Constellation Brands, Inc., Constellation Brands U.S. Operations, Inc., and Crown
Imports, LLC.
Quarles & Brady, Brian A. Howie; Reid & Hellyer and Michael G. Kerbs for
Defendants and Respondents MillerCoors LLC and Pabst Brewing Company.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Alamo Recycling, LLC (Alamo) and Chino Valley Recycling, LLC
(Chino) operate “recycling center[s]” where beverage containers sold in California may
be redeemed for their “California Redemption Value.” In this action, plaintiffs sued
defendant Anheuser Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. and other companies that sell or
2
distribute beverages containers in California (the Beverage Companies or defendants).1
The trial court sustained defendants’ general demurrer to the complaint without leave to
amend (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)), dismissed the complaint, and entered
judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
The gravamen of the complaint is that defendants knowingly and “falsely” label
beverage containers sold both inside and outside California with “CA CRV,” “California
Redemption Value,” or similar labels when, in fact, under California law, only containers
purchased inside California may be redeemed in California. The complaint alleges that
containers sold outside California are transported into California and redeemed at
recycling centers like those operated by plaintiffs, and this exposes plaintiffs to state
regulatory fines and penalties, risks rendering the “California Beverage Recycling Fund”
insolvent, and thereby risks the economic viability of plaintiffs’ recycling businesses.
1 Defendants and respondents include Anheuser-Busch InBev Worldwide Inc., Anheuser-Busch, LLC, The Coca-Cola Company, Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., Nestle Holdings, Inc., Nestle Waters North America, Inc., Nestle Waters North America Holdings, Inc., Nestle USA, Inc., Cott Beverages, Inc., Pepsico, Inc., Pepsico Sales, Inc., Pepsi-Cola Advertising and Marketings, Inc., Pepsi-Cola Management and Administrative Services, Inc., Pepsi-Cola Sales and Distribution, Inc., Pepsi-Cola Technical Operations, Inc., Pepsi-Cola National Marketing, LLC, Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., Dr Pepper/7-Up Bottling Company of the West, Snapple Beverage Corp., Constellation Brands, Inc., Constellation Brands U.S. Operations, Inc., Crown Imports, LLC, MillerCoors LLC, and Pabst Brewing Company. Before the trial court sustained the Beverage Companies’ general demurrer, plaintiffs dismissed their complaint, without prejudice, against Molson Coors Brewing Company, Molson Coors International, LP, Coors Brewing Company, and Miller Brewing Company.
3
Based on this allegation, the complaint alleges common law tort claims against
defendants for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict products liability, interference
with prospective economic advantage and business relations, and breach of express
warranty. As remedies, plaintiffs seek to permanently enjoin defendants from selling
beverage containers in California as long as defendants continue to label containers sold
outside California with “CA CRV” or other California redemption marks. Plaintiffs also
seek “[s]pecial damages apportioned by the market share of each defendant,” general
damages according to proof, and other damages. For the reasons we explain, the
injunctive and compensatory relief plaintiffs seek cannot be awarded by a California
court because it would violate the “dormant” commerce clause of the federal
Constitution. We therefore affirm the judgment of dismissal.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background: The California Beverage Container Recycling
and Litter Reduction Act
California is one of 10 states that seek to promote recycling through a beverage
container redemption program. The California Beverage Container Recycling and Litter
Reduction Act (the Recycling Act or Act) (Pub. Resources Code, § 14500 et seq.)
establishes a comprehensive program “to encourage increased, and more convenient,
beverage container redemption opportunities for all consumers.” (Id., § 14501, subd.
(a).) One of the stated purposes of the Act is “to create and maintain a marketplace
4
where it is profitable to establish sufficient recycling centers and . . . enhance the
products liability for defective design; (4) strict products liability for failure to warn; (5)
breach of express warranty; (6) intentional interference with prospective economic
relations; and (7) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.
10
Plaintiffs seek special, general, punitive, and exemplary damages “apportioned by
the market share of each defendant.” Plaintiffs also seek a permanent injunction
prohibiting defendants “from selling and/or distributing beverages within[] the [S]tate of
California, until such time as said defendants discontinue the improper labeling of
beverage containers.” Plaintiffs’ claims are based on their assertion that the Beverage
Companies “distribute and/or sell beverages in . . . beverage containers which are
improperly and falsely labeled ‘CA Redemption Value,’ ‘California Redemption Value,’
‘CA Cash Refund,’ ‘California Cash Refund,’ or ‘CA CRV’” “in parts of the United
States, other than California, including but not limited to Arizona and/or Nevada . . . .”
Plaintiffs allege the containers so labeled are “false” because some “used beverage
containers sold in states other than California, such as Arizona and Nevada where there is
no beverage deposit or beverage redemption law” are “regularly . . . transported to
California to be illegally sold and redeemed at recycling centers” such as plaintiffs’
recycling centers in the cities of Chino and Fontana.
Plaintiffs further allege that the Beverage Companies “mislabeled” the containers
they sold outside of California “because they were aware that these beverage containers
would be purchased by California residents crossing state lines with the intent to avoid
the deposit and would be then transported across the border to the [S]tate of California,
consumed and then redeemed at recycling facilities, such as Alamo and Chino.”
Plaintiffs cite an alleged incident, “on or about January of 2011,” when plaintiffs paid
California redemption value for illegally imported out-of-state beverage containers.
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Plaintiffs do not name any of the individuals who transported or redeemed any out-of-
state containers in California, nor do they contend the Beverage Companies are among,
or in conspiracy with, those who illegally attempted to redeem such out-of-state
containers. Instead, plaintiffs allege the Beverage Companies “knew or should have
known” that such illegal redemption activities would be undertaken by unnamed third
party actors.
The complaint alleges that plaintiffs Alamo and Chino were the subject of recent
enforcement actions by CalRecycle: “Alamo received an accusation from CalRecycle
alleging among other things, Alamo’s receipt and payment of redemption value for used
beverage containers originating from outside the State of California.” According to
CalRecycle, in January 2011, Alamo “facilitated” the redemption of out-of-state
containers that originated in Phoenix, Arizona, which resulted in “the arrest and criminal
conviction of eight of the individuals involved in the recycling fraud.” CalRecycle also
noted that, over a three week period that same month, “there were at least 19 occasions
when [Alamo] purchased more than 500 pounds of aluminum beverage containers from
an individual, operation or entity in a single day,” in violation of Department regulations.
“Based on the volume and frequency of the loads being delivered,” CalRecycle charged,
Alamo “knew, or should have known, that this material was far in excess of what could
be anticipated from consumer transactions and that they were purchasing ineligible
material.” As a result, CalRecycle revoked Alamo’s certification to operate two
recycling centers and also imposed civil penalties and restitution.
12
The complaint similarly alleges that plaintiff “Chino received from CalRecycle a
notice of revocation of Chino’s probationary certification to pay redemption value for
used beverage containers in California.” CalRecycle issued that notice on the ground that
Chino “was receiving unusually large loads of aluminum beverage containers on a daily
basis” and was involved in one redemption in which nine suspects were arrested (seven
of whom pleaded guilty) on violations of grand theft, conspiracy, and recycling fraud.
The notice also alleged that Chino: (1) paid and claimed refund values on ineligible
beverage containers that Chino knew, or should have known, came from noncertified
recyclers or from outside the State; (2) paid refund values to a person, operation, or entity
not certified by CalRecycle that was delivering loads of aluminum beverage containers in
excess of 500 pounds in a single day, in violation of state regulations; and (3) on at least
three occasions, failed to properly inspect each load of containers for eligibility prior to
determining the basis for payment, in violation of state regulations.
At defendants’ request, the trial court took judicial notice that, in February 2013,
plaintiffs entered into separate settlement agreements with the Department, resolving the
Department’s administrative charges against plaintiffs. Under the terms of the settlement
agreements, Alamo’s recycling center certificate became probationary for a minimum of
five years and Chino’s revoked recycling center certificate was reinstated as probationary
for a minimum of five years. As restitution, each plaintiff agreed to pay $62,500 to the
California Beverage Container Recycling Fund.
13
C. The Demurrer and the Trial Court’s Ruling
Defendants jointly demurred to the complaint on the grounds: (1) it failed to state
a cause of action (general demurrer), and (2) its allegations were ambiguous,
unintelligible, and uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).) In support of
their general demurrer, defendants argued that the “dormant” commerce clause of the
federal Constitution “precludes the use of state law to regulate out-of-state beverage
marketing and sales, as [p]laintiffs attempt to do through their Complaint . . . . Moreover,
California’s presumption against extraterritoriality categorically precludes [p]laintiffs’
claims.”2 Defendants also argued the complaint failed to allege at least one element of
each alleged tort claim.
Regarding uncertainty, defendants argued the complaint was uncertain and
unintelligible because it was “pleaded in generalities and legal conclusions. It fails to
disclose which actions of any particular [d]efendant[] had any impact on [p]laintiffs.
Plaintiffs also fail to specify how any one of the [d]efendants was responsible for, or had
2 At defendants’ request, the trial court took judicial of the following exhibits: (1) a first amended accusation filed by the Department against plaintiff Alamo on March 19, 2012; (2) a letter sent by the Department on May 17, 2012, to plaintiff Chino, terminating Chino’s probationary certificate to operate a recycling center; (3) the stipulated settlement agreement and final agency decision filed by plaintiff Alamo and the Department on February 23, 2013; (4) the stipulated settlement agreement and final agency decision filed by plaintiff Chino and the Department on February 23, 2013; (5) the Department’s official statement of guidance on California beverage container labeling requirements titled California Beverage Container Labeling; and (6) two orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed, respectively, on May 29, 2009 and October 23, 2009, in the case styled International Bottled Water Association v. Paterson, No. 09 Civ. 4672 (DAB).
14
specific beverage containers involved in any way, in a fraudulent redemption at
[p]laintiffs’ recycling centers.” Finally, defendants asked the court not to adjudicate
plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief on the grounds the claims “would ‘drag a court of
equity into an area of complex economic policy,’” the claims would interfere with the
regulatory functions of an administrative agency, and enforcing the injunction would be
unduly burdensome for the court.
Following a hearing, the court overruled the demurrer on uncertainty grounds,
noting in its minute order that the “Complaint is not so uncertain that defendants cannot
understand what is being alleged against them.” The court sustained the general
demurrer, however, after concluding plaintiffs’ claims, or the relief plaintiffs were
seeking by their complaint, was precluded by the commerce clause of the federal
Constitution. Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment in
favor of defendants. This appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review on Demurrer
A general demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint by claiming it fails to
state a cause of action based on defects appearing on its face or from matters subject to
judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; County of Fresno v. Shelton
(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1008-1009.) In other words, a general demurrer “‘searches
the complaint for all defects going to the existence of a cause of action and places at issue
the legal merits of the action on assumed facts.’” (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183
15
Cal.App.4th 521, 528.) On appeal, we are not bound by the trial court’s determination
but independently review the complaint to determine whether it states a cause of action
under any legal theory. (Banis Restaurant Design, Inc. v. Serrano (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 1035, 1038-1039.)
Our review of the legal sufficiency of the complaint is guided by well settled rules:
we assume the truth of all properly pleaded material facts and consider judicially noticed
matters, but we disregard asserted conclusions of fact and law. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a
whole and its parts in context. (Ibid.) And when, as here, a general demurrer was
sustained without leave to amend, we determine whether the plaintiff has met its burden
of demonstrating a reasonable possibility that the complaint can be amended to state a
cause of action. If so, we reverse, and if not, we affirm. (Ibid.)
B. The Parties’ Claims on Appeal
Plaintiffs point out that, “[a]t its core, this case is about [defendants] knowingly
and negligently selling a product [i.e., ‘falsely’ labeled beverage containers] that
[defendants] know will be brought into California and cause injury to the people,
businesses, and taxpayers of California.” More specifically, plaintiffs argue that, because
no one can tell the difference between beverage containers purchased inside and outside
California when all such containers are labeled “CA CRV” or similarly, defendants’
“mislabeling” of the out-of-state containers exposes plaintiffs to fines and penalties under
the Act, risks the insolvency of the California Beverage Container Recycling Fund, and
16
thereby risks the economic viability of plaintiffs’ recycling businesses. Defendants
argue, as they did in the trial court, that the damages and injunctive relief plaintiffs seek
by their complaint are barred by the “dormant” commerce clause of the federal
Constitution. For the reasons we explain, we agree.
C. Analysis
“The Commerce Clause empowers Congress ‘[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among
the several states.’” (McBurney v. Young (2013) ___ U.S. ___ [133 S.Ct. 1709, 1719]
(McBurney); U.S. Const., art. I., § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “‘the
Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union
unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of
the individual States within their respective spheres.’” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders,
Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422, quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S.
324, 335-336 (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on
‘the several States,’” the United States Supreme Court has long inferred that the clause
imposes implicit limitations on state power, and these limitations are embodied in a
judge-made doctrine known as the “negative” or “dormant” commerce clause.
(McBurney, supra, at p. 1719.)
The high court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence “‘significantly limits the
ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate
commerce.’” (McBurney, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 1719, citing Maine v. Taylor (1986) 477
U.S. 131, 151.) As indicated, the dormant commerce clause doctrine “is driven by a
17
concern about ‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’ [Citations.]”
(McBurney, supra, at p. 1719.) “‘The crucial inquiry,’” in determining whether a state
law violates the dormant commerce clause, is whether the statute, “‘is basically a
protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate
local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.’” (Id. at
pp. 1719-1720, citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey (1978) 437 U.S. 617, 624.)
More broadly, the high court in Healy explained that, taken together, its dormant
commerce clause cases “stand at a minimum” for the three propositions. (Healy, supra,
491 U.S. at p. 336.) First, a state law violates the commerce clause if it applies to
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the state’s borders, regardless of whether the
commerce has effects within the state. (Id. at p. 336, citing Edgar v. MITE Corp. (1982)
457 U.S. 624, 642-643.) Second, a state law that “directly controls” commerce occurring
wholly outside the state’s borders is invalid regardless of whether the law’s
extraterritorial reach was intentional. (Healy, supra, at p. 336, citing Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority (1986) 476 U.S. 573, 579 [A statute
that “directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce . . . is virtually per se
invalid under the Commerce Clause”].) Third, “the practical effect of the statute must be
evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by
considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory
regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State
18
adopted similar legislation. Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against
inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the
jurisdiction of another State. [Citation.]” (Healy, supra, at pp. 336-337.)
As plaintiffs point out, the third proposition is of concern when the statute has an
incidental rather than a direct impact on interstate commerce. (See Healy, supra, 491
U.S. at pp. 336-337.) As the high court explained in a case predating Healy, “[a]lthough
the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce
have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. [Citation.]” (Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970) 397 U.S. 137, 142 (Pike).)
Thus, if a state statute regulates even-handedly to serve a local public interest but fails the
Pike balancing test, it is invalid under the dormant commerce clause doctrine.
Here we are not concerned with the validity of a state statute under the dormant
commerce clause doctrine. As plaintiffs point out, they are not suing defendants under
the Act, and nothing in the Act or its implementing regulations prohibits defendants from
placing “CA CRV” or similar marks on beverage containers they sell both inside and
outside of California. But the relief plaintiffs seek by their complaint would require the
superior court to (1) enjoin defendants from placing “CA CRV” or similar marks on all
beverage containers they sell outside of California, and (2) require defendants to pay
19
money damages to plaintiffs as a result of defendants’ sales, outside California, of
beverage containers bearing “CA CRV” or similar marks.
There is no practical difference between the extraterritorial consequences of a state
statute, and a court’s issuance of an injunction or a damages award, because an injunction
or damages award judgment may impermissibly burden interstate commerce as much as a
state statute. “State power may be exercised as much by a jury’s [or judge’s] application
of a state rule of law in a civil lawsuit as by a statute.” (BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 572, fn. 17; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S.
254, 265 [“The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever
the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised”]; San Diego Building Trades
Council, etc. v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 247 [“[R]egulation can be as effectively
exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventative relief.”].)
Thus, “a statute or regulation is not necessary for asserting a dormant Commerce Clause
claim[.]” (Ileto v. Glock Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 1191, 1217; Haynes v. AMTRAK
(C.D. Cal. 2006) 423 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1083-1084 [negligence claim for damages based
on California common law preempted by commerce clause]; Kurns v. Railroad Friction
Products Corp. (2012) ___ U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 1261, 1269] [federal law may preempt
“state common-law duties and standards of care”].) As defendants put it, it makes no
difference whether they are “punished for marketing California-compliant [i.e., Act-
compliant] products outside California through a specific statute . . . or through generally
applicable tort liability. . . .”
20
Here, we conclude that the relief plaintiffs seek by their complaint—an injunction
prohibiting defendants from placing “CA CRV” or similar marks on beverage containers
sold outside California, and damages resulting from defendants’ sales of beverage
containers marked “CA CRV” or similarly outside of California—would violate the
dormant commerce clause doctrine. We rely on two federal court cases holding similar
Michigan and New York statutes invalid under the dormant commerce clause doctrine.
In American Beverage Association v. Snyder (6th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3d 362, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Michigan law prohibiting the sale outside
Michigan of beverage containers bearing the Michigan redemption marking
“impermissibly regulate[d] interstate commerce by controlling conduct beyond the State
of Michigan.” (Id. at p. 376.) The court explained that the Michigan statute “not only
require[d] beverage companies to package a product unique to Michigan but also
allow[ed] Michigan to dictate where the product [could] be sold” (ibid.), and none of the
nine other states with beverage container deposit laws similarly attempted to “burden the
beverage industry” by requiring state-specific packaging (id. at p. 375, fn. 6). The court
recognized the “potential destruction of the national common market through the
adoption of state-exclusive product laws” that would result if a state could prohibit the
sale of state-compliant packaged goods in other states. (Id. at p. 376.)
In International Bottled Water Association v. Paterson (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009,
Aug. 13, 2009, and Oct. 23, 2009) No. 09 Civ 4672) (DAB), the federal district court for
the Southern District of New York preliminarily, then permanently, enjoined a New York
21
law prohibiting the sale outside New York of beverage containers bearing New York
redemption markings. In its August 13, 2009, opinion addressing a proposed
modification of its May 23, 2009, preliminary injunction, the district court observed that
the parties did not dispute, and the court agreed, that the New York statute violated the
dormant commerce clause doctrine.
Similarly here, plaintiffs’ effort to use California tort law to prohibit defendants
from selling in other states beverage containers that bear California redemption markings
is invalid under the dormant commerce clause doctrine. As defendants point out, in
seeking such an injunction and damages, plaintiffs “are wielding California tort law as a
cudgel to punish (and thus prohibit) [defendants’] sale of the same products outside of
California that are sold within it. That has the obvious practical effect of dictating to the
Beverage Companies how their labels read in the other 49 States. Such cross-border
commercial compulsion is precisely the type of extraterritorial effect that the Commerce
Clause forbids.” Indeed, if every state precluded out-of-state sales of their own “state-
compliant” beverage containers—whether by statute, regulation, or judicial decision—
defendants would be forced to manufacture and distribute 50 different types of containers
in 50 different markets.
In sum, as defendants argued in the trial court, “the question at the end of the day
is simply whether [p]laintiffs can hold [d]efendants liable under California law for
activities that a California statute permits and the U.S. Constitution protects. That answer
22
is unequivocally, ‘no,’ and that is true no matter how [p]laintiffs might try to restate their
allegations.” For the reasons discussed, we agree.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rule of Court, rule 8.278.)
KING J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J.
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Filed 8/24/15 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
ALAMO RECYCLING, LLC et al., E060392 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super.Ct.No. CIVRS1303347) v. ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION ANHEUSER BUSCH INBEV FOR PUBLICATION WORLDWIDE, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
THE COURT
A request having been made to this Court pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a), for publication of a nonpublished opinion heretofore filed in the above entitled matter on July 23, 2015, and it appearing that the opinion meets the standard for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c),
IT IS ORDERED that said opinion be certified for publication pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b), 8.1105(c)(4), and 8.1105(c)(6). The opinion filed in this matter on July 23, 2015, is certified for publication.
KING J.
I concur:
RAMIREZ P. J. 1
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims for damages and injunctive relief against beverage companies for labeling containers sold outside California with California redemption marks are barred by the dormant commerce clause of the federal Constitution.
Issues
Whether the dormant commerce clause precludes state law claims seeking to regulate the labeling of beverage containers sold outside of California.
Whether the trial court properly sustained a general demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The injunctive and compensatory relief plaintiffs seek cannot be awarded by a California court because it would violate the “dormant” commerce clause of the federal Constitution.”