P. ex rel. Mullen v. Green Vine Collective CA4/1 (2015) · DecisionDepot
P. ex rel. Mullen v. Green Vine Collective CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Oct 21, 2015 No. D066609Unpublished
Filed 10/21/15 P. ex rel. Mullen v. Green Vine Collective CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE ex rel. JOHN P. MULLEN, as D066609 Oceanside City Attorney, etc.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00047878- v. CU-MC-NC)
GREEN VINE COLLECTIVE et al.,
Defendants;
JOHN NOBEL, as Trustee, etc.,
Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jacqueline M. Stern, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
The Law Offices of Nathan Shaman and Nathan A. Shaman, Defendant and
Appellant.
John P. Mullen, City Attorney, and Annie Perrigo, Deputy City Attorney, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Real party in interest John Nobel, Trustee of the J.I. Nobel Family Trust (sued in
this case as Nobel Family Trust 02-18-98) (Trust), appeals from a postjudgment order
denying his motion to vacate a default judgment entered against the Trust. Nobel
contends we must reverse the order and direct the trial court to enter a new order vacating
the default judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction over the Trust and the default
judgment is, therefore, void. We agree and reverse the order.
BACKGROUND
The People of the State of California through the City Attorney of the City of
Oceanside (People) sued the Green Vine Collective and the Trust for abatement,
injunction, equitable relief, and civil penalties arising from the operation of an unlicensed
and unpermitted medical marijuana dispensary on Trust property. The complaint did not
name either of the Trust's trustees as representative parties.1
The People subsequently obtained a default judgment against the Green Vine
Collective and the Trust.2 The judgment included an award of penalties and attorney's
fees totaling $494,600. It also included a permanent injunction enjoining the Green Vine
Collective and the Trust from, among other actions, operating a medical marijuana
dispensary in the City of Oceanside without a business license. Notwithstanding their
1 Nobel and his wife are the Trust's trustees.
2 Green Vine Collective is not a party to this appeal.
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failure to name either of the Trust's trustees as parties to the action, the People served
notice of entry of judgment on Nobel.
Approximately 10 months later, after the People unsuccessfully attempted to have
the trial court hold the Trust in contempt for violating the permanent injunction, Nobel
moved to vacate the judgment on the ground the judgment was facially void because a
trust is not a suable entity and, therefore, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it.3
The People countered the court had personal jurisdiction over the Trust because the Trust
was properly served with a summons and it was incumbent upon Nobel to raise any issue
regarding the Trust's capacity to be sued by moving to quash service of the summons.4
The trial court denied the motion. Although it acknowledged the judgment against
the Trust was meaningless and could not be enforced, it disagreed the judgment was
necessarily void for lack of personal jurisdiction.
3 The record does not indicate why the trial court declined to hold the Trust in contempt. The People state in their appellate brief the trial court based its decision on a finding the Trust was not a suable entity.
4 Although not directly at issue in this appeal, neither assertion is correct. "A nonexistent entity may not be effectively served with summons as a named defendant." (Omega Video v. Superior Court (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 470, 477.) In addition, a party is not required to bring a motion to quash to challenge a judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. (See Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.) 3
DISCUSSION
I
Vacating the Judgment
"The court … may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set
aside any void judgment or order." (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) A motion to
vacate a judgment " ' "is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the
absence of a clear showing of abuse … the exercise of that discretion will not be
disturbed on appeal.' " [Citations.] The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason." (Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H.,
supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249.)
"A judgment is void if the court rendering it lacked subject matter jurisdiction or
jurisdiction over the parties. Subject matter jurisdiction 'relates to the inherent authority
of the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it.' [Citation.] Lack of
jurisdiction in this 'fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear
or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.'
[Citation.]
"In a broader sense, lack of jurisdiction also exists when a court grants 'relief
which [it] has no power to grant.' [Citations.] Where, for instance, the court has no
power to act 'except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act
without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites,' the court acts without
jurisdiction in this broader sense. [Citation.] [¶] Collateral attack of such judgments is
disfavored, even when the judgment is unauthorized by statute. [Citations.] In some
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cases, however, if the trial court has made 'a grant of relief to one of the parties [which]
the law declares shall not be granted,' such judgment may be considered void for lack of
jurisdiction notwithstanding the court's jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter." (Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 684, 691-692; Becker v. S.P.V.
Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 493 [a judgment may be void on its face because
the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or because the court granted relief
it had no power to grant]; Connelly v. Castillo (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1583, 1588
[same].)
Here, the trial court had no power to enter a judgment in favor of the People
against the Trust. A trust is not person. It is a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property. (Portico Management Group, LLC v. Harrison (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 464,
473 (Portico).) A trust cannot sue, be sued, or be a judgment debtor. (Ibid.; Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 680.250, 680.280.) Only a trustee, as the real party in interest, may defend an
action against a trust. (Portico, supra, at p. 473.) The judgment against the trust was,
therefore, meaningless and unenforceable. (Id. at p. 474; see Oliver v. Swiss Club Tell
(1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 528, 537-538 [a judgment against a nonentity incapable of suing
or being sued is void ab initio].) Accordingly, the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason by denying Nobel's motion to vacate the judgment.
II
Amending the Judgment
As part of their opposition to Nobel's motion to vacate the judgment, the People
requested the trial court amend the judgment to add the Trust's trustees as judgment
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debtors on the theory the trustees are the Trust's alter egos. The trial court did not
address the People's request. The People reiterate their request on appeal. Assuming,
without deciding, this request may be properly raised on appeal, we deny it.
"Section 187 of the Code of Civil Procedure grants to every court the power to use
all means to carry its jurisdiction into effect, even if those means are not set out in the
code. [Citation.] Under section 187, the court has the authority to amend a judgment to
add additional judgment debtors. [Citation.]
"Judgments are often amended to add additional judgment debtors on the grounds
that a person or entity is the alter ego of the original judgment debtor. [Citations.] This
is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the judgment
to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant.
[Citations.] 'Such a procedure is an appropriate and complete method by which to bind
new individual defendants where it can be demonstrated that in their capacity as alter ego
of the [original judgment debtor] they in fact had control of the previous litigation, and
thus were virtually represented in the lawsuit.' " (NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989)
208 Cal.App.3d 772, 778-779, fn. omitted.) Nonetheless, because of due process and
related concerns, this procedure may not be used, as the People desire, to amend a default
judgment to add the names of additional judgment debtors. (See Motores de Mexicali,
S.A. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1958) 51 Cal.2d 172, 175-176; NEC
Electronics Inc., supra, at p. 780.)
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to
issue a new order granting the motion and vacating the default judgment. Appellant is
awarded his costs on appeal.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, J.
McDONALD, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A trust is not a suable entity and cannot be a judgment debtor; therefore, a default judgment entered against a trust is void ab initio and must be vacated.
Issues
Whether a trust is a suable entity capable of being a judgment debtor.
Whether a default judgment entered against a trust is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Whether a court may amend a default judgment to add trustees as judgment debtors under an alter ego theory.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A trust cannot sue, be sued, or be a judgment debtor.”
“a judgment against a nonentity incapable of suing or being sued is void ab initio”
“the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason by denying Nobel's motion to vacate the judgment.”