Although such authorities are persuasive rather than mandatory precedent, we agree with
their reasoning and conclusions. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in
entering an order that requires State Farm to divide payments because the SSPA provides
that an annuity issuer may not be required to do so. (§ 10139.3, subd. (e).)
Waiver, Forfeiture, Judicial Estoppel
RSL contends that State Farm has waived or forfeited or is judicially estopped
from asserting its statutory right to avoid splitting payments because it waived any
objections to dividing payment in the 2012 transfer order and agreed in its 2013 proposed
order to divide payments. State Farm responds that it expressly preserved its ability to
object to payment splitting in 2012 and timely objected to the 2013 transfer.
6
Effect of 2012 Order
Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a known right.” (Applera Corp. v.
MP Biomeds, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 769, 791.) RSL argues that by agreeing to
split payments in the 2012 order, State Farm intentionally relinquished its right to assert
the anti-splitting statute. However, the 2012 order expressly stated that State Farm’s
“lack of opposition to this matter, or stipulation hereto or compliance herewith, shall not
constitute evidence in any other matter, and is not intended to constitute evidence in any
other matter that: [¶] . . . . [¶] c. Annuity Owner [State Farm Fire] and Annuity Issuer
[State Farm Life] have waived any right in connection with any other litigation or
claims.” The 2012 order thus makes it clear that State Farm did not intentionally
relinquish its rights under section 10139.3, subdivision (e), with respect to future
transactions.
RSL nonetheless argues that by failing to object to the 2012 order, State Farm put
an end to the anti-assignment condition. To support that position, RSL cites German-
American Sav. Bank v. Gollmer (1909) 155 Cal. 683. That case stated the principle that a
condition against waiver of assignment of a leasehold estate is permanently discharged by
consent or waiver. (Id. at p. 688.) That principle is inapposite in the present context.
The Proposed 2013 Order
RSL argues that State Farm submitted a proposed 2013 order in the same form as
the 2012 order (which provided for splitting the Aug. 11, 2016, payment between Alford
and EHL) and consented to splitting payments.
7
State Farm filed a written opposition to the proposed transfer and appeared at
hearings on the proposed transfer where it asserted its opposition to payment splitting. At
the close of the September 24, 2013, hearing, the trial court stated it would approve the
transfer and instructed the parties to work out the form of the order. RSL and State Farm
agreed to an order similar to the 2012 order, but RSL did not submit that proposed order
to the trial court. State Farm therefore filed an objection to the proposed order, stating
that State Farm had not withdrawn its objection to the proposed order, that State Farm
disagreed with the trial court’s ruling, and that RSL had misrepresented State Farm’s
position by submitting a proposed order that differed from the proposed order to which
State Farm had agreed.
It is clear from the record that State Farm never withdrew its objections to the
proposed 2013 transfer and never consented to split payments in connection with the
2013 transfer.
Judicial Estoppel
RSL argues that State Farm is judicially estopped by its prior conduct from
challenging the order requiring it to divide payments.
“‘Judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding
that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some earlier proceeding.’”
(Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181.) Judicial estoppel
applies when “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in
judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in
asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true);
8
(4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a
result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.” (Id. at p. 183.) Judicial estoppel does not apply
when a party merely advocates inconsistent provisions; rather, it applies when a party
successfully asserts one position and later attempts to benefit from asserting an
inconsistent position. (Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
24, 32.)
Here, the 2012 transfer was a separate and distinct transaction as to which State
Farm elected to raise no objection while explicitly reserving its right to do so in the
future. Thus, State Farm’s positions in the two transactions are not “totally inconsistent.”
The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply.
Reversal of Order
We have concluded that the trial court’s order violated section 10139.5,
subdivision (e), and State Farm has not forfeited its right to oppose that order. Reversal
is therefore required. RSL has requested this court to vacate that order and remand the
case with instructions to the trial court to order a servicing arrangement under which
State Farm would send the entirety of the 2016 and 2021 payments to EHL, with EHL to
retain the transferred portions and remit the balance to Alford. We decline to do so.
State Farm aptly points out that such an order would put it in the position of having to
rely on another entity to fulfill its contractual obligations to Alford and would expose
State Farm to litigation if, for example, RSL or its assignee sought bankruptcy protection.
9
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is reversed. Appellants are awarded their costs on
appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
McKINSTER Acting P. J. We concur:
KING J.
CODRINGTON J.
10
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the Structured Settlement Protection Act (SSPA) prohibits courts from compelling an annuity issuer or structured settlement obligor to divide payments between a payee and a transferee. Consequently, the trial court erred in ordering State Farm to split payments against its objection.
Issues
Whether the Structured Settlement Protection Act's prohibition against requiring an annuity issuer to divide payments is mandatory or permissive.
Whether State Farm waived its right to object to payment splitting by not objecting to a prior, separate transfer order.
Whether judicial estoppel prevents State Farm from challenging the payment-splitting order.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Neither the annuity issuer nor the structured settlement obligor may be required to divide any structured settlement payment between the payee and any transferee or assignee or between two or more transferees or assignees.”
“Where statutory restrictions are couched in negative terms they are usually held to be mandatory.”
“We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in entering an order that requires State Farm to divide payments because the SSPA provides that an annuity issuer may not be required to do so.”