Miller-Brumfield v. Cal. Dept. of State Hospitals CA4/1 (2015) · DecisionDepot
Miller-Brumfield v. Cal. Dept. of State Hospitals CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Aug 21, 2015 No. D068044Unpublished
Filed 8/21/15 Miller-Brumfield v. Cal. Dept. of State Hospitals CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KATHERINE MILLER-BRUMFIELD, D068044
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1202395)
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
Bryan F. Foster, Judge. Affirmed.
Lyon Law, Geoffrey C. Lyon, Eugene R. Long, Jr., and Nathaniel N. Peckham for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Alicia M. B. Fowler, Assistant Attorney
General, Celine M. Cooper and Melissa F. Day, Deputy Attorneys General for Defendant
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Katherine Miller-Brumfield (Brumfield) appeals from a summary judgment
granted in favor of her former employer, the California Department of State Hospitals
(the Department), on her first amended complaint (complaint) alleging discrimination and
retaliation related claims. She contends the trial court erred in finding the doctrine of res
The whistleblower complaint alleged her immediate supervisor and members of the
Hospital's upper management engaged in numerous acts of discrimination, harassment,
retaliation, and violations of statutes and administrative directives between June 2008 and
September 2010.
In March 2011 the DFEH sent Brumfield a letter advising her it had investigated
her allegations of discrimination in the second DFEH complaint and determined there
was insufficient evidence to sustain them. Five days later, the DFEH closed the case and
sent her a right-to-sue letter.
In the interim, the Board consolidated the hearing on Brumfield's administrative
appeal and her whistleblower complaint. Following the hearing, which spanned three
days in June 2011, the administrative law judge who presided over the matter issued a
proposed decision. The Board adopted the decision in August 2011. In the decision, the
Board dismissed the whistleblower complaint, finding Brumfield's "complaints about
individual employment rights do not constitute protected disclosures under … section
8547.2, subdivision (d)." The Board further sustained the adverse action, finding the
temporary salary reduction was just and proper as Brumfield had engaged in conduct
constituting inexcusable neglect and discourteous treatment in violation of section 19572,
1 Further statutory references are also to the Government Code unless otherwise stated.
4
subdivisions (d) and (m), respectively. Brumfield did not file a petition for writ of
mandate challenging the Board's decision.
In October 2011 the Department served Brumfield with a second notice of adverse
action (second notice) advising her she would be discharged in seven days. As grounds
for the discharge, the second notice alleged that in May 2011, Brumfield failed to provide
direct, constant supervision of a patient assigned to her for one-to-one care because he
was at risk for falling. She also failed to complete an observation record for the patient,
which had to be updated and initialed every 15 minutes, and she falsely stated she had
asked a coworker to watch the patient for her. The second notice additionally alleged in
June 2011 she misused the Hospital's e-mail system by sending an e-mail to dozens of
employees accusing a coworker of discrimination and retaliation and accusing the
administrative law judge assigned to hear her administrative appeal and whistleblower
complaint of deliberately lying and abusing his authority.
The Hospital's executive director met with Brumfield before the effective date of
the discharge. He found no reason to modify the adverse action because the conduct
underlying the second notice was similar to the conduct underlying the first notice,
Brumfield had not learned from her mistakes, and there was a strong likelihood she
would commit the same misconduct in the future. Brumfield appealed her discharge to
the Board, but later dismissed the appeal.
In March 2012 Brumfield filed a third complaint with the DFEH (third DFEH
complaint). The same day, at her request, the DFEH closed the case and sent her a right-
to-sue letter. The same day she also filed the instant action for gender discrimination,
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race discrimination, disability discrimination, failure to make reasonable
accommodations, medical leave discrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent
harassment and discrimination.
In August 2013 the Department moved for summary judgment on multiple
grounds, including that the doctrine of res judicata barred Brumfield's causes of action,
she could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and she could not establish
the reasons for the Department's adverse actions were pretextual. The court granted the
motion, agreeing the doctrine of res judicata barred Brumfield's causes of action.2
DISCUSSION
"On appeal after a motion for summary judgment has been granted, we review the
record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition
papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained. [Citation.] Under
California's traditional rules, we determine with respect to each cause of action whether
the defendant seeking summary judgment has conclusively negated a necessary element
2 The trial court determined the statute of limitations precluded Brumfield from basing any of her causes of action on alleged conduct occurring before July 27, 2009. Brumfield forfeited any claim of error regarding this determination because she did not raise any issue regarding it in her opening brief. (Kelly v. CB & I Constructors, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 442, 451-452.) For the same reason, she forfeited any claim of error regarding the granting of summary judgment on her failure to reasonably accommodate cause of action. (Ibid.) Also for the same reason, she forfeited any claim of error regarding the granting of summary judgment on her discrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination causes of action on any bases other than the temporary reduction of her salary, the failure to promote her, and her discharge. (Ibid.) Finally, she forfeited any claim of error regarding the granting of summary judgment on her medical leave discrimination cause of action because she did not oppose the Department's motion for summary judgment as to this cause of action. (Ibid.) 6
of the plaintiff's case, or has demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material
issue of fact that requires the process of trial, such that the defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334,
fns. omitted.) " 'We are not bound by the [trial] court's stated reasons for its summary
judgment ruling; rather, we examine the facts before the trial court then independently
determine their effect as a matter of law.' " (Basurto v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 866, 877.)
I
A
1
The doctrine of res judicata has frequently been used "as an umbrella term
encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion." (DKN Holdings LLC v.
Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 68 (Morgan);
Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476 (Flait).) Brumfield
countered this ground with three points: (1) there is a factual dispute about whether she
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abandoned her patient requiring one-to-one care or whether a coworker agreed to monitor
the patient in her absence, (2) her misuse of the Department's e-mail system was not
sufficient to warrant her discharge, and (3) the close proximity between her protected
activities and her discharge indicate the discharge was retaliatory.
As to the first point, to meet her burden, Brumfield had to do more than present
evidence showing the Department's decision was wrong, mistaken, or unwise. She had to
present evidence showing such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the Department's stated reasons that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and, consequently, infer the
Department did not truly act for the stated reasons. (Batarse, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at
p. 834; Morgan, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 75.) The mere existence of differing version
of events, which in this case can be characterized as a "she said, they said" dispute, does
not show the Department's reasons are too weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent, or
contradictory to be believable. Thus, the existence of differing versions is not sufficient
for Brumfield to demonstrate pretext.
As to the second point, it is immaterial whether Brumfield's misuse of the
Department's e-mail system was sufficient by itself to warrant her discharge because the
Department did not rely solely or even principally on this misconduct to discharge her.
Instead, the Department relied principally on her abandonment of her patient requiring
one-to-one care. The misuse of the Department's e-mail system was simply a secondary
instance of her inability or unwillingness to abide by the Department's policies, which
was the overarching basis of both adverse actions taken against her.
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Finally, as to the third point, evidence Brumfield engaged in protected activity
near the time of discharge is not sufficient to meet her burden. Temporal proximity by
itself will not create a triable issue as to pretext after an employer offers a legitimate,
nonretaliatory explanation for its actions. (Arteaga v. Brink's, Inc. (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 327, 353, 357.) Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in
granting summary judgment to the extent Brumfield's causes of action are based on her
discharge.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Department is awarded its appeal costs.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, J.
AARON, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that claim preclusion bars the plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims related to her temporary salary reduction, and that she failed to establish a prima facie case or evidence of pretext regarding her failure-to-promote and discharge claims.
Issues
Does the doctrine of claim preclusion bar the plaintiff's claims arising from her temporary salary reduction?
Does the Board's decision on the administrative appeal have preclusive effect on claims related to the plaintiff's discharge or failure to promote?
Did the plaintiff establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination regarding the failure to promote?
Did the plaintiff provide sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment regarding her discharge?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We cannot reasonably infer a discriminatory intent from these results and Brumfield has not identified any other evidence of a discriminatory intent.”
“Temporal proximity by itself will not create a triable issue as to pretext after an employer offers a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for its actions.”