California Court of Appeal Oct 21, 2015 No. E063023Unpublished
Filed 10/21/15 In re K.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re K.M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E063023
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1100622)
v. OPINION
S.M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jacqueline C. Jackson,
Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Sharon S. Rollo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant S.M.
Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant K.M.
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Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, Anna M. Marchand, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
S.M. (Mother) and K.M. (Father) filed multiple petitions for modification of
existing orders in the dependency and guardianship proceedings concerning their three
children, Ki., Ke. and Ka. The juvenile court denied each petition without a hearing, and
the parents appeal. We will reverse the judgment entered on January 9, 2015, and
remand the cause for a hearing on the petition filed on January 5, 2015. We will
otherwise affirm the judgments appealed from.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
The lengthy history of this case has been described in detail in prior appeals.1 For
purposes of this appeal, a brief summary suffices.
Ke. and his older brother, Ki., were adjudged juvenile court dependents in
Riverside County under a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
300,2 which alleged that both children had suffered serious physical abuse by their
parents. A third sibling, Ka., was born to the parents after dependency proceedings were
initiated as to Ki. and Ke. Ka. was removed from the parents’ custody at birth and was
later adopted. (See generally In re K.M. (Oct. 22, 2014, E059994) [nonpub. opn].)
1 On our own motion, we have taken judicial notice of the records in related case Nos. E056706, E057540, E058604, E059994 and E060804.
2 All further statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
At a review hearing as to Ki. and Ke. held on July 18, 2012, the juvenile court
found that although the parents had been provided services for nearly three years, they
had made only minimal progress toward alleviating the cause of the dependency and had
not benefitted from the services. The court found that the parents had exceeded the
statutory time limit for reunification services and denied further services. The court set a
section 366.26 hearing to establish a permanent plan for the boys.
On February 26, 2014, the juvenile court established a legal guardianship for Ki.
and terminated dependency jurisdiction as to him. (In re K.M. (Nov. 26, 2014, E060804)
[nonpub. opn].)
On March 12, 2013, the juvenile court established a legal guardianship for Ke.,
and ordered visits between Ke. and his parents to be “reasonable and as directed by the
legal guardian.”3 The court then terminated dependency jurisdiction as to Ke.
On January 5, 2015, the parents filed a petition pursuant to section 388, seeking
modification of the visitation order as to Ke.4 In that petition, the parents alleged as
changed circumstances that they had called Ke.’s guardian on multiple occasions, but that
despite the existing visitation order, the guardian refused to allow them to speak to Ke. or
3 Mother challenged this order in her appeal in case No. E058604. She argued that the order improperly delegates discretion over every aspect of visitation to the legal guardian. We found the issue forfeited because she did not object to the order in the juvenile court. (In re K.M. (E058604, Apr. 28. 2014) [nonpub. opn.].)
4 The record on appeal also contains two section 388 petitions that predate the January 5, 2015 petition. The order denying the January 5, 2015 petition is the earliest order as to which the notices of appeal, filed March 5, 2015, are timely. The parties raise no issue pertaining to the earlier section 388 petitions. Accordingly, we omit any discussion of the earlier petitions.
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to arrange a visit between Ke. and his parents. They asked for a “more specific”
visitation order. They alleged that the requested modification would be in Ke.’s best
interest because it would allow Ke. and his parents “to communicate and have a bond that
would be benefitting both child and parents.” On January 9, 2015, the juvenile court
summarily denied the petition, stating that the proposed change did not promote the best
interest of the child.
On February 3, 2015, the parents filed a petition to modify the order terminating
parental rights as to Ka. They asserted that the “seizure” of Ka. violated the child’s
Fourth Amendment rights and the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. On the same
date, the parents filed a section 388 petition seeking to overturn the guardianship orders
as to Ki. and Ke. This petition also alleged violation of the children’s Fourth
Amendment rights and the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. On February 19,
2015, the juvenile court summarily denied both petitions, stating that the proposed
modification did not promote the best interest of the children.
On February 11, 2015, the parents filed a section 388 petition seeking to overturn
the order terminating parental rights as to Ka. and Ke.5 The petition again alleged
violation of the children’s Fourth Amendment rights and the parents’ Fourteenth
Amendment rights. On February 26, 2015, the juvenile court summarily denied the
petition, stating that the proposed modification did not promote the best interest of the
children.
5 Parental rights were not terminated as to Ke.
4
On March 5, 2015, the parents filed notices of appeal.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
SUMMARY DENIAL OF THE SECTION 388 PETITION FILED ON
JANUARY 5, 2015, WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Sufficiency of the Notices of Appeal.
The only issue the parents raise on appeal is the denial of their petition, filed on
January 5, 2015, and denied on January 9, 2015. This petition sought modification of the
visitation order as to Ke. County counsel argues that the appeal should be dismissed
because the notices of appeal do not refer to the January 9, 2015 order. The parents
contend that we should construe their notices of appeal liberally, to include every order as
to which the notices of appeal were timely. This includes the January 9, 2015 order.
To be sufficient, a notice of appeal must identify the judgment or order appealed
from. We are required to construe a notice of appeal liberally and must find it sufficient
if we can reasonably determine the judgment or order appealed from. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.405(a)(3).) Here, the notices of appeal specify the date of the order
appealed from: “on or about [February] 19” 2015 or “on or about [February] 19 -20”
2015. They also describe the possible issues on appeal as violations of the children’s
Fourth Amendment rights and the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights and inadequate
representation by their lawyers by virtue of the lawyers’ failure to present the
constitutional violations. The constitutional issues were raised in the section 388
petitions filed on February 3, 2015, as to Ke. and Ki. and in the section 388 petition filed
on February 11, 2015, as to Ka. and Ke. The February 3 petitions were denied on
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February 19, 2015. Thus, the notices of appeal clearly identify the orders appealed from.
The notices of appeal do not refer to an order filed on or about January 9, 2015, and they
do not refer to any issue concerning the visitation order as to Ke. Nevertheless, we will
stretch the limits of liberal construction and deem the notices of appeal to include the
January 9, 2015 order. We deem it appropriate to do so because of the fundamental
nature of the interests involved in cases involving parent-child relationships and because,
having had the opportunity to brief the issue on its merits, respondent will suffer no
prejudice as a result. (See Norco Delivery Service, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Inc.
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 955, 960-961 [notice may be liberally construed in favor of appeal
where “the faulty notice of appeal engenders no prejudice and causes no confusion
concerning the scope of the appeal”].)
Denial of the Petition for Failure to Make a Prima Facie Showing That the
Modification Would Promote Ke.’s Best Interest Was an Abuse of Discretion.
Under section 388, a parent may petition to change or set aside a prior order “upon
grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The juvenile
court shall order a hearing where “it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be
promoted” by the new order. (§ 388, subd. (d).) Thus, the parent must sufficiently allege
both a change in circumstances or new evidence and the promotion of the child’s best
interests. (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157.) A prima facie case requiring
a hearing is made if the allegations demonstrate that these two elements are supported by
probable cause. (Ibid.) It is not made if the allegations would fail to sustain a favorable
decision even if they were found to be true at a hearing. (Ibid.) “While the petition must
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be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency [citations], the allegations must
nonetheless describe specifically how the petition will advance the child’s best interests.”
(Ibid.) Mere conclusory statements as to either prong do not suffice: “If a petitioner
could get by with general, conclusory allegations, there would be no need for an initial
determination by the juvenile court about whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted.
In such circumstances, the decision to grant a hearing on a section 388 petition would be
nothing more than a pointless formality.” (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584,
593.)
We review a juvenile court’s decision to deny a section 388 petition without a
hearing for abuse of discretion. (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.)
The gist of the January 5, 2015 section 388 petition is that despite the existing
order that the parents were to be afforded visitation that was “reasonable and as directed
by the legal guardian,” the guardian had refused to permit any visitation without
justification. It is arguable that this does not constitute a change in circumstances and
that the parents might more appropriately have brought a motion to compel the guardian
to comply with the existing order, and if the juvenile court had denied the petition on that
basis, we would not find that it was an abuse of discretion. The juvenile court, however,
did not check the box on the order form indicating that it was denying the petition
because the parents failed to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.
Rather, the sole basis for denying the petition stated on the order is that the proposed
change of order would not promote the best interest of the child. Implicitly, then, the
court found that the petition made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. The
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question, therefore, is whether it was an abuse of discretion to conclude that the parents
did not make a prima facie showing that the order they sought would promote Ke.’s best
interest.
A decision is an abuse of discretion if it exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) Here, the decision does exceed the bounds
of reason because it directly contradicts, without any evidentiary basis, the court’s prior
implicit finding that visitation would promote Ke.’s best interest. As Father points out,
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C), provides that upon establishing a guardianship, the
court “shall also make an order for visitation with the parents . . . unless the court finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be detrimental to the
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Here, the court’s prior order for
reasonable visitation at the discretion of the guardian reflects an implicit finding that
visitation would not be detrimental to Ke. and would therefore promote Ke.’s best
interest. There was no evidence submitted with or in opposition to the section 388
petition that would afford a rational basis for changing that conclusion. The petition
expressly stated that a visitation order was in place, and that the guardian was flouting it.
This allegation, if proven, would have warranted a “more specific” visitation order, as the
parents requested in their petition. Accordingly, denying the petition summarily was an
abuse of discretion. (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment entered on January 9, 2015, is reversed. The juvenile court is
directed to hold a hearing on the parents’ petition pursuant to section 388, filed January 5,
2015, within 30 days after the finality of this opinion.
The judgments appealed from are otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
KING J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily denying the parents' section 388 petition for a more specific visitation order without a hearing, as the petition sufficiently alleged that the current visitation order was being frustrated by the legal guardian.
Issues
Whether the court should liberally construe the notices of appeal to include an order not explicitly referenced therein.
Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily denying a section 388 petition for a more specific visitation order without an evidentiary hearing.
Disposition. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We will stretch the limits of liberal construction and deem the notices of appeal to include the January 9, 2015 order.”
“The court’s prior order for reasonable visitation at the discretion of the guardian reflects an implicit finding that visitation would not be detrimental to Ke. and would therefore promote Ke.’s best interest.”
“Accordingly, denying the petition summarily was an abuse of discretion.”