California Court of Appeal Sep 29, 2015 No. D068866Unpublished
Filed 9/29/15 Paul v. Super. Ct. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PARMINDER PAUL, D068866
Petitioner, (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. DS543327) v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY,
Respondent;
KIRSTEN PAUL,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PRODEEDING in mandate. Paula S. Rosenstein, Judge. Petition
granted.
Borchard & Callahan, Janelle M. Dease, Law Offices of Michael Jason Lee, and
Michael Jason Lee for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Linda Cianciolo for real party in interest.
Petitioner Parminder Paul challenges by petition for writ of mandate respondent's
September 17, 2015, order purporting to commence the 30-day stay of an order allowing
removal of a minor child from the state (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7) before the formal
order allowing his ex-wife, real party in interest Kirsten Paul, to move their minor
daughter to Michigan was signed and filed. We grant the petition.
Parminder and Kirsten are divorced and have been unable to agree on the custody
of their minor daughter, Jasmine. Respondent Superior Court of San Diego County (the
family court) held an evidentiary hearing and, on August 19, 2015, granted Kirsten's
request that she be permitted to move Jasmine to Michigan. Kirsten's counsel agreed to
prepare the formal order granting the move-away request. The unsigned minutes of the
hearing state that "[t]he move away is granted" and, inaccurately, that Parminder would
prepare the formal order.
Kirsten's counsel drafted a proposed order stating Jasmine was to be returned to
Kirsten in Michigan on September 18, 2015, and sent it to Parminder's counsel for
review. Parminder's counsel objected to the proposed order on the basis that the return
date conflicted with the 30-day stay of move-away orders provided by Code of Civil
Procedure section 917.7, which, counsel contended, would not begin to run until the
formal order was filed. Kirsten then filed an ex parte application with the family court on
September 16, seeking clarification of the move-away order, specifically as to when the
30-day stay commenced and when Jasmine was to return to Michigan. The court granted
the application on September 17, and "to clarify any confusion," ordered that the 30-day
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stay commenced on August 19 and Jasmine was to return to Michigan no later than
September 18.
Parminder promptly petitioned this court for a writ of mandate and requested an
immediate stay. He argued Jasmine could not be required to return to Michigan on
September 18, 2015, because the 30-day stay of Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7
did not begin to run on August 19 and would not do so until the formal order, which
Kirsten's counsel agreed to prepare, was signed and filed. We stayed the family court's
orders to the extent they purported to require Jasmine to return to Michigan by September
18, obtained a response from Kirsten, and advised the parties we were considering
issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial
Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.)
DISCUSSION
The family court clearly intended to start the 30-day stay period running on
August 19, 2015, and the record suggests both Parminder and Kirsten knew this, but the
court never entered an order sufficient to trigger the stay. A postjudgment order allowing
removal of a minor child from the state is stayed "for a period of 30 calendar days from
the entry of judgment or order." (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7, italics added.) None of the
family court's rulings constituted the required "entry" of a move-away "order."
The move-away ruling made orally at the August 19, 2015 custody hearing did not
constitute entry of an order, because an "order" is a "direction of a court or judge, made
in writing." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003, italics added; see In re Marcus (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 1009, 1016 ["a writing is essential to avoid the uncertainty that can arise
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when attempting to enforce an oral ruling"].) "A trial court's oral ruling on a motion does
not become effective until it is filed in writing with the clerk or entered in the minutes."
(In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170.) The minutes of the August
19 hearing do state that "[t]he move away is granted," and ordinarily "[t]he entry date of
an appealable order that is entered in the minutes is the date it is entered in the permanent
minutes." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2); see In re Marcus, supra, at p. 1016
[order "may be set forth in detail in the court's minutes"]; In re Marriage of Lasich (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 702, 705, fn. 1 [postjudgment move-away order is appealable].) "But if
the minute order directs that a written order be prepared, the entry date is the date the
signed order is filed . . . ." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2), italics added.) At the
end of the August 19 hearing, Kirsten's counsel agreed to prepare a formal move-away
order, and the family court's minutes state an order was to be prepared (although they
incorrectly identify Parminder as the preparer). Where, as here, "the trial court's minute
order expressly indicates that a written order will be filed, only the written order is the
effective order." (In re Marriage of Drake, supra, at p. 1170, italics added.) Because no
such order has ever been filed, the 30-day stay of Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7
has not yet commenced.
To correct the family court's error in ruling the stay began to run on August 19,
2015, issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate. The material facts
are not in dispute, the applicable law is settled, Parminder is clearly entitled to relief, the
need for final resolution of Jasmine's custody is urgent, and no useful purpose would be
served by plenary consideration of the issue. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Lewis v.
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Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241; Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 894, 909-910.)
DISPOSITION
Let a writ issue commanding respondent, immediately upon receipt of the writ, to:
(1) vacate its September 17, 2015 order granting real party in interest's ex parte
application and purporting to clarify the August 19 move-away order; (2) enter a new
order denying that application; and (3) prepare, sign, file, and serve a formal order
memorializing the move-away and other orders made at the August 19 hearing. The
temporary stay issued by this court on September 18 is dissolved. In the interests of
justice, this opinion shall be final as to this court upon filing, and the parties shall bear
their own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.490(b)(2)(A), 8.493(a)(1)(B).)
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
MCDONALD, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the 30-day stay of a move-away order under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 does not commence until a formal written order is signed and filed, particularly when the court's minute order directs that such an order be prepared.
Issues
Does a 30-day stay of a move-away order under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 begin upon an oral ruling or minute entry when a formal written order is required?
When does the entry date of a move-away order occur for the purposes of triggering a statutory stay?
Disposition. granted
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A postjudgment order allowing removal of a minor child from the state is stayed "for a period of 30 calendar days from the entry of judgment or order."”
“But if the minute order directs that a written order be prepared, the entry date is the date the signed order is filed”
“Because no such order has ever been filed, the 30-day stay of Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 has not yet commenced.”