California Court of Appeal Sep 9, 2015 No. E060209Unpublished
Filed 9/9/15 P. v. Flores CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E060209
v. (Super.Ct.No. BLF1100204)
JESSE JAMES FLORES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Richard A. Erwood,
Judge. Affirmed.
Ellen M. Matsumoto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Jessie James Flores appeals after he was convicted of
murder and other crimes in the shooting death of Jane Doe. Defendant urges that his trial
counsel was incompetent in failing to file a disqualification of the trial judge; no one
realized until after the trial and sentence that the trial judge had formerly been a
prosecutor who appeared at arraignment on defendant’s 1998 strike offense. Defendant
also argues that it was a violation of his right to due process to permit the trial court to
preside in this case, particularly as to the request to dismiss the strike prior in the interest
of justice. (See People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.) We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jane Doe, the victim, had been in a relationship with defendant for about seven
years. Together, they had three children: six-year-old Jessie, four-year-old J., and two-
year-old Jillian. Defendant and his family occupied the back bedroom of Jane Doe’s
mother’s house. Jane Doe’s mother, father, her brother Oscar, and a sister, Susana, also
lived in the house. The bedroom occupied by defendant and his family had two doors:
one opened onto the hallway in the house; the other led to the backyard.
On the evening of August 11, 2011, another of Jane Doe’s sisters, F., came to the
house to visit their mother. F. and her mother were talking in the mother’s bedroom
when Jane Doe came in. Jane Doe was upset and crying. Soon afterward, defendant also
came to the mother’s bedroom. Defendant angrily ordered Jane Doe to return to their
bedroom. Jane Doe and her mother told defendant to leave the room. He went back to
his family’s bedroom; reluctantly, Jane Doe went with him.
2
Behind the closed door of defendant’s and Jane Doe’s bedroom, noise erupted.
Jane Doe yelled at defendant to “stop” what he was doing. The other family members
present, F., Oscar, and their mother, rushed to the back bedroom and tried to open the
door. It was locked or blocked; F., Oscar and their mother were only able to partially
force the door open. Through the crack in the doorway, F. could see that defendant had
Jane Doe pinned on the floor against the wall with one hand, and held a shotgun on her
with the other. Jane Doe was trying to push defendant away.
F., Oscar, and their mother finally were able to push their way into the room.
Defendant’s three children also ran into the bedroom. Jane Doe’s mother tried to wrest
the shotgun from defendant, but he was able to shove her outside into the backyard. F.
and Oscar left the room to find a phone and call 911. When F. returned, Jane Doe was on
the floor, still struggling with defendant for control of the shotgun. When Jane Doe
released her grasp on the barrel of the gun, defendant put the shotgun to her chest and
fired. Defendant threw the shotgun onto the bed and fled out the back door.
Jane Doe died as a result of the shotgun wound. Defendant took refuge at his
cousin’s house where he was discovered and arrested several days after the shooting.
Defendant was charged with one count of first degree murder, one count of being
a felon in possession of a firearm, and three counts (one for each of his children) of child
endangerment.
A few days after the shooting, Oscar found a portfolio containing several pages of
defendant’s writings. Defendant had written a long and rambling statement, an extended
3
apologia for an apparent intention to kill both Jane Doe and himself.1 Among other
things, he wrote that he did not want to be without her. If she pushed him away, it would
1 The writing consisted of 15 handwritten pages, which were not dated or signed (and which contained many spelling, punctuation and grammatical errors which are set forth hereafter). The writing was admitted at trial as exhibit 26A. Defendant admitted that the writing was his. Defendant wrote that he knew what he intended to do was wrong, but that he had gotten to a point that he “could not take it no more,” and that he “had no choice” but it was “time for me to roll out,” and that he was “sorry but sometimes the world is so cruel to people.” Defendant apologized that he “had to take a life with me,” but that “it’s the only thing that I really had in the world,” although “she [presumably, Jane Doe] was n mine to begin with.” Defendant wrote that he now understood why people did things “like this when I watch the news and Americas most wanted,” when they lose “the only thing in this world” that they care about. Defendant felt ignored and unheard, and all his dreams had been shattered. He tried very hard to make things right, but was unable to do so. Defendant felt that others kept him and Jane Doe (“my only love”) apart. He did not want to do what he contemplated “but I was at the edge.” Defendant wrote that “I have killed not wantin to but had to for I have a heart,” and he “just did not no how to use it.” Defendant expressed love for his children and promised to see them “in another life.” Defendant said that “only God can and will judge me for what Ive done,” and that he “had to follow thro with this mission for I can not tolerate with the situation of being ignored and hated by my people.” Defendant hoped, “now that Im gone,” that “everyone is happy,” and that they would “understand[] what Ive done is for a good reason not just because.” Rather melodramatically, he asked that people not “shed any tears of sorrow” when “look[ing] in my casket.” Defendant said, “I write this with a smile cause Im headed home and theres a place for me some were up there.” Defendant wrote an apology to his mother, and then explained that he “gave a warnin I wasn in my state of mind.” Defendant thanked Jane Doe for making him a better person, “but it came to late,” for he “told her I will die and I will kill for her that’s why Im here now.” He said, “some people can move on,” but “not me [because] I have to much with her and I love her to death.” Defendant enjoyed his life with Jane Doe, but he “told her even if she found someone I wasn goin to let that happin nope shes mine and Im provin a point on that.” Defendant fretted that “she tells people she don’t love me anymore,” and “I no my girl wants someone else but I can’t let that happin not as long a[s] Im alive.” He was not someone who could “just let things go just like that”; rather, he said, “not ever can I let her go.” He was very hurt when “she tells me she don’t wanna be with me anymore.” He warned others to be careful what they say to people who love them, “so u don’t end up in my shoez’ hurtin people.” Defendant asserted that “No one could not change my mind on what Im about to do,” because “Im determined” and “I have lost my only family to something so dumbd.” He was determined not to leave the relationship: “I think she is just watin for me to get up and leave on my own but that’s not happin.” Instead, “I stick around so I can show her that I’m serious but if she don’t believd or not it will be to late tho prosis [sic: process?] will be done.” Defendant [footnote continued on next page]
4
[footnote continued from previous page] placed the responsibility on Jane Doe for his actions, saying, “it’s all in her hands on what will happin fatue [sic: fate? Future?] is in her hands not mine anymore.” Defendant related that he had “her name tattoed big on my back thats how sure I no she belong’z to me. And no one is going to chang that ever, twisted I am right now and twisted I will stay till it work’z out or until we are both gone Im not leavin without her.” Defendant had his “mind . . . all ready set for this,” and “Im just ready for this and for who ever gets this note please let other people no why I did what I did its called crazy love for someone.” Defendant wrote that “my heart is pacin fast right now cause just known she will leave with me thats the only way Ill be at peace.” Defendant “really hope[d] for simthin good for us but if ur readin this letter its cause it did’n happin.” Defendant blamed others, saying, “I did not wish it to come down to this but [it] did thanks to all the people who put shit in her head that was not true just twistin shit up so she would leave me.” Defendant warned that others “Should have just keept your mouth shut and this would have never happened but because everyone wants to lie and tell storys, this is what came out of your nonsence.” Defendant blamed the circumstances of his growing up, and said that he wrote the letter so someone would tell his children that he loved them, but did not want them to be like him. Defendant did not want people to be shocked by what he intended to do, but his life was “ruined by haters.” He was “tired of feelin this way,” and lamented “all the people [who] always get into relationships that aint theres.” Defendant was upset that Jane Doe ignored him: “I cant even touch her without her pushin me away.” He knew “she wants someone else[,] I can feel it.” He knew that she would have gone already if she had met someone else, “but I no that I would not let it. Not as long as Im alive[.] Ill let that happin not over my dead body. I told her already what I was going to do[.] I no she don’t believe me but when the time comez’ she will find out but it will be to late.” Defendant was at a “last point of not going back,” and wrote that “Ive already told her my warning has been said if she dont take it then when the time is right it will happin. I look it now what ever happins, happins . . . at this point I leave it up to God’s hands he no’s what I wanna do.” Defendant continued later, musing that when he called to talk to Jane Doe, she would merely say, “what you want[?]” He thought she “really dont wanna be with me . . . but like I said before over my dead body she will be with another.” He was hurt that she said she did not love him, “but one day I won’t be able to take it anymore for only the Father can forgive me for what Ive done and what is to come but I guess that’s just the way life goes.” Defendant wrote that “my mission is gettin closer and closer” and “I no it will happin soon.” He felt he was giving full effort in the relationship, but Jane Doe was not. She listened too much to what others wanted to do. Defendant was “tired of all this shit,” and felt he had “drawn the last straw.” Defendant “tried to tell her what was goin to happin,” but “she didn even see this comin but I did thats why I stand here alone to the grave.” He claimed that he “tried not to call it quits but she pushed me to the edge,” and prayed “please forgive me Father for my sins.” Defendant said, “what Ive done is not wrong hell no,” and “I leave it in God’s hands.” He wrote, “I really don’t care if you people hate me for what Im about to do,” and blamed others for putting ideas in Jane Doe’s head. Defendant said, “my fuse is getting shorter,” and that “tomorrow I will go to the church and ask God for my forgiveness for what has happened and for [footnote continued on next page]
5
be “too late.” He resolved that he would not turn back; he would “blow her heart away
so she feels no pain and suffering.”
Evidence that came out at trial showed that, approximately two weeks before Jane
Doe’s death, defendant had confided to Jane Doe’s sister, Susana, about the problems in
his relationship with Jane Doe. Defendant stated that he intended to kill himself and Jane
Doe; he had gone to church and talked to a priest and to God about it.
In another incident, about a month before the killing, defendant and Jane Doe had
gone with some friends to the river so that defendant could teach Jane Doe how to shoot
the shotgun. Defendant became jealous when he thought Jane Doe was trying to kiss her
friend’s brother, so he fired the gun at Jane Doe, grazing her leg with the shot.
Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial. He stated that he and Jane Doe had
been arguing on the day of the killing. Jane Doe was packing defendant’s belongings in a
laundry basket and asking him to leave. She took the shotgun down from the shelf in the
closet and put it in the laundry basket, presumably so that defendant would take the
shotgun with him. Defendant testified that he was suicidal at the time. Defendant picked
up the gun and declared that he wanted to kill himself. Jane Doe grabbed the barrel of
the shotgun and tried to take it away. Jane Doe’s mother and the children came into the
[footnote continued from previous page] what is to come.” He stated, “we all got to go and Im ready for it I dug Im [sic: my ?] own grave . . . .” Defendant wrote that Jane Doe “don’t no she is makin thing’s worse by her pushing me away but for when it happins she will no but it will be to late cause theres no turning back[.] Ima blow her heart away so she feels no pain and sufferin but I will tell her I did it for love.” Defendant felt that “this is what God wants me to do. This was my mission in life . . . .”
6
room while he and Jane Doe were fighting for possession of the shotgun; Jane Doe’s
mother also joined in the struggle over the gun. During the struggle, the shotgun was in
constant motion, pointing “everywhere.” Defendant testified that the gun suddenly went
off; defendant did not purposely shoot Jane Doe, and he believed that he did not have his
finger on the trigger. Even though the killing was unintentional, defendant ran away
because he panicked.
Defendant explained that the writings Oscar had found had been written a few
weeks earlier, before a period when he and Jane Doe had separated. Defendant was
depressed, and he felt “down and out” at that time. Then he and Jane Doe were separated
for a couple of weeks. About two weeks before the killing, he and Jane Doe had
reconciled, and were getting along well together. Although defendant had written
statements to the effect that he would kill Jane Doe and himself, he testified that he had
no plans to actually do so. He “was just scribbling stuff down.” He did not really plan to
kill himself, but he was “just saying that,” so that Jane Doe would feel sorry for him.
After the charges were initially filed, defense counsel requested appointment of a
mental health professional to provide her with a report concerning a possible insanity
defense. The court appointed Dr. William H. Jones. (Evid. Code, § 1017.) About six
weeks later, the court declared a doubt as to defendant’s competence to stand trial, and
asked Dr. Jones to provide a report to the court pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. The
court later appointed Dr. Michael C. Leitman to provide a second opinion on defendant’s
competency to stand trial, and, after many delays, reappointed Dr. Leitman to file an
7
updated competency evaluation. At the competency hearing, the court found defendant
competent to stand trial and resumed the criminal proceedings.
After the preliminary hearing, defendant was held to answer on all charges. At
arraignment on the information, he pleaded not guilty but later amended the plea to not
guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity. The court appointed Dr. Anna Molnar and
Dr. Robert L. Suiter to provide reports to the court pursuant to Penal Code sections 1026
and 1027. At trial, the sanity phase was to be tried separately from the guilt phase, and
defendant requested a court trial on his priors.
The jury found defendant guilty as charged on all counts, and found true as to the
first degree murder that defendant had personally used a firearm to commit the offense.
After the guilt phase, defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The truth of the prior conviction allegations was tried to the court. The People submitted
a certified copy of the case printout in defendant’s 1998 burglary conviction, which
conviction was the basis of both the strike allegation and the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement. The court admitted the case printout into evidence as
exhibit 36. The court found true that defendant had suffered a strike prior, the burglary
conviction in 1998. (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (c), (e)(1).) The also court found true an
allegation that the same 1998 burglary offense constituted a prior serious or violent
Before sentencing, defense counsel requested the court to exercise its discretion
under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss defendant’s strike conviction under People v.
8
Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th 497. The trial court denied the request and
declined to dismiss defendant’s strike prior.
The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 75 years to life (25
years to life for the murder, doubled as a second strike, plus 25 years to life for the
firearm enhancement) on count 1 (murder), plus an indeterminate term of 19 years 8
months, as follows: The court selected the middle term of four years, doubled to eight
years, for one of the child endangerment counts, deemed the principal offense; and
added two years eight months (one-third the middle term of four years, or one year four
months, doubled to two years eight months) for each of the two other child endangerment
counts; plus one year four months (one-third the middle term of two years—i.e., eight
months—doubled to one year four months) for the firearm possession offense; and an
additional five-year term for the prior serious felony conviction.
Defense counsel filed a timely notice of appeal on defendant’s behalf; the notice
did not specify any particular ground of appeal.
ANALYSIS
I. Factual and Procedural Background of Judge Erwood’s Participation in the 1998 Case
and the Present Proceedings
The computer printout of defendant’s prior burglary conviction, exhibit 36, was
admitted into evidence below at the court trial on the truth of the prior conviction
allegations. The trial judge here, Richard A. Erwood, was a deputy district attorney in
1998, and he had made three brief appearances as a prosecutor in defendant’s 1998 case.
9
After the preliminary hearing, defendant was held to answer on all the charges in the
1998 case. Judge Erwood first appeared as a deputy district attorney at the arraignment
on the information on February 11, 1998; the arraignment was continued for one week.
Judge Erwood appeared for a second time on February 18, 1998; defendant was
arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty. Judge Erwood made a third appearance on March
13, 1998, an occasion when defendant was not transported to court, and which resulted in
a continuance of the proceedings. Defendant later pleaded guilty, at a proceeding
attended by a different prosecutor, to a single count of burglary in the 1998 case.
With respect to the present case, no one, at any time before the filing of this
appeal, raised the issue that Judge Erwood had made these appearances in 1998. No
statement of objection to disqualify Judge Erwood for cause was made at any time in the
trial court; there is no trial court ruling on disqualification to review.
II. Statutory Provisions Concerning Disqualification of Trial Judges
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 provides in relevant part: “(a) A judge
shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following are true: [¶] . . .[¶]
“(2) (A) The judge served as a lawyer in the proceeding, or in any other
proceeding involving the same issues he or she served as a lawyer for a party in the
present proceeding or gave advice to a party in the present proceeding upon a matter
involved in the action or proceeding.
“(B) A judge shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if
within the past two years:
10
“(i) A party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party, was a
client of the judge when the judge was in the private practice of law or a client of a
lawyer with whom the judge was associated in the private practice of law.
“(ii) A lawyer in the proceeding was associated in the private practice of law with
the judge.
“(C) A judge who served as a lawyer for, or officer of, a public agency that is a
party to the proceeding shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if he
or she personally advised or in any way represented the public agency concerning the
factual or legal issues in the proceeding.”
Here, the salient grounds for possible disqualification are those set forth in Code
of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivisions (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(C).
As to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(2)(A), Judge Erwood
never served as a lawyer “in the proceeding” at bench. The present proceeding did not
“involv[e] the same issues” as the 1998 case, except in the sense that Judge Erwood was
called upon here to exercise his discretion whether or not to dismiss the 1998 strike prior.
Judge Erwood participated in the 1998 proceeding only for continuances or to stand by
while the court arraigned defendant on the charge and entered defendant’s not-guilty
plea; the question is whether such participation amounted to giving “advice to a party in
the present proceeding upon a matter involved in the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(2)(A).)
11
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(2)(B), is clearly
inapplicable, both because Judge Erwood did not serve as a lawyer for a party to the
current proceeding within two years of the present proceeding, and because he was not a
lawyer in private practice.
As to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(2)(C), Judge Erwood
did serve as an attorney for a public agency (Riverside County District Attorney) that is a
party to the present proceeding; the issue is whether he “personally advised or in any way
represented the public agency concerning the factual or legal issues in the proceeding.”
Again, the only connection was that Judge Erwood had formerly represented the People
in 1998, for purposes of continuances or defendant’s arraignment on the information in
the burglary case. Then, he determined in the present proceeding whether or not to
dismiss the 1998 prior burglary strike conviction.
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3 prescribes the procedures for disqualifying
a trial court judge for cause.2 Among other things, Code of Civil Procedure
2 Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3 provides in relevant part: “(a) [¶] (1) If a judge determines himself or herself to be disqualified, the judge shall notify the presiding judge of the court of his or her recusal and shall not further participate in the proceeding, except as provided in Section 170.4, unless his or her disqualification is waived by the parties as provided in subdivision (b). [¶] . . .[¶] “(b) [¶] (1) A judge who determines himself or herself to be disqualified after disclosing the basis for his or her disqualification on the record may ask the parties and their attorneys whether they wish to waive the disqualification, except where the basis for disqualification is as provided in paragraph (2). A waiver of disqualification shall recite the basis for the disqualification, and is effective only when signed by all parties and their attorneys and filed in the record. “(2) There shall be no waiver of disqualification if the basis therefor is either of the following: [¶] . . .[¶] [footnote continued on next page]
12
section 170.3, subdivision (b)(2)(B), provides that, when the ground of disqualification is
that the judge had “served as an attorney in the matter in controversy,” the
disqualification may not be waived by the parties. That is, the trial court may ask the
parties to waive the disqualification, except if the alleged ground of disqualification is
that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 170.3, subd. (b)(2)(A)), or if the ground is that the judge “served as an attorney in the
matter in controversy, or the judge has been a material witness concerning that matter.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (b)(2)(B).) However, in In re Steven O. (1991) 229
Cal.App.3d 46, 53-55, under an earlier version of the disqualification statutes, where the
ground of disqualification was that the judge had formerly served as a prosecutor in
[footnote continued from previous page] “(B) The judge served as an attorney in the matter in controversy, or the judge has been a material witness concerning that matter. [¶] . . .[¶] “(4) If grounds for disqualification are first learned of or arise after the judge has made one or more rulings in a proceeding, but before the judge has completed judicial action in a proceeding, the judge shall, unless the disqualification be waived, disqualify himself or herself, but in the absence of good cause the rulings he or she has made up to that time shall not be set aside by the judge who replaces the disqualified judge. “(c) [¶] (1) If a judge who should disqualify himself or herself refuses or fails to do so, any party may file with the clerk a written verified statement objecting to the hearing or trial before the judge and setting forth the facts constituting the grounds for disqualification of the judge. The statement shall be presented at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification. [¶ . . . [¶] “(d) The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding. The petition for the writ shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the court’s order determining the question of disqualification. If the notice of entry is served by mail, that time shall be extended as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 1013.”
13
previous related proceedings, the failure to raise the disqualification challenge at any time
before judgment effected a waiver of disqualification.
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), provides that a
determination as to disqualification is not an appealable order, and may only be reviewed
by writ of mandate. Here, defendant never filed a statement of objection to Judge
Erwood’s presiding in the case, so there was never a determination made in the trial court
as to the disqualification of Judge Erwood. We must first examine the consequences of
this procedural posture.
III. Defendant Did Not File a Timely Statement of Objection in the Trial Court
In Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, a panel of three arbitrators decided
a partnership dissolution dispute, and made an award in favor of the responding party.
The award was confirmed by the trial court, and the appellant filed an appeal. While the
appeal was pending, the appellant discovered that one of the arbitrators had recently
retired from a law firm that had previously represented several business entities owned or
controlled by the respondent. The challenged arbitrator was one of only two of the
arbitrators who had signed the award; the third arbitrator had refused to sign the award
for unrelated reasons. (Id. at p. 935.) The Court of Appeal held that “the acts of a judge
subject to disqualification for cause are voidable rather than void and, by extension, [we]
conclude that the same rule should apply to arbitrators. Because the actions of the
challenged arbitrator in the instant case were at most voidable, and not void, the trial
court properly denied appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment due to its pendency on
14
appeal. [¶] However, a trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to vacate a judgment while an
appeal is pending creates a dilemma for the party who, with due diligence, discovers only
after the notice of appeal is filed that the judge or arbitrator hearing the matter was
disqualified. For the sake of judicial efficiency and economy, a party who first discovers
facts during the pendency of an appeal indicating the disqualification of a judge or
arbitrator should raise the disqualification issue at the earliest opportunity, rather than
waiting until the appellate process is exhausted and the trial court is again vested with
As to competence, a defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” measured against “prevailing
professional norms.” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 688 [104 S.Ct.
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) Review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential,
and is subject to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the range of
reasonable professional assistance. (Id. at p. 689.)
As to prejudice, “[p]rejudice is shown when there is a ‘reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 357.)
However, if a defendant’s showing is insufficient on either prong, the claim of
IAC fails. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 697 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80
25
L.Ed.2d 674].) Thus, “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . that course should be followed.” (Ibid.)
Here, the ground of disqualification—having served as an attorney in a prior
proceeding—is not a ground that may be expressly waived by the parties. (Cf., however,
In re Steven O., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 46, 53-55 [failure to raise a disqualification issue
is one way of waiving the right to raise the issue on appeal].) Arguably, then, it would
have been unreasonable not to have brought a motion to disqualify, had counsel been
aware of Judge Erwood’s participation in the 1998 case. Against the disqualification, it
might be disputed whether Judge Erwood’s participation as a lawyer in the 1998 case
“involv[ed] the same issues” as the current case, or whether such participation amounted
to giving “advice to a party in the present proceeding upon a matter involved in the action
or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(2)(A).) Similarly, it could be
disputed whether Judge Erwood, in the 1998 case, “personally advised or in any way
represented the public agency concerning the factual or legal issues in the proceeding.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(2)(C).) In addition, the question would remain
whether defense counsel may have had some tactical reason for not moving to disqualify
Judge Erwood, e.g., counsel may have wanted Judge Erwood to preside.
We need not be detained by these matters, however, as defendant cannot
demonstrate prejudice. It is not reasonably probable that, even if defense counsel had
26
moved to disqualify Judge Erwood, and even if Judge Erwood’s participation in the 1998
case would have warranted disqualification, the result of the Romero determination
would have been different had it been made by any other judge. As noted, a “reasonable
probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 357.) Under that standard, a
defendant must show that, absent the deficient performance, there would have been at
least “a significant but something-less-than-50 percent likelihood of a more favorable
verdict.” (People v. Howard (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 41, 48.) It should also be noted,
however, that “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable. [Citation.]” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 112 [178 L.Ed.2d
624, 647, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792].)
Defendant admits that he cannot argue that Judge Erwood abused his discretion in
declining to dismiss defendant’s 1998 strike conviction. He is reduced to arguing,
pursuant to Howard, that there is a significant, if less than 50 percent, chance that another
judge might have ruled differently, and dismissed his strike prior. Defendant emphasizes
that his burglary strike conviction was 13 years old, and that defendant had not had any
criminal convictions in the interval between that offense and the present charges. He
maintains that Judge Erwood “focused much more on the nature and circumstances of
[defendant’s] present offenses than he did on [defendant’s] priors,” so that it is “probable
under Howard’s less-than-50 percent chance that had another judge ruled . . , his prior
could have been stricken.”
27
As the California Supreme Court held in Romero, although the trial court retains
discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss a strike allegation “in furtherance of
justice,” that discretion is circumscribed and limited. (People v. Superior Court
(Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, 530.) The California Supreme Court further clarified in
People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, that “ ‘furtherance of justice’ ” in this context
requires consideration of: “the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of
society represented by the People,” (id. at p. 159), and, more specifically, must consider
“whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious
and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part,
and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Id. at p. 161.)
The only factor that might conceivably militate in favor of dismissing defendant’s
strike prior is the interval (approximately 13 years) between the strike offense and the
present offenses. However, the mere passage of time between strike offenses is not as
significant as the defendant’s conduct after the previous strike offense. (See People v.
Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, 163.) During the interval between the prior strike and
the present offenses, defendant may not have committed any new crimes, but his criminal
behavior escalated dramatically with respect to the current offenses. In addition, the
nature of the prior offense, burglary, was and remains a serious felony, fully within the
spirit of the Three Strikes law.
28
Defendant’s background, character, and prospects also did not place him outside
the three strikes scheme of punishment. Defendant had been unemployed for an extended
time, at least two years, and he did not remember when he had last worked. Defendant
had very poor prospects. He had only a high school education. The court noted that
defendant “was basically living off the person that he killed.” Defendant had a history of
mental health issues that the psychological professionals believed rendered him
dangerous to the safety of others. Defendant was evaluated several times during the
course of the proceedings below, and several of the evaluators found that defendant was
manipulative and malingering. Defendant himself indicated that he had made his
handwritten statement in part to emotionally manipulate the victim, e.g., by threatening
suicide. The document itself graphically displayed an intention not only to commit
suicide, but also to kill the victim. Defendant planned to kill the victim out of
possessiveness and jealousy; if he could not have her, he would not let anyone else be
with her.
The present offenses were particularly egregious; defendant murdered his
children’s mother in their presence. Under all the circumstances, it would be sheer
speculation, and not a reasonable probability, that any other judge would have found that
defendant fell outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme.
Defendant cannot show prejudice, and his IAC claim fails on the merits.
29
VI. Defendant Was Not Deprived of Due Process
Defendant next recasts his claim—that Judge Erwood should have been
disqualified—as a deprivation of due process.
“ ‘[N]otwithstanding the exclusive-remedy provision of Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.3, “a [party] may assert on appeal a claim of denial of the due process right to
an impartial judge.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The Due Process Clause entitles a person to
an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.’ [Citation.]”
(Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 673.) However,
not every claim that a judge should have been disqualified implicates due process.
As the California Supreme Court has explained, “a statutory disqualification
scheme, like that found in our Code of Civil Procedure, is not solely concerned with the
rights of the parties before the court but is also ‘intended to ensure public confidence in
the judiciary.’ [Citation.] [Fn. omitted.] Thus, an explicit ground for judicial
disqualification in California’s statutory scheme is a public perception of partiality, that
is, the appearance of bias.” (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000-1001.)
However, “[b]y contrast, the United States Supreme Court’s due process case law focuses
on actual bias. This does not mean that actual bias must be proven to establish a due
process violation. Rather, consistent with its concern that due process guarantees an
impartial adjudicator, the court has focused on those circumstances where, even if actual
bias is not demonstrated, the probability of bias on the part of a judge is so great as to
become ‘constitutionally intolerable.’ [Citation.] The standard is an objective one.”
30
(Id. at p. 1001, citing Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 882, [129
S. Ct. 2252, 2262, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208, 1221].)
The Freeman court explained the objective standard to be applied by the
reviewing court, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Caperton. In
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., supra, 556 U.S. 868 [129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d
1208], a West Virginia high court justice refused to recuse himself from a case involving
a $50 million damage award against a coal company whose chairman had contributed
$3 million to the justice’s election campaign. The justice cast the deciding vote that
overturned the award. “Noting that the West Virginia justice’s rejection of the
petitioners’ disqualification motion was based on his conclusion that he harbored no
actual bias, the [United States Supreme Court] said: ‘We do not question his subjective
findings of impartiality and propriety. Nor do we determine whether there was actual
bias.’ (Caperton, supra, 556 U.S. [868] at p. [882] [129 S.Ct. at p. 2263].) Rather, the
court suggested, the inherent subjectivity involved in an individual judge’s examination
of his or her own bias ‘simply underscore[s] the need for objective rules. . . . In lieu of
exclusive reliance on that personal inquiry, or on appellate review of the judge’s
determination respecting actual bias, the Due Process Clause has been implemented by
objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias. [Citations.] In defining these
standards the Court has asked whether, “under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness,” the interest “poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
31
adequately implemented.” [Citation.]’ (Ibid.)” (People v. Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th
993, 1004.)
The distinction between statutory grounds for disqualification and grounds for
disqualification under the constitutional due process clause is significant. “The rule of
judicial disqualification limned in Caperton may be complex but its application is
limited. . . . [T]he protection afforded a litigant under the due process clause in the realm
of judicial disqualification extends beyond the narrow common law concern of a direct,
personal, and substantial pecuniary interest in a case to ‘a more general concept of
interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality.’ [Citation.] Where such interests
are present, a showing of actual bias is not required. . . . [T]he court has said that ‘ “what
degree or kind of interest is sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting ‘cannot be
defined with precision.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Nonetheless, the court has also made it
abundantly clear that the due process clause should not be routinely invoked as a ground
for judicial disqualification. Rather, it is the exceptional case presenting extreme facts
where a due process violation will be found. [Citation.] Less extreme cases—including
those that involve the mere appearance, but not the probability, of bias—should be
resolved under more expansive disqualification statutes and codes of judicial conduct.
[Citation.]” (People v. Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th 993, 1005.)
We conclude that this case is not a rare case presenting extreme facts, and
implicates only statutory disqualification concerns. As in Freeman, “[t]his case does not
implicate any of the concerns—pecuniary interest, enmeshment in contempt proceedings,
32
or the amount and timing of campaign contributions—which were the factual bases for
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in which it found that due process required
judicial disqualification. While it is true that dicta in these decisions may foreshadow
other, as yet unknown, circumstances that might amount to a due process violation, that
dicta is bounded by repeated admonitions that finding such a violation in this sphere is
extraordinary; the clause operates only as a ‘fail-safe’ and only in the context of extreme
facts.” (People v. Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th 993, 1006.)
Defendant analogizes his circumstances to two cases in which the reviewing court
found that the judicial officer should have been disqualified.
First, he points to In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133 [75 S.Ct. 623, 99
L.Ed.942]. There, Michigan law permitted any trial court judge to “act as a so-called
‘one-man grand jury.’ ” (Id. at p. 133.) The petitioners, police officers, were called by a
judge, sitting as a single “judge-grand jury,” and examined about an inquiry into alleged
police corruption. The “judge-grand jury,” finding the answers of the examinees
unsatisfactory, determined that one officer must have committed perjury, and issued an
order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. The “judge-grand jury” also
issued an order to show cause to the other officer for contempt for refusing to answer
questions without an attorney present. At an order to show cause hearing, the “judge-
grand jury” tried both officers for contempt, found them guilty, and imposed sentence.
The United States Supreme Court held that, “[i]t would be very strange if our system of
law permitted a judge to act as a grand jury and then try the very persons accused as a
33
result of his investigations.” (Id. at p. 134-137.) The court described the problem: “As a
practical matter it is difficult if not impossible for a judge to free himself from the
influence of what took place in his ‘grand-jury’ secret session. His recollection of that is
likely to weigh far more heavily with him than any testimony given in the open
hearings. . . . [T]he judge whom due process requires to be impartial in weighing the
evidence presented before him, called on his own personal knowledge and impression of
what had occurred in the grand jury room and his judgment was based in part on this
impression, the accuracy of which could not be tested by adequate cross-examination.”
(Id. at p. 138.)
Defendant here does not present the same circumstances. As a former deputy
district attorney, Judge Erwood had taken part in only three appearances in defendant’s
1998 case: two continuances and one arraignment, at which defendant pleaded not
guilty. There is nothing to show that Judge Erwood had both tried the earlier strike
offense, and then used that knowledge in ruling on defendant’s application to have the
strike prior dismissed in the current proceedings. Murchison is inapplicable.
Second, defendant relies on Sincavage v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th
224; this reliance is likewise unavailing.
The initial problem is that Sincavage did not raise a constitutional due process
claim; rather, that case involved review of a statutory disqualification claim for which the
standard is higher. (People v. Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th 933, 1005 [the states have
adopted judicial conduct codes to eliminate even the appearance of partiality. These
34
codes impose “ ‘ “standards more rigorous than due process requires.” ’ ” The due
process clause provides the “ ‘constitutional floor’ ” in matters involving judicial
disqualification, whereas codes of judicial conduct provide greater protection].)
In addition, Sincavage is distinguishable on the facts. There, the trial court judge,
Judge Zuniga, presided over a 1995 trial, where the defendant was charged with drug and
vehicular offenses. The information also charged the defendant with prior convictions in
1982 for robbery and attempted robbery. At the beginning of trial, the prosecutor alerted
the court that, in reviewing transcripts of the 1982 trial, Judge Zuniga had acted as the
calendar deputy district attorney in the courtroom where defendant’s guilty pleas were
taken. Another deputy district attorney had actually taken the plea. Judge Zuniga
assured the defendant on the record: “ ‘If in fact, Mr. Sincavage, I had taken your plea, if
I had prosecuted one of your cases, I would automatically recuse myself. I would not
hear the case. [¶] From looking at the transcript, I merely called your case and another
prosecutor and Mr. Coleman . . . from the Public Defender’s Office were actually
involved in the plea itself.’ ” (Sincavage v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 224,
227.) The defendant agreed to have the case tried by Judge Zuniga, and he was found
guilty. At a separate court trial on the priors, the defendant filed a statement of objection,
to disqualify Judge Zuniga for cause under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1.
Counsel had discovered, in preparing for hearing on the priors, that Judge Zuniga had
actually tried the preliminary hearing in the defendant’s 1982 case. Judge Zuniga filed a
response, declaring that she had no recollection of the 1982 case, and that she could be
35
fair and impartial in the hearing on the priors. Another judge denied the objection,
refusing to disqualify Judge Zuniga. (Sincavage v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 228.)
The defendant filed for writ review of the denial of the request to disqualify Judge
Zuniga. The Court of Appeal granted the writ of mandate, stating: “There are two facts
in this case which, taken together, lead to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, a person
knowing these facts would entertain doubt that Judge Zuniga would be impartial in ruling
on matters involving the priors. The first fact is that Judge Zuniga was active in the
prosecution of the priors. The second is that Judge Zuniga herself stated, if she heard that
she had acted as prosecutor in a case charged as a prior, she would automatically recuse
herself. Her statements may well have led petitioner to refrain from exercising any
challenge at that time. A doubt as to impartiality and fairness arises when the judge
changes her mind upon learning the very fact which she earlier said would disqualify
her.” (Sincavage v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 224, 230.)
Neither of the critical facts is present in the instant case. There is no showing that
Judge Erwood was active in the prosecution of defendant’s strike prior. Judge Erwood
never made a statement, as did the judge in Sincavage, that he would recuse himself if it
turned out that he had acted as a prosecutor in a case charged as a prior offense.
Sincavage v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 224 is materially different from the
instant case.
In conclusion, we find no due process violation in Judge Erwood’s presiding over
defendant’s trial, and over the Romero determination not to dismiss defendant’s strike
36
prior. The issue, as explained in Freeman, is “ ‘whether, “under a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness,” the interest [in the prior proceeding]
“poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.” ’ ” (People v. Freeman,
supra, 47 Cal.4th 993, 1004.)
Here, there is no significant or realistic risk of bias or prejudgment. Defendant has
raised, as the sole ground of disqualification, the provisions of the disqualification statute,
i.e., that Judge Erwood formerly served as a public attorney (deputy district attorney) for
the People in defendant’s 1998 case. Judge Erwood’s involvement was limited to three
appearances. The appearances had occurred over a dozen years before the trial in the
instant case. Two of the three appearances were non-substantive, consisting of
continuances. At the third appearance, then-Deputy District Attorney Erwood stood by
as defendant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty on a burglary charge. A
different attorney represented the People in the plea proceedings that disposed of that
case.
The record here fails to show that either defendant or Judge Erwood remembered
or was otherwise aware of his earlier appearances in defendant’s strike prior. There is
also no indication that anyone—the court, either counsel, or defendant—recognized
Judge Erwood’s connection to the 1998 strike prior until after all the current proceedings
had been concluded.
37
The probability of actual judicial bias under the circumstances presented here is
minuscule. Defendant’s due process claim must be rejected.
DISPOSITION
Defendant forfeited the right to raise the issue of the trial judge’s disqualification
on direct appeal by failing to raise it at any time below and by failing to pursue writ
review, the exclusive remedy for improper disqualification rulings. Defendant cannot
proceed with the matter as a claim of IAC, because there is no factual record. Defendant
should have proceeded by writ of habeas corpus on his IAC claim. Insofar as the IAC
claim is reviewable on appeal, defendant fails to establish that he suffered any prejudice
from counsel’s failure to seek disqualification of the trial judge. Defendant’s due process
claim is unmeritorious; although such a claim may be pursued on direct appeal, it is only
an extraordinary case that will present such a heightened risk of actual bias that due
process requires disqualification of the judicial officer. This is not such a case.
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J. We concur:
KING J.
MILLER J.
38
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that the defendant waived any claim regarding the trial judge's potential disqualification by failing to raise a timely objection in the trial court.
Issues
Whether the trial judge was disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 due to his prior role as a prosecutor in the defendant's 1998 case.
Whether the defendant's failure to file a timely statement of objection in the trial court precludes appellate review of the disqualification issue.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“No statement of objection to disqualify Judge Erwood for cause was made at any time in the trial court; there is no trial court ruling on disqualification to review.”
“the failure to raise the disqualification challenge at any time before judgment effected a waiver of disqualification.”