California Court of Appeal Oct 28, 2015 No. D066762Unpublished
Filed 10/28/15 P. v. Boyd CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D066762
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD246173)
MICHAEL DAVID BOYD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael T.
Smyth, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark D. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Teresa
Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Michael David Boyd guilty of one count of indecent exposure (Pen.
Code, § 314, subd. (1)),1 with the further finding that Boyd committed the offense after
having entered an inhabited dwelling (§ 314); one count of burglary of an inhabited
dwelling (§§ 459, 460); and one count of simple assault (§ 240). The trial court
sentenced Boyd to a six-year term in prison.
Boyd contends that (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on certain target
(2) burglary of an inhabited dwelling (§§ 459, 460, 667.5, subd. (c)(21)); and (3) indecent
exposure after having entered an inhabited dwelling (§§ 314, subd. (1), 314).
On the day of trial, Boyd made a motion to discharge his appointed attorney and to
represent himself, but the trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was not timely.
At trial, the jury found Boyd not guilty of assault with the intent to commit oral
copulation, convicting him instead of the lesser included offense of simple assault.
(§ 240.) The jury found Boyd guilty on the two remaining counts of burglary and
indecent exposure, including a true finding for the indecent exposure count that the
offense was committed after having entered an inhabited dwelling without consent.
The trial court sentenced Boyd to prison for six years.
4
II
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing on the Target Offenses for Burglary Identified by the People
We first consider Boyd's argument that the trial court committed instructional
error related to the burglary count.
In count 2, Boyd was charged with burglary, with the allegation that he unlawfully
entered Jillian's apartment with the intent to commit a felony. (§ 459.) In response to a
pretrial motion in limine by defense counsel, the prosecutor identified four possible target
felonies that Boyd allegedly intended to commit when entering the apartment: oral
copulation by force or fear (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)), rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), sexual
penetration by force or fear (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)), or felony sexual battery (§§ 242, 243.4,
subds. (a), (d)). The jury instructions identified these four target felonies, stating that "[a]
burglary was committed if the defendant entered with the intent to commit Oral
Copulation by Force or Fear, Rape, Sexual Penetration by Force or Fear, or Felony
Sexual Battery." The jury was also instructed on the elements of each of the target
felonies.
On appeal, Boyd contends that the trial court erred by identifying the target
felonies of rape, sexual penetration by force or fear, and felony sexual battery in the
burglary instructions because, according to Boyd, the evidence did not support an
instruction on those target felonies. Specifically, Boyd argues "there is no evidence in
the record that [he] intended to commit rape, penetration by force or fear, or sexual
5
battery." Boyd contends that the only target felony supported by the evidence was oral
copulation by force or fear, based on the fact that he told Jillian to "suck me dry."
Further, Boyd contends that because the jury found him not guilty of assault with the
intent to commit oral copulation, the jury must necessarily have concluded that he did not
enter the apartment with the intent to commit oral copulation, and that the burglary
conviction must accordingly have been based on one of the three other target felonies,
which Boyd claims should not have been included in the jury instructions at all.2 As we
will explain, we conclude that Boyd's argument lacks merit.3
2 Although we need not resolve the issue in light of our conclusion that the evidence supports an instruction on all four of the target felonies, we note that the jury's not guilty verdict on the charge of assault with intent to commit oral copulation does not — as Boyd contends — necessarily establish that the jury found that Boyd did not intend to force Jillian to orally copulate him during the incident. The jury could have reasonably interpreted the evidence to establish that although Boyd was focused on forceful oral copulation when he was standing outside of Jillian's apartment and speaking to her without assaulting her, by the time Boyd forced his way inside the apartment and was assaulting Jillian by lying on top of her and choking her, he was no longer focused on oral copulation, but on a different type of sexual assault, such as rape.
3 The People contend that Boyd forfeited this appellate challenge to the inclusion of certain target felonies in the burglary instructions because he did not make that objection in the trial court. Failure to object to instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects defendant's substantial rights. (§ 1259; People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 64.) Here, the record shows that Boyd made a brief and unclear objection to the burglary instruction. Specifically, when discussing the burglary instructions, defense counsel stated, "Same objection, Your Honor, as the in limine of the numbering of different crimes in count 2." The trial court overruled the objection. It is unclear what defense counsel was referring to by incorporating his in limine argument into his instructional objection, but we need not, and do not, decide whether the objection was sufficient to preserve Boyd's appellate argument that three of the target felonies should not have been included in the instructions, as we reject Boyd's appellate argument on the ground that it lacks substantive merit.
6
Boyd's argument relies on the principle that "[i]t is error to give an instruction
which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the
case." (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.) "The trial court has the duty to
instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence
[citations] and has the correlative duty 'to refrain from instructing on principles of law
which not only are irrelevant to the issues raised by the evidence but also have the effect
of confusing the jury or relieving it from making findings on relevant issues.' " (People
v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681.) Accordingly, Boyd's argument has merit only if
he can establish that the inclusion of the target felonies of rape, sexual penetration by
force or fear, and felony sexual battery in the burglary instructions had "no application to
the facts of the case" (Guiton, at p. 1129) and was " 'irrelevant to the issues raised by the
evidence.' " (Saddler, at p. 681.)
As the jury was instructed, the crime of rape consists of nonconsensual sexual
intercourse (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); CALCRIM No. 1000); the crime of sexual penetration by
force or fear consists of nonconsensual genital or anal penetration by an unknown object
or foreign object other than a sexual organ (§ 289, subd. (a)(1); CALCRIM No. 1045);
and felony sexual battery consists of nonconsensual intimate touching while restraining a
person for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse (§§ 242, 243.4, subds. (a),
(d); CALCRIM No. 935). Here, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that
Boyd entered Jillian's apartment with the intent to commit rape, sexual penetration by
force or fear, or felony sexual battery, and thus the instruction was therefore properly
given.
7
As we have explained, immediately before entering Jillian's apartment, Boyd made
direct sexually aggressive comments to Jillian, indicating while his penis was exposed
that he wanted Jillian to orally copulate him, telling her to "suck him dry." As the
confrontation moved into Jillian's apartment, Boyd continued to behave in a manner that
could reasonably be construed as sexually aggressive, but no longer focused on the
demanded act of oral copulation. Specifically, while naked from the waist down, Boyd
climbed on top of Jillian and forcefully restrained her with his body weight, while stating,
in a demanding manner, "It's okay, just let me do this. I just need to do this. It's okay.
It's okay. You've got to let me do this." This occurred immediately after Boyd held onto
Jillian's legs, stating, "You're mine. I'm taking you. You're mine." A reasonable finder
of fact could interpret Boyd's behavior and words while inside the apartment as evidence
that by the time he entered the apartment he intended to sexually assault Jillian, not just
by forcing her to orally copulate him, as he suggested earlier, but by raping her, touching
her intimate areas or sexually penetrating her without her consent. Accordingly, the
evidence amply supports the inclusion of the target felonies of rape, sexual penetration by
force or fear, and felony sexual battery in the burglary instructions.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Indecent Exposure Conviction
Next, we consider Boyd's contention that insufficient evidence supports his
conviction for indecent exposure. As we will explain, we reject the argument.
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
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from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . We presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have
reasonably deduced from the evidence. . . . If the circumstances reasonably justify the
trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. . . . 'A
reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness's credibility.' "
(People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60, citations omitted.)
A person commits the crime of indecent exposure when he "willfully and lewdly
. . . [¶] . . . [e]xposes his person, or the private parts thereof, . . . in any place where there
are present other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby . . . ." (§ 314, subd. (1).)
"[A] person does not expose his private parts 'lewdly' within the meaning of section 314
unless his conduct is sexually motivated. Accordingly, a conviction of that offense
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the actor not only meant to expose himself,
but intended by his conduct to direct public attention to his genitals for purposes of
sexual arousal, gratification, or affront." (In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 366 (Smith).)
Boyd contends that "[t]here is not substantial evidence that [he] willfully exposed
himself to Jillian[,]" because the evidence can only be reasonably interpreted as
establishing that "his pants simply fell down during the assault." Further, Boyd contends
that even if he did realize that his pants had fallen down at some point during the
incident, the only inference supported by the evidence is that he failed to pull them back
up because he was so "actively engaged in the . . . assault" that he was "unable to deal
with his fallen pants," not because he intended to expose himself. Boyd also argues that
9
the indecent exposure conviction is not supported by the record because there is no
evidence of him "direct[ing] . . . attention to his genitals for purposes of sexual arousal,
gratification, or affront." (Smith, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 366.) As we will explain, we
disagree with Boyd's characterization of the evidence and conclude that substantial
evidence supports a finding that Boyd willfully exposed himself to Jillian for a sexual
purpose.
As Jillian testified, she did not see Boyd's pants fall to his ankles, and thus did not
know if Boyd pulled down his pants down intentionally or if the pants fell down
accidentally.4 Thus, there is no direct evidence that Boyd intentionally pulled down his
pants to expose himself. However, the circumstantial evidence strongly supports an
inference that Boyd intentionally pulled down his pants to show Jillian his penis and to
obtain sexual gratification. First, contrary to Boyd's suggestion, there was no physical
struggle occurring when Boyd's pants fell down. Instead, Boyd was standing at Jillian's
front door with a hand on her shoulder and hand on the door. Immediately prior to that,
Boyd was standing at the door with both hands on Jillian's shoulders. Jillian looked
4 Boyd acknowledges Jillian's testimony that she did not see how Boyd's pants ended up around his ankles. However, focusing on Jillian's later statement during her testimony that Boyd's "pants had fallen down, and he was asking me to suck on him," Boyd argues that Jillian had changed her testimony to assert that Boyd's pants had accidentally fallen down. We reject the argument. Based on the entire context, it is not reasonable to understand Jillian's statement that Boyd's pants "had fallen down" as an assertion that Boyd's pants had fallen down accidentally, as Jillian had already testified that she did not see how the pants ended up around Boyd's ankles. Jillian's reference to the fact that the pants "had fallen down" is most reasonably understood as describing the fact that that pants were no longer around Boyd's waist, not an explanation of how the pants came to be around Boyd's ankles.
10
down and saw that Boyd was no longer wearing his pants. Therefore, there is no
evidence of other physical activity, other than a willful act by Boyd, that could have
made Boyd's pants fall down. Second, Boyd's exposure of his penis was done at the
exact moment that Boyd stated to Jillian that she should "suck him dry," referring to
Jillian performing oral copulation on his penis. From the fact that Boyd stood in front of
Jillian with an exposed penis at the same time he demanded oral sex, a reasonable
factfinder could infer that Boyd exposed himself to Jillian for the purpose of drawing her
attention to the sexual organ on which he wanted her to perform oral copulation. Further,
because Boyd was demanding oral sex from Jillian, it is also reasonable to infer that
Boyd was exposing his penis for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification through
oral copulation.
Moreover, the indecent exposure conviction is independently supported by the
evidence of what occurred once Boyd was inside the apartment. Specifically, after Boyd
entered the apartment he kept his penis exposed by not pulling up his pants. During this
time, Boyd was making statements and taking actions that could reasonably be
interpreted as indicating that he intended to sexually assault Jillian, such as stating that he
was "taking" her and "I just need to do this," while lying on top of her and physically
restraining her. Because this activity occurred while Boyd's penis was exposed, a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that Boyd kept his penis exposed for the purpose of
facilitating the sexual assault that he intended to perpetrate. Accordingly, Boyd's act of
continuing to expose his penis while inside the apartment also supports a conviction for
11
indecent exposure, because that conduct also could reasonably be understood as a willful
exposure of Boyd's penis for the purpose of sexual gratification.
Boyd contends that the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that he was
too disoriented to know that his pants had fallen down and therefore intended nothing
sexual by exposing his penis. We disagree. Although the record certainly supports a
finding that Boyd was experiencing some kind of mental disturbance during the incident,
in that he was acting very strangely and referring to Jillian as "Molly," who was not there,
a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Boyd was sufficiently coherent to
understand what he was doing. Boyd appeared to recognize Jillian during the incident,
referring to her name and the name of her ex-husband. The evidence supports a
conclusion that Boyd was taking conscious, forceful and directed action toward the goal
of engaging in some sort of sexual activity with Jillian, first by exposing himself and
demanding oral sex, and later by attacking her and stating that he was "taking" her and
stating, "I just need to do this." Based on all of the evidence, a reasonable fact finder
could conclude that Boyd was not too mentally disturbed to have known of and intended
the exposure of his penis to Jillian for a sexual purpose.
In sum, we reject Boyd's argument that insufficient evidence supports the
conviction for indecent exposure.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Boyd's Motion to Represent Himself
On the day of trial, Boyd made a motion for the trial court to allow him to
discharge his appointed counsel and to represent himself. The trial court concluded that
12
the motion was not timely and exercised its discretion to deny the motion. Boyd
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for self-representation.
We begin our analysis with an overview of the relevant procedural history of this
action. Boyd was first charged in February 2013, and trial did not take place until August
2014. Although there is no indication that the delay was due to the fault of Boyd or a
design to avoid trial, it is relevant that Boyd was represented by several different
attorneys during that time, and we focus on that history here.
Specifically, after being represented by the public defender's office for several
months, according to Boyd, he concluded that the public defender was not adequately
representing him, and he thus hired private counsel in April 2013. In October 2013, after
concluding that private counsel was not providing adequate representation, Boyd
discharged that attorney and asked to be represented once again by the public defender's
office.5 Boyd concluded that the newly assigned attorney from the public defender's
office wanted to follow a defense strategy that Boyd did not agree with, and accordingly
in December 2013, he filed a motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
(Marsden), asking to have that counsel relieved and substitute counsel appointed. The
trial court granted the motion in January 2014, finding that there was an irreconcilable
5 Boyd requests in a footnote to his appellate brief that we take judicial notice of a Web site showing his private attorney's purported current ineligibility to practice law. "To obtain judicial notice by a reviewing court under Evidence Code section 459, a party must serve and file a separate motion with a proposed order." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1).) Boyd has not complied with that procedure, and we accordingly reject the request as procedurally improper.
13
breakdown in communication, and appointed counsel from the alternate public defender's
office for Boyd. The alternate public defender's office initially assigned a certain
attorney to represent Boyd, but replaced that attorney with trial counsel James McMahon
in June 2014, who obtained a continuance of the trial date. McMahon then suffered a
sports injury that incapacitated him for five weeks, and trial was therefore continued
again to August 25, 2014.
At some point during McMahon's preparation for trial, Boyd conferred with
McMahon and determined that he did not agree with McMahon's defense strategy, which
was the same strategy that the public defender's office had planned to follow.
Specifically, Boyd believed that the defense strategy should be to dispute Jillian's version
of what occurred during the incident rather than to focus on establishing that Boyd's
mental state during the incident prevented him from forming the necessary specific
intent.
On the day of trial, August 25, 2014, Boyd filed a Marsden motion, requesting that
McMahon be relieved as counsel and that an attorney from the office of assigned counsel
be appointed to represent him. The trial court denied the motion at a hearing held during
the morning court session on August 25.
At the afternoon court session on the same day, immediately before the trial court
planned to begin considering motions in limine and discussing jury selection procedures,
Boyd made a motion to discharge McMahon and represent himself. At the hearing on
Boyd's motion for self-representation, the prosecutor and defense counsel both
represented that they were prepared to proceed immediately with the trial; Boyd stated
14
that he would require an undetermined amount of time to prepare for trial if he were to
represent himself; and the prosecutor stated that the victim, Jillian, had suffered
significant emotional distress each time a new trial date was set. The trial court denied
Boyd's motion for self-representation, determining that Boyd had ample earlier
opportunities to assert the right to represent himself, and under the totality of the
circumstances, Boyd's motion was not timely. The case therefore proceeded to trial, with
McMahon representing Boyd.
"A defendant has a federal constitutional right to represent himself if he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.)
In order to invoke an unconditional right of self-representation, the defendant must assert
the right 'within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.' [Citations.] A
motion made after this period is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."
People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 852, italics added.) On the other hand, "when a
motion to proceed pro se is timely interposed, a trial court must permit a defendant to
represent himself upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily and intelligently elected to do
so," and has no discretion to deny a request meeting those requirements. (People v.
Here, Boyd's motion was unquestionably made on the "eve of trial," within the
meaning of that term as discussed in Lynch, supra, 50 Cal. 4th at page 722, as it was
made on the afternoon when trial proceedings were scheduled to commence. Therefore,
we may conclude, on the basis of the motion's timing alone, that it was untimely.
However, even when we examine the other relevant factors identified in Lynch for
determining whether a motion for self-representation before trial is timely, those factors
also lead us to conclude that the motion was untimely.6
6 Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th 693, did not specify whether a de novo or abuse of discretion standard governs review of a trial court's determination on the question of timeliness. However, Lynch made clear that if the motion is found to be untimely, it is then " 'addressed to the sound discretion of the court' " (id. at p. 722), which strongly suggests that the initial determination of timeliness is an issue committed to our independent review. This is the same standard used in reviewing another central issue concerning whether a defendant is constitutionally entitled to having his self- representation motion granted, namely whether such a motion is knowingly and voluntarily made. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 24.) We accordingly apply a de novo standard of review in deciding whether Boyd's motion for self-representation was timely. 17
The first relevant factor is "the time between the motion and the scheduled trial
date." (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726.) Here, as we have discussed, the motion was
made on the scheduled trial date, leaving no time between the motion and the scheduled
trial date.
A second relevant factor is "whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial."
(Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726.) As we have discussed, both the prosecutor and
defense counsel stated that they were ready to proceed immediately to trial. In contrast,
Boyd stated that he would require an undetermined amount of time to prepare for trial if
he were to represent himself. As our Supreme Court observed in Lynch, under similar
circumstances, "if the self-representation motion had been granted, defendant would have
required an undetermined amount of time to investigate and prepare for trial. A trial court
may properly consider the delay inherently caused by such uncertainty in evaluating
timeliness." (Id. at p. 728, italics added.) The undetermined delay that would be caused
by granting the motion for self-representation, when counsel was ready to proceed
immediately, supports a conclusion that the motion was untimely.
Third, we consider "the number of witnesses and the reluctance or availability of
crucial trial witnesses." (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726.) Although there were no
problems with the availability of witnesses in this case, Lynch's third factor is implicated
to the extent that the victim, Jillian, was the central witness at trial, and, as the prosecutor
explained, Jillian would suffer emotional distress if the trial was continued. Specifically,
the prosecutor stated that Jillian was anticipating that trial would be going forward on the
designated date after several prior continuances, and each new trial date had "caused
18
[Jillian] significant emotional distress" in that "she has to relive what happened on that
day," making it in Jillian's interest "to get this done and behind her." Relevant to this
consideration, when deciding whether a motion for self-representation was timely in
Lynch, our Supreme Court observed that "[t]he victims and the prosecution ha[ve] a right
to a speedy trial . . ." (id. at p. 727), parenthetically quoting the statement in Morris v.
Slappy (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 14, that "in the administration of criminal justice, courts may
not ignore the concerns of victims." (See Lynch, at p. 727.)
The final relevant factor is "whether the defendant had earlier opportunities to
assert his right of self-representation." (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726.) As the trial
court correctly observed, Boyd had ample opportunity prior to trial to decide that he
should represent himself and to make a motion for self-representation. Specifically, the
record shows that Boyd had disagreements with prior attorneys, causing him to make a
prior Marsden motion and also to discharge retained counsel. At any point during the
disputes with his prior attorneys, or at any point after McMahon was assigned to
represent Boyd in June 2014, Boyd could have evaluated the situation and decided to
represent himself, rather than waiting until the eve of trial to make that motion. Indeed,
the record shows that as early as January 8, 2014, during the hearing on Boyd's first
Marsden motion, Boyd was considering representing himself, as his attorney explained to
the trial court during the first Marsden hearing that Boyd has "informed me numerous
times that if he does not get a new attorney, then he will go pro per."
Boyd argues that he should not have been expected to make a motion for self-
representation until his Marsden motion was denied on the day of trial. We disagree.
19
Given the history of this case, Boyd should have anticipated before filing the second
Marsden motion that it might be denied. Indeed, in ruling on Boyd's first Marsden
motion, the trial court cautioned Boyd that he is "not the one that dictates what the
ultimate defenses are going to be" and that he was expected to cooperate with his next
attorney, but Boyd's disagreement with McMahon's trial strategy was the main basis for
the second Marsden motion.
Based on all of these considerations, we conclude that Boyd's motion for self-
representation, made on the date of trial, was not timely.
Having determined that the motion for self-representation was untimely, the
second issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the untimely
motion for self-representation. In exercising its discretion to deny an untimely motion,
the trial court may consider " 'such factors as the " 'quality of counsel's representation of
the defendant, the defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the
request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which might
reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion.' " ' " (Clark, supra, 3
Cal.4th at pp. 98-99.)
Here, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny Boyd's motion for self-
representation. On the date of Boyd's self-representation motion on August 25, 2014, the
case had been pending approximately one and a half years, since February 2013. Boyd
would have required an undetermined amount of time to prepare himself for trial if he
was permitted to represent himself, and it would have caused further distress to the
victim, Jillian, if the trial was continued. These factors, all identified by the trial court in
20
deciding to deny Boyd's motion, provided a sound basis for the court's exercise of its
discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
AARON, Acting P.J.
PRAGER, J.*
* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 21
AI Brief
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Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions for burglary and indecent exposure, holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury on multiple target felonies for the burglary count and that substantial evidence supported the indecent exposure conviction. Additionally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for self-representation made on the day of trial.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on multiple target felonies for the burglary count.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for indecent exposure.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for self-representation made on the day of trial.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Boyd entered Jillian's apartment with the intent to commit rape, sexual penetration by force or fear, or felony sexual battery, and thus the instruction was therefore properly given.”
“substantial evidence supports a finding that Boyd willfully exposed himself to Jillian for a sexual purpose.”
“The trial court denied Boyd's motion for self-representation, determining that Boyd had ample earlier opportunities to assert the right to represent himself, and under the totality of the circumstances, Boyd's motion was not timely.”