedes there were no objections to Detective's
testimony during trial. The People contend there was no CSAAS evidence, the phrase
"child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome" was never mentioned at trial, the issue
has been forfeited, and in any event, Detective's testimony was properly admitted.
5
Detective first testified about his background and experience investigating
hundreds of sexual assault and child abuse cases. One to two pages of his testimony then
pertained to whether, during his investigations, victims had delayed or failed to disclose
instances of abuse:
"Q. In the cases that you've investigated, is it common for victims to not disclose immediately after the touching occurs?
"A. That's very common. In fact, it's usually more common that the child does not disclose right away than it is that the child does disclose right away.
"[¶] . . . [¶]
"Q. Have you seen -- or it is common for parents or other family members to -- even if they know or suspect child molestation is going on to not report it?
"A. And surprisingly that's common, as well. A lot of times family want to handle their business within their family. It's something that's maybe shocking, but it happens more times than you think."
The majority of Detective's testimony concerned how he had learned of the alleged acts
of sexual assault in Jane's case, his investigation of Soto, and information relevant to the
interrogation, including whether trained officers will often minimize the gravity of certain
acts or appear nonjudgmental about acts of child molestation. The recordings of the
pretext call and lengthy interrogation were played to the jury while Detective was on the
stand. Finally, during cross-examination, Detective was principally questioned about his
interrogative techniques and what Soto had actually confessed to (or not).
To preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal, the complaining party generally is
required to make a timely and meaningful objection in the trial court. (Evid. Code, § 353,
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subd. (a).) The purpose of this rule "is to encourage a defendant to bring any errors to the
trial court's attention so the court may correct or avoid the errors and provide the
defendant with a fair trial." (People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060.)
" 'In requiring an objection at trial, the forfeiture rule ensures that the opposing party is
given an opportunity to address the objection, and it prevents a party from engaging in
gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the outcome, and then claiming
error.' " (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 624 [record at trial was not
developed, credibility could not be assessed, and curative actions could not be taken].)
We conclude the issue has been forfeited. Soto did not object or move to exclude
Detective's testimony during trial proceedings. Now, there is a basic dispute as to
whether Detective's testimony even constituted expert evidence on CSAAS and for what
purposes he was called as a witness—issues that were not brought to the trial court's
attention and could have been resolved. According to case law, CSAAS is a therapeutic
tool describing five stages or common reactions of children suffering from sexual abuse,
and may help to explain behaviors that jurors would otherwise find inconsistent with
abuse. (See generally People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 (Stark); People v.
Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 389.) Detective was not represented to be an expert
on CSAAS, he did not reference any kind of "syndrome" or "condition" of children
suffering from child abuse, and he is not a psychologist or psychiatrist or other obviously
qualified candidate to speak on the subject. We disagree with Soto that an objection or
timely motion to exclude would have been futile, because the trial court could have
questioned the prosecution's intentions, limited the scope of Detective's direct
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examination, or taken appropriate curative measures if necessary. Detective's testimony
was properly admitted.
B. Jury Instructions
Next, assuming that Detective provided expert evidence on CSAAS, Soto
contends the court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury that the evidence could
not be used to prove Jane had been abused, but could only be used to evaluate whether
Jane's conduct was not inconsistent with someone who had been abused.
(See CALCRIM No. 1193.) Soto did not request a limiting jury instruction. Courts are
split on whether a trial court has a sua sponte duty to provide a limiting instruction
regarding CSAAS evidence, or, in contrast, whether an instruction must be requested by
defense counsel. (Stark, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 116 [instruction required only "if
requested"]; People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (Housley) [holding trial
courts have a sua sponte duty to provide limiting instruction "in all cases in which an
expert is called to testify regarding CSAAS"].)
We need not address this conflict. As discussed above, Soto has not established
that Detective provided CSAAS evidence or he was called as an expert to testify
regarding CSAAS. Moreover, any instructional error was harmless. (People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.) It is not reasonably probable that the jury would have
returned a favorable verdict for Soto if a limiting instruction had been given. Soto
confessed he had wrongfully touched Jane on various occasions in a sexual manner.
Based on their testimony, Jane and Kelly's actions were consistent with Jane having been
sexually molested. Jane told an older friend and her mother about the "big" incident soon
8
after it happened. In addition, Kelly explained that she had fervently wished to go to the
police, but her husband told her not to, which almost ruined their marriage. Instead, she
chose to throw Soto out of the house. Thus, the jury had a substantial basis to conclude
that Jane was telling the truth irrespective of any "delayed disclosure" testimony.
Finally, the potential for misuse of the challenged testimony was minimal under
the circumstances. The risk inherent in admitting CSAAS evidence is the jury may
accord undue weight to an expert's opinion (usually a doctor or psychologist) that the
victim's behavior was typical of abuse victims, "an issue closely related to the ultimate
question of whether abuse actually occurred." (Housley, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 958.)
In contrast, Detective was speaking about his observations generally, and his experiences
in the field varied greatly—he had seen children report their abuse "right away," not until
decades afterwards, or "anywhere in the middle." Thus, Detective did not create a profile
of child abuse victims nor imply there was one, and he certainly was not opining whether
Jane had been abused. Finally, the jury was properly instructed on how to consider
expert witness testimony.
We therefore conclude that any instructional error was harmless because it is not
reasonably probable that Soto would have obtained a more favorable result had a limiting
instruction been given.
II. CALCRIM No. 1111
Soto challenges the use of CALCRIM No. 1111 on the grounds the instruction
unfairly favors the prosecution, is impermissibly argumentative, is duplicative, and
diminishes the weight of certain facts that are pertinent to the jury's evaluation of the
9
evidence. He asserts use of CALCRIM No. 1111 therefore violated his constitutional
rights, and for that same reason, his failure to object at trial did not result in forfeiture of
the claim on appeal. Assuming Soto's constitutional rights are at issue here and we
consider his challenge to the instruction on the merits, we conclude there was no error.
CALCRIM No. 1111 instructs the jury on the elements of the crime of committing
a forcible lewd act with a child, in violation of section 288, subdivision (b)(1). The
instruction, as read to the jury, states the People must prove "the defendant used force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury" in committing
a lewd act "with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or
sexual desires" of the defendant or the child. (CALCRIM No. 1111, emphasis added.) It
also defines "force," "duress," and how an act is accomplished by "fear."
Soto specifically challenges the following language in CALCRIM No. 1111:
"Actually arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the
perpetrator or the child is not required." Soto argues this language is argumentative and
duplicative because it instructs on facts the prosecution is not obligated to prove and the
jury was already instructed on what needed to be proved. Soto also argues the language
in question improperly implies that the jury should not consider facts relating to whether
he or Jane were sexually aroused, whereas such facts were relevant and could be
considered in determining whether he acted with sexual intent.
"In reviewing any claim of instructional error, we must consider the jury
instructions as a whole, and not judge a single jury instruction in artificial isolation out of
the context of the charge and the entire trial record. [Citations.] When a claim is made
10
that instructions are deficient, we must determine whether their meaning was
objectionable as communicated to the jury. If the meaning of instructions as
communicated to the jury was unobjectionable, the instructions cannot be deemed
erroneous. [Citations.] The meaning of instructions is . . . [determined under the] test of
whether there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the law
in light of the instructions given, the entire record of trial, and the arguments of counsel.
[Citations.]" (People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 276.)
We conclude CALCRIM No. 1111, in its entirety, properly instructed the jury on
the applicable law. (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 51 (Veale).) CALCRIM
No. 1111 appropriately clarifies that actual sexual arousal is not an element of the offense
and therefore proof of it is not required for a section 288 conviction. (§ 288, subd. (b)(1);
People v. McCurdy (1923) 60 Cal.App.499, 502 ["Whether the acts actually, or in point
of fact, have the effect of arousing the passions or sexual desires of the person upon
whom they are committed, is immaterial."]; see also People v. Martinez (1995)
11 Cal.4th 434, 452 ["[S]ection 288 is violated by 'any touching' of an underage child
accomplished with the intent of arousing the sexual desires of either the perpetrator or the
child."].) The language in CALCRIM No. 1111 is not constitutionally objectionable.
III. Sufficiency of Evidence
Soto next contends there was insufficient evidence of "force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury" to support his convictions for
committing forcible lewd acts with a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (b).) He argues the
evidence only supports convictions under section 288, subdivision (a). We disagree.
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"In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court's task is to
review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)
Subdivisions (b) and (a) of section 288 on their face distinguish "between those
lewd acts that are committed by force and those that are not." (People v. Cicero (1984)
157 Cal.App.3d 465, 473 (Cicero) [disapproved on other grounds in People v. Soto
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 229].) Section 288, subdivision (a), makes it a felony to "willfully and
lewdly" commit "any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part or
member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child."
Section 288, subdivision (b)(1), proscribes any such conduct committed "by use of force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury." "Where a
defendant uses physical force to commit a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, and
the child suffers physical harm as a consequence, the defendant has committed a lewd act
'by use of force' under subdivision (b)." (Cicero, at p. 484.) However, "[w]here no
physical harm to the child has occurred, the prosecution has the burden of proving
(1) that the defendant used physical force substantially different from or substantially in
excess of that required for the lewd act and (2) that the lewd act was accomplished
against the will of the victim." (Id. at pp. 484-485.)
12
Soto cites People v. Schulz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 999 (Schulz), for the proposition
the evidence did not show he used force. The court in Schulz stated that, "[s]ince
ordinary lewd touching often involves some additional physical contact, a modicum of
holding and even restraining cannot be regarded as substantially different or excessive
'force.' " (Id. at p. 1004.) The Schulz court held that grabbing the victim's arm and
holding her while the defendant fondled her did not constitute force sufficient to support
a conviction for forcible lewd acts. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the Schulz court concluded
there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for violating section 288,
subdivision (b), based on duress. The Schulz court stated: "In our view duress was
involved in this 'nightmare' incident. The victim, then nine years old, was crying while
defendant, her adult uncle, restrained and fondled her. On this occasion he took
advantage not only of his psychological dominance as an adult authority figure, but also
of his physical dominance to overcome her resistance to molestation. This qualifies as
duress." (Id. at p. 1005.)
Furthermore, courts have rejected the reasoning in Schulz, regarding force.
(People v. Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1004; People v. Bolander (1994)
23 Cal.App.4th 155, 159-161; People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1789-1790;
People v. Babcock (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 383, 387-388 (Babcock ).) In Babcock, the
court found sufficient force where a defendant grabbed the victims' hands and made them
touch his genitals, thereby overcoming the victims' attempts to pull away.
(Babcock, at pp. 386-387.) Similarly, sufficient force was found in Cicero, supra,
157 Cal.App.3d at page 486, where the defendant picked up two girls by the waist in a
13
playful but deceitful manner and then placed his hands on their crotches while carrying
them away.
Soto also argues there was no evidence of any express or implied threats, such as
threats of retribution, violence, restrictions of Jane's privileges or shame or humiliation,
to support a finding of duress. Under section 288, subdivision (b)(1), " 'duress' means ' "a
direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to
coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities" ' " to do or submit to something
that person would not otherwise have done or submitted to. (Veale, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46, quoting People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13
(Cochran).) "[T]hreats need not be express, but may be inferred from conduct.
[Citation.] Silent threats, of course, generate fear." (People v. Reyes (1984)
153 Cal.App.3d 803, 811.) The victim's age, size, and relationship to the defendant are
relevant to a determination of whether the victim's participation has been obtained by
duress. (Cochran, at pp. 15-16, see also People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 51
[finding the evidence sufficient to establish duress, even though the eight-year-old victim
testified the defendant did not use force, violence, or threats].)
Here, there was substantial evidence that Jane suffered physical harm after the
"big" incident to support that those lewd acts were committed by use of force.
(Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 474 ["We presume all would agree that one who
inflicts physical harm on a child in the commission of a lewd act is properly convicted of
a violation of subdivision (b) 'by use of force.' "].) Jane credibly testified that the lower
14
half of her body was in significant pain, it hurt her to urinate, she could barely sit, and her
vaginal area was extremely red, which was corroborated by Kelly.
In addition to the physical harm suffered, Jane's testimony regarding all the
incidents was more than sufficient to support a finding of force, as well as duress, under
section 288, subdivision (b)(1). Such testimony included that Soto held her up so he
could touch her vagina even though Jane kicked to get away, and he forced her legs open
when she tried to close them in order to digitally penetrate her vagina. In each incident,
Soto picked Jane up and/or positioned her against her will. During the big incident, after
he hurt her by an act of anal penetration, Soto flipped Jane over, and then covered her
face with a blanket while he orally copulated and penetrated her vagina. These acts of
force were substantially different than the molestations themselves.
Finally, as in Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pages 43-44, the molestations took
place in the family home, by a trusted adult family member who resided there, when
Jane's parents were away. Soto was Jane's "uncle," he was left in charge when he
molested her, and Jane's parents were frequently out of town. Soto was taller and
stronger than Jane, who was only six years old when the sexual abuse began. She was
scared of him when he molested her, and in each incident, he used "physical dominance
to overcome her resistance to molestation." (Schulz, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.)
The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of force, as well as duress, under section
288, subdivision (b)(1).
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IV. Juror Misconduct
Soto's final contention on appeal is that the court erred by not holding an
evidentiary hearing regarding an allegedly sleeping juror. This claim is meritless.
During deliberations, the jury foreperson notified the court that one of the jurors had been
"falling asleep" during trial. Defense counsel stated that no inquiry on the matter was
needed since he had not observed any sleeping jurors:
"I would be okay with not even addressing it. Because it sounds -- it sounds -- I didn't -- I was watching jurors. They didn't seem to be falling asleep at any point during the trial. I didn't -- I've seen people fall asleep in court. It's usually pretty noticeable."
Nonetheless, the trial court questioned the foreperson, who reported that two other jurors
had accused the juror in question of falling asleep, but the questioned juror denied it and
was participating in the deliberation process. At that point, counsel for both sides agreed
that no further inquiry was needed. Accordingly, Soto has forfeited his claim of juror
misconduct. (People v. Williams, (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 289.) Moreover, under the
circumstances and given defense counsel's representations, the court acted well within its
discretion in determining that no evidentiary hearing was required. (Id. at p. 289 ["[T]he
mere suggestion of juror 'inattention' does not require a formal hearing disrupting the trial
of a case."].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCINTYRE, Acting P. J.
PRAGER, J.*
* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 17