The trial court subsequently denied claimant's petition for a writ of mandate, finding
claimant had not satisfied his burden of proof. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1992, in the state of Rhode Island, Charles Herbert Holmes III was convicted of
second degree child molestation. (Holmes passed away during the pendency of this
appeal and his daughter, Jesica Sandra Holmes, was substituted as the petitioner. All
references to Holmes in this opinion are to Mr. Holmes, the original claimant.) Based on
the Rhode Island conviction, Holmes began registering as a sex offender in California. In
2005, Holmes pled guilty for failing to register as a sex offender. He spent about six
years, 11 months in custody for the conviction. In 2013, he filed with the Board an
erroneously convicted person claim under section 4900.
Holmes alleged he was entitled to compensation for the time he served in prison
for failing to register as a sex offender because he was not actually required to register as
a sex offender in California. The Attorney General submitted a letter in response to the
claim, noting that Holmes may not have been required to register as a sex offender based
on his Rhode Island conviction. The Attorney General indicated she would oppose the
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claim on the ground Holmes failed to demonstrate he had suffered pecuniary injury as a
result of his incarceration.
A hearing officer issued a proposed decision finding Holmes had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the crime for which he pleaded guilty was not
committed and that Holmes had suffered pecuniary injury as a result of the conviction. A
three person panel of the Board reviewed Holmes's claim. At the hearing, no one
contested the fact Holmes was not required to register as a sex offender; accordingly, the
arguments focused on the pecuniary injury requirement. Following the hearing, the
Board, in a 2-1 vote, rejected the hearing officer's proposed decision, finding that Holmes
failed to establish he had suffered pecuniary injury.
Holmes filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside the Board's denial
of his claim. The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying Holmes's petition for writ of
mandate, finding the Board did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the claim on the
ground Holmes had failed to prove that he suffered pecuniary injury. After hearing oral
argument, the trial court confirmed its tentative ruling and later entered judgment denying
the claim. Holmes timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Claim for Erroneous Conviction and Imprisonment or Incarceration
The purpose behind section 4900 is to offer a remedy for individuals who prove
their innocence and secured their freedom after they have been erroneously convicted by
compensating them for "each day he or she spent illegally behind bars away from society,
employment, and their loved ones." (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill
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No. 618 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 15, 2013.) Section 4900 provides that
anyone who was convicted of a felony and served time in prison may present a claim for
compensation "for the pecuniary injury sustained by him or her through the erroneous
conviction and imprisonment." If the evidence shows the claimant (1) did not commit the
charged crime and (2) sustained a pecuniary injury through the erroneous conviction and
imprisonment, the Board "shall report the facts of the case and its conclusions to the next
Legislature, with a recommendation that an appropriation be made by the Legislature for
the purpose of indemnifying the claimant for the pecuniary injury." (§ 4904.) The
amount of the appropriation recommended shall be $100 per day of incarceration served
subsequent to the claimant's conviction. (Ibid.)
The Board has adopted rules and regulations for the presentation and processing of
claims for compensation filed by persons allegedly erroneously convicted of crimes.
(Ebberts v. State Board of Control (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 329, 333; citing Cal. Admin.
Code, tit. 2, §§ 640-647.5.) The regulations provide that claimants may establish
pecuniary injury by: (1) showing gainful employment prior to being incarcerated;
(2) showing they could have been gainfully employed if not for being incarcerated; or
(3) presenting other evidence showing that, as a result of being incarcerated, they suffered
a monetary loss. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 640, subd. (c).) The claimant has the burden
of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, all issues necessary to establish
eligibility. (Id. at § 644, subd. (c)(1).) " 'Preponderance of the evidence' is usually
defined in terms of 'probability of truth,' for example as evidence that, ' "when weighed
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with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth." ' "
(Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 482-483.)
"All relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which
reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs." (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, § 641, subd. (c).) Such evidence "may be admitted even though there is a
common law or statutory rule which might make its admission improper over objection in
any other proceeding." (Id. at § 641, subd. (d).) "The hearing officer may use relevant
experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence."
(Id. at § 645, subd. (e).) The hearing officer is required to prepare a proposed decision,
based on the evidence presented at the hearing and matter subject to judicial notice,
containing a statement of the factual and legal bases for the proposed decision. (Id. at
§ 645, subds. (b) & (d).) "If the factual basis for the proposed decision includes a
determination based substantially on the credibility of a witness, the proposed decision
shall identify specific evidence that supports the credibility determination, which may
include but is not limited to demeanor, manner or attitude." (Id. at § 645, subd. (c).)
II. Standard of Review
The Board's ruling on a claim for compensation is subject to writ review under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (See Tennison v. California Victim Comp. &
Government Claims Bd. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1180 (Tennison).) The trial court
reviews the denial of a claim for compensation under section 4900 by examining the
entire administrative record to determine whether the Board's findings were supported by
substantial evidence, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all inferences in
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support of the findings. (Tennison, at pp. 1180, 1182.) " '[Our] function is identical to
that of the trial court. [We] review[] the administrative record to determine whether the
[Board's] findings were supported by substantial evidence, resolving all conflicts in the
evidence and drawing all inferences in support of them. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Id. at
p. 1182.) Substantial evidence " 'must be " 'of ponderable legal significance,' " which is
reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value.' " (Id. at p. 1180.) "Inferences may
constitute substantial evidence as long as they are the product of logic and reason rather
than speculation or conjecture." (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)
III. Analysis
It was undisputed that Holmes had been wrongfully convicted for failing to
register as a sex offender. The Board's notice of decision denied Holmes's claim on the
ground he failed to establish pecuniary injury as a result of his wrongful conviction. The
Board found that Holmes was unemployed, recently out of prison and homeless at the
time of his arrest. It also noted that Holmes worked for a short time after his
incarceration as a cook in Rhode Island but was laid off and "is currently unemployed but
collects cans for recycling to make income." Based on Holmes's "extensive criminal
history and unemployment status at the time of his arrest," the Board concluded he had
not demonstrated pecuniary loss as a result of his incarceration.
Holmes asserts the Board's finding is not supported by the record. Should we
conclude the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence, Holmes alternatively
contends these findings do not support the Board's legal conclusions. As we shall
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explain, substantial evidence supported the Board's determination that Holmes did not
suffer pecuniary injury.
Pecuniary injury may be shown by gainful employment prior to being incarcerated
and evidence that the claimant could have been gainfully employed if not for being
incarcerated. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 640, subd. (c).) "Gainful employment" is defined
by Black's Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 641, col. 2 as "[w]ork that a person can pursue
and perform for money." The Random House Unabridged Dict. (2d ed. 1993) p. 782
defines "gainful" as "profitable; lucrative."
To establish he suffered pecuniary injury as a result of being incarcerated, Holmes
stated in his sworn claim form that prior to his incarceration in 2005, he worked full time
as a cook at Christie's Restaurant in Newport, Rhode Island being paid about $8-9 an
hour. During his incarceration, Holmes argued that he "cleaned dishes and cooked
consistently" for four years with an unblemished work record. We have not located any
evidence in the record to support this argument; however, the trial court found there was
no dispute that Holmes worked while in custody. For purposes of analysis, we accept
Holmes's statement that he worked for four years while incarcerated.
Substantial evidence supported the Board's implied conclusion that Holmes was
not gainfully employed at the time of his arrest and would not have been gainfully
employed if not for being incarcerated. Holmes has an extensive criminal history,
starting with an arrest in Rhode Island for possessing marijuana when he was 18 years
old. Over the next nine years, Holmes suffered four additional arrests in Rhode Island
until his 1992 conviction for second degree child molestation. From 1995 to 2001,
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Holmes suffered convictions and was periodically incarcerated in Florida for crimes
including burglary, drug possession and larceny. Holmes presented no evidence showing
any gainful employment during this time period.
Holmes's criminal history picks up in 2003 in California when he suffered a
conviction for first degree burglary and was sentenced to four years in prison. At that
time, Holmes admitted he " 'did this stuff' " to support his methamphetamine addiction.
He was paroled in March 2005, absconded, was returned to custody and again paroled in
September 2005. In November 2005, he pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex
offender (the erroneous conviction). A probation report dated December 2005 indicated
that at the time of his arrest in May 2005, Holmes was living on the street and collecting
cans. He admitted to being under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of his
arrest. Holmes told the probation officer that his last job was in Rhode Island as a line
cook in 2002 and that he started using methamphetamine in 2003 and used it " 'whenever
he [could] get it,' " usually daily.
The Board impliedly rejected Holmes's sworn statement that prior to his
incarceration in 2005, he worked full time as a cook in Rhode Island, citing Holmes's
extensive criminal history and unemployment status at the time of his arrest. The Board
was entitled to evaluate the credibility of Holmes's sworn statement in light of the
contrary statement he made to a probation officer that he had not worked as a cook since
2002. (Tennison, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1189 [Board properly treated evidence
with skepticism and accorded it little weight]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 645, subd. (c).)
Additionally, Holmes's criminal history showed that in 2003, he suffered a California
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conviction and was incarcerated until being paroled in March 2005. These records
severely undercut Holmes's conclusory and unsupported statement that, prior to his 2005
erroneous conviction in California, he had gainful employment as a cook in Rhode Island.
The lack of any documented employment history, Holmes's criminal history, and the fact
Holmes was homeless and a methamphetamine addict when arrested, amply support the
Board's implied conclusion that Holmes would not have been gainfully employed if not
for his erroneous conviction. Put simply, the Board was entitled to make a credibility
determination based on the conflicting evidence before it.
Holmes complains that the Board made its decision not based on the evidence, but
based on the Board's personal disgust of his background and character. During the
hearing, one of the Board members stated, "[I]f we find that [Holmes] has not been
working and he has not suffered a loss, then I have a way out." Holmes suggests the
Board completely disregarded the facts so it would not have to grant him compensation.
We agree that the general character of a claimant is not relevant in evaluating whether the
claimant suffered pecuniary injury. However, the background of the claimant, including
the claimant's criminal history, is relevant as such evidence provides insight into whether
the claimant had been, or could have been, gainfully employed. As here, such
information may also show the claimant's evidence regarding gainful employment prior to
an erroneous conviction is not credible.
Claimants may also show pecuniary injury with "other evidence showing that, as a
result of being incarcerated, [they] suffered a monetary loss." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2,
§ 640, subd. (c).) Other evidence presented by Holmes included a statement in his claim
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form that at the time he filed the claim form, he was working as a full-time cook at
Patriot's Diner in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. He also presented a letter and receipts
showing that since February 2014, he worked for Community Wide Clean-Up as a laborer
earning $9 an hour for a minimum of six to eight hours daily. Holmes presented receipts
showing he collects a variety of metals and then recycles them through Recon Recycling.
Holmes also earned money working contracted projects such as moving and disposing of
furniture, construction, gardening, and trash removal. He presented a table summarizing
the work he performed for Community Wide Clean-Up starting in February 2014.
Evidence of employment after an erroneous incarceration may show a claimant is
capable of obtaining gainful employment and may be relevant to whether a claimant was,
or could have been, gainfully employed at the time of an erroneous conviction. However,
based on the totality of the evidence presented here, the Board could reasonably conclude
the evidence of postincarceration employment carried little weight. Notably, while
Holmes stated he worked as a cook in Rhode Island for some unknown time period after
his release, he provided no documents to support this assertion. In fact, although Holmes
was released in November 2012, he provided no documents showing any employment
until February 2014.
Additionally, postincarceration employment does not show a claimant "suffered a
monetary loss" as a result of the erroneous conviction. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 640,
subd. (c).) We construe the phrase "suffered a monetary loss" as something different than
whether the claimant was, or could have been, gainfully employed at the time of the
erroneous conviction. For example, a claimant may suffer a monetary loss by losing the
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equity in the claimant's home when the home is foreclosed upon as the result of the
claimant's erroneous conviction. Here, Holmes presented no evidence suggesting he
"suffered a monetary loss" as a result of his erroneous conviction.
In summary, substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusion that Holmes
failed to demonstrate that he suffered pecuniary loss as a result of his erroneous
incarceration. Since we conclude the Board's findings were supported by substantial
evidence, Holmes alternatively argues the Board's findings did not support its legal
conclusions. He contends the Board's ultimate determination to deny his claim was not
founded in the law, but on its dislike of him as revealed by some of the Board's comments
during the hearing and the erroneous finding in its decision that he "collects cans for
recycling to make income."
Whether the Board's findings support the legal conclusions upon which it arrived
at its ultimate determination presents a question of law. (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1058-1059.) "If the
administrative record reveals the theory upon which the agency has arrived at its ultimate
decision, the decision should be upheld so long as the agency found those facts that as a
matter of law are essential to sustain the decision." (Id. at p. 1059.)
Here, the administrative record reveals the Board denied Holmes's claim because
he failed to demonstrate any pecuniary loss as a result of his erroneous incarceration.
While the transcript of the hearing contains comments from one of the Board members
indicating he disliked the idea of compensating "a career criminal," this same Board
member noted that if Holmes "has not been working and . . . has not suffered a loss, then I
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have a way out." While these comments may have been tactless, they do not show the
Board ignored the law and abused its judicial discretion. Rather, they show the Board
correctly understood that if the claimant failed to show pecuniary injury, then it could
properly deny the claim.
Finally, Holmes correctly notes the decision contains a misstatement of fact that he
is currently unemployed but "collects cans for recycling to make income." The evidence
Holmes presented shows that starting in February 2014, he not only collected cans, but
also other recyclable metals and performed other odd jobs for income. Nonetheless, as
indicated above, this evidence of postincarceration employment carries little weight. On
this record, this misstatement is of no consequence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
MCDONALD, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the Board's denial of a claim for indemnity for an erroneous conviction was supported by substantial evidence because the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving he suffered a pecuniary injury as a result of his incarceration.
Issues
Whether the Board's finding that the claimant failed to prove pecuniary injury was supported by substantial evidence.
Whether the Board's denial of the claim was based on an abuse of discretion or improper bias against the claimant's criminal history.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusion that Holmes failed to demonstrate that he suffered pecuniary loss as a result of his erroneous incarceration.”
“The claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, all issues necessary to establish eligibility.”