People v. Blackburn

Filed 8/17/15 (this opn. precedes companion case, S211329, also filed 8/17/15)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, ) ) Plaintiff and Respondent, ) S211078 ) v. ) ) Ct.App. 6 H037207 BRUCE LEE BLACKBURN, ) ) Santa Clara County Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. BB304666 ____________________________________)

The statutory scheme for extending the involuntary commitment of a mentally disordered offender (hereafter sometimes MDO) beyond termination of parole requires the trial court to ―advise the person of his or her right to be represented by an attorney and of the right to a jury trial‖ and to hold a jury trial ―unless waived by both the person and the district attorney.‖ (Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (a) (hereafter section 2972(a)).) We granted review to decide whether a trial court must advise the defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and whether the trial court must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant before holding a bench trial to extend the defendant‘s commitment as a mentally disordered offender. We conclude that the trial court must advise the MDO defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence — that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt — that the

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defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision. Here, the trial court did not advise defendant Bruce Lee Blackburn of his right to a jury trial, did not obtain Blackburn‘s personal waiver of that right, and did not find that there was substantial evidence that Blackburn lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver. Thus, the trial court erred in conducting a bench trial that extended Blackburn‘s commitment. When a trial court errs in completely denying an MDO defendant his or her statutory right to a jury trial, the error constitutes a miscarriage of justice and automatically requires reversal. In Blackburn‘s case, however, because the trial court and the parties, in reliance on prior law, likely did not contemplate the need to make a record in conformity with today‘s holding, we reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment upholding the extension order and remand the case to that court with directions to remand to the trial court for a proper determination of whether Blackburn personally made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial or whether, at the time of counsel‘s waiver, there was substantial evidence that Blackburn lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver. I. In 2004, Blackburn was convicted of first degree burglary and forcible false imprisonment. Blackburn had entered the home of an 85-year-old woman at night, and she awoke to find him naked and lying on top of her. He pinned her down with his legs and restrained her by pulling her hair, but the woman managed to escape. When the police arrived, they found Blackburn sitting naked on the toilet, eating pork chops, and speaking incoherently. In December 2006, he was declared a mentally disordered offender and committed to Atascadero State Hospital as a condition of parole. His commitment was extended in 2009 and again in 2010.