California Court of Appeal Aug 17, 2015 No. E062975Unpublished
Filed 8/17/15 In re N.H. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re N.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E062975
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J252325)
v. OPINION
S.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lynn M. Poncin,
Judge. Affirmed.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Jamila Bayati, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant S.F. (mother) appeals the trial court’s February 24, 2015,
order terminating her parental rights to two of her six children pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 366.26. She contends the court erred in finding the sibling
bond exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)) inapplicable. We affirm.
Cal.App.4th at p. 1317.) The mere existence of a sibling relationship is not enough to
apply the exception; the relationship must be “sufficiently significant” to cause detriment
upon its termination; otherwise, there is “no substantial interference” with the sibling
relationship. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952.)
“Moreover, even if a sibling relationship exists that is so strong that its severance
would cause the child detriment, the court then weighs the benefit to the child of
continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit to the child adoption would
provide.” (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th. at pp. 952-953.)
7
B. Standard of Review
Appellate courts have traditionally applied either the substantial evidence test or
the abuse of discretion test in considering challenges to juvenile court determinations of
whether one or more of the statutory exceptions to adoption preference applies. (In re
Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 469.) There is little, if any, practical difference
between the two. (Ibid.) As explained in In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339:
“‘[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the
sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial
judge. The reviewing court should interfere only “‘if [it] find[s] that . . . no judge could
reasonably have made the order that he did.’ . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1351.)
More recently, courts have applied a composite standard of review, recognizing
that the determination whether an adoption exception applies entails both factual and
discretionary determinations. (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315
[substantial evidence standard applies to court’s factual determination whether a
beneficial relationship exists, and abuse of discretion standard applies to court’s
discretionary determination whether there is a compelling reason to apply the exception];
accord, In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622; In re J.C. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 503, 530-531.)
C. Analysis
In considering the sibling bond exception, the trial court considered the
prospective parent’s intent to maintain contact between W.H. and N.H. and their older
8
siblings. Such consideration was appropriate. (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
287, 293; In re Salvador M. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422.) Here, the prospective
adoptive parent was committed to ongoing sibling visitation as demonstrated by her
facilitating sibling visits during the case. Mother’s claims to the contrary are not
supported by the record. Thus, she has failed to show that the termination of her parental
rights would substantially interfere with W.H.’s and N.H.’s relationship with their
siblings. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
Additionally, the record demonstrates other reasons why the sibling bond
exception does not apply. As the trial court observed, W.H. and N.H. had not lived with
their siblings for a “good portion” of their lives, and they had “not shared significant
common experiences.” W.H. was 29 months old and N.H. was 16 months old when they
were removed from mother’s care. As such, their memories, if any, of events shared with
their siblings are limited. W.H. and N.H. were toddlers who barely knew their half
siblings. While mother places great weight on the excitement W.H. and N.H. expressed
when visiting their siblings, such evidence merely shows that the siblings are good
playmates, not that they are intensely bonded to each other.
Moreover, the best interests and long-term emotional interests of W.H. and N.H.
are better served by adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) At the time parental rights
were terminated, W.H. was three years old and N.H. was two years old. Due to their
young ages, they needed more care than their older half siblings. They quickly bonded
with their caregiver, calling her mom. To impose a less permanent plan upon them
9
would expose them to 15 more years of foster care and possible placement changes.
After parental rights are terminated, the objective is permanence and stability, best
advanced through adoption. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
In sum, the court reasonably determined there was no compelling reason to apply
the sibling relationship exception.
III. DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights and placing the W.H. and N.H. for adoption
are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J. We concur:
MILLER J.
CODRINGTON J.
10
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court properly terminated parental rights because the sibling bond exception did not apply, as the children had not shared significant common experiences and the prospective adoptive parent was committed to maintaining the sibling relationship.
Issues
Did the trial court err in finding the sibling bond exception to adoption inapplicable under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v)?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The mere existence of a sibling relationship is not enough to apply the exception; the relationship must be “sufficiently significant” to cause detriment upon its termination”
“the court reasonably determined there was no compelling reason to apply the sibling relationship exception.”