Pippins v. Estate of Christine Young CA1/5

Filed 10/19/15 Pippins v. Estate of Christine Young CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

KATHY PIPPINS, Plaintiff and Respondent, A142022 v. ESTATE OF CHRISTINE YOUNG, (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC10501108) Defendant; DAVID JAH, Movant and Appellant.

David Jah (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to set aside the interlocutory judgment in this partition action. We affirm. BACKGROUND We recite only the background relevant to this appeal. In 2010, Kathy Pippins (respondent), in her capacity as administrator of the Estate of Mary Elizabeth Pippins (Pippins Estate), filed this partition action against the Estate of Christine Eileen Young (Young Estate). The complaint alleged the Pippins Estate and the Young Estate were both owners of certain real property in San Francisco (Property) and sought a partition by sale. Teal Jaa (Jaa), in her capacity as administrator of the Young Estate, filed an answer. Jaa was initially represented by counsel but in January 2012 her counsel withdrew without substituting new counsel.

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In December 2012, appellant, an heir to the Young Estate, filed a motion to be added as a defendant. In a January 2013 order, the trial court construed the motion as one seeking intervention and denied it. Trial was held in January 2013. Jaa appeared for the Young Estate without counsel. An interlocutory judgment issued, ordering the Property partitioned by sale and appointing a partition referee. In March 2013, appellant filed a motion to vacate the January interlocutory judgment on the ground that Jaa could not act on behalf of the Young Estate while unrepresented by counsel. Respondent stated her position that appellant lacked standing to set aside the interlocutory judgment but agreed the interlocutory judgment should be voided. The trial court found appellant lacked standing and set aside the interlocutory judgment based on respondent’s arguments and brief. The order set a new trial date of July 15, 2013. Both Jaa and appellant were served with a copy of this order. At the July 2013 trial, no appearance was made on behalf of the Young Estate. Following trial, an interlocutory judgment issued directing the Property be partitioned by sale and appointing a partition referee. Jaa was served with notice of the interlocutory judgment. In June 2014, appellant filed a motion to set aside and vacate the July 2013 interlocutory judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. DISCUSSION Appellant sought to set aside the interlocutory judgment on the ground that it was the result of extrinsic fraud or mistake or, alternatively, void.1 (Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 314–315 (Gibble); Civ. Proc. Code, § 473,