California Court of Appeal Aug 14, 2015 No. E060664Published
Before: Ramirez
Filed 8/14/15
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
JOSEPH COPPINGER, Jr. et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. E060664 ROGELIO RAWLINS et al., (Super.Ct.No. RIC1218874) Defendants and Respondents OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Craig G. Riemer, Judge.
Affirmed.
Law Office of Michael V. Hesse and Michael V. Hesse for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Dickman & Holt and John G. Dickman and Montessa D. Holt for Defendants and
Respondents Rogelio Rawlins and Maria Rawlins.
Arias & Lockwood and Christopher D. Lockwood; Dana M. Smith, Riverside
County Counsel for Defendants and Respondents County of Riverside.
Prior owners subdivided their land into two parcels, dedicating narrow lots “A,”
“B,” and “C,” to defendant County of Riverside (County) for public road and utility
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purposes. The County accepted the dedication in 1980, with the proviso that Lots “B”
and “C” would not immediately become part of the county-maintained road system. In
1984, plaintiffs Joseph and Connie Coppinger purchased one parcel. Defendants Rogelio
and Maria Rawlins purchased the other parcel, and used Lot “C” for ingress and egress.
Plaintiffs erected a gate to prevent the Rawlinses from using Lot “C,” and eventually
filed a lawsuit against the Rawlins and the County for quiet title, trespass, injunctive
relief, and declaratory relief. The Rawlinses and the County demurred to the third
amended complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
Plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that (1) the dedication of the public right of way
At oral argument, plaintiffs drew our attention to the recent decision in Jefferson
Street Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1175, in which Division
Three of the Fourth Appellate District reversed a judgment denying a petition for
administrative mandate because the City of Indio’s development restrictions constituted
an uncompensated taking. In that case Jefferson acquired a 26.85 acre parcel of land, and
submitted a development proposal to the City to construct a retail shopping center. The
proposal affected property on which Interstate 10 interchange projects were
contemplated. Thus, certain restrictions were placed on the plaintiff’s development
proposal that reduced the developable area of Jefferson’s property to 17.1 acres. (Id., at
pp. 1184-1185.)
Jefferson filed an action for writ of mandate alleging the City lacked authority to
condition approval of the project on leaving any portion of the property undeveloped, and
included a cause of action for inverse condemnation challenging the regulatory taking
and a forced dedication of private property. (Jefferson Street Ventures, supra, 236
Cal.App.4th at p. 1188.) The reviewing court agreed that the restrictions constituted an
uncompensated taking of the property on which development was prohibited by the City.
(Id., at p. 1192.)
That case is wholly inapposite here: First, plaintiffs were not forced to dedicate
any portion of their property as a condition of their use of it; it was already subject to an
accepted dedication when they purchased it, so they purchased the property subject to,
and with constructive notice of, the dedication. The Coppingers were not adversely
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affected by the dedication because they were not compelled to make the dedication.2 If
there was any taking at all, it would have been a taking from the Robinsons, well before
plaintiffs acquired the property. Second, in the Jefferson Street Ventures case, the
plaintiff argued the taking claim in his complaint, and at the hearing on the mandamus
petition. As we have pointed out, no such theory was either pled or orally argued in the
trial court proceedings in the present case.
d. There Is No Reasonable Possibility that the Defect in the Pleadings Can Be
Cured.
We now turn to the question of whether plaintiffs had demonstrated a reasonable
possibility that the pleading defect can be cured. The burden of proving such reasonable
possibility rests squarely on the plaintiffs. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318;
Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 520, fn. 16.)
Both in the trial court and on appeal, plaintiffs have not explained how an
amendment to their complaint would cure the defect. Plaintiffs forfeited any further
leave to amend by failing to request leave in the trial court or to argue on appeal that the
trial court’s denial of leave to amend was error. (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th
1075, 1091; Freeny v. City of San Buenaventura (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1347.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded costs.
2 As such, they had no primary right to state a cause of action. (See Gamble v. General Foods Corp. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 893, 898.)
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CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the County's acceptance of the dedication of the lots was valid and absolute, and that the plaintiffs, who purchased the property with constructive notice of the recorded dedication, failed to state a cause of action to quiet title or for other relief.
Issues
Whether the County's acceptance of the dedication of the lots was qualified or incomplete, thereby reverting title to the plaintiffs.
Whether the plaintiffs have standing to assert a 'taking' claim regarding the original dedication by their predecessors in interest.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The offer of dedication of Lots ‘B’ and ‘C’ was expressly accepted by the County Board of Supervisors in its certification of the Parcel Map.”
“The sale of the land offered for dedication did not terminate the offer, and the subsequent landowners—plaintiffs—were bound by their predecessor’s offer to dedicate.”
“Plaintiffs were not subjected to a “taking” by the County because the offer of dedication was made and accepted prior to their acquisition of title.”