California Court of Appeal Aug 14, 2015 No. D066851Unpublished
Filed 8/14/15 P. v. Medrano CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D066851
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS266174)
FEDERICO JESUS MEDRANO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Edward P.
Allard III, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and
Kristen Hernandez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Federico Jesus Medrano appeals from a judgment convicting him of attempted
murder and assault with a deadly weapon. He argues his attempted murder conviction
must be reversed because the record does not support that he had the intent to kill. We
defendant tell his two companions, in a "calm but . . . stern" voice, to "hold him down."
As Perez and Marroquin grabbed Ferraro's arms and tried to hold him, Ferraro was
"[t]hrowing as many punches as [he] could just to break away." Ferraro testified they
"ended up in a ball," with Ferraro "fighting everybody off." Defendant stabbed Ferraro in
his head and right side. Vizcarra testified that after defendant stabbed Ferraro, defendant
was "smiling" or "smirking." When asked if defendant appeared angry, Vizcarra testified
he appeared "more scared," explaining "[w]hen you see someone nervous or scared their
chest kind of, it was either that or the adrenaline as he was backing away."
As the assault was occurring, Vizcarra yelled to Roman that she had Roman's
license plate number. In response, Roman yelled at defendant and his companions to get
in the car, and they drove away from the scene. Ferraro testified he was "amped up" and
he realized his head was bleeding, but he did not immediately realize he had been stabbed
in his side. As defendant and the others were driving away, Ferraro "stupidly" threw up a
sign and screamed the name for the Otay neighborhood where he grew up, even though
he was not a gang member.
Stab Wound Injuries Inflicted by Defendant
Ferraro testified that during the attack it appeared defendant was trying to stab him
in the chest and neck area, but Ferraro may have been "wiggling too much" for defendant
to get a "clean shot," and defendant stabbed Ferraro in the head and flank area near his
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kidney. Ferraro was bleeding heavily, and Vizcarra drove him to a hospital emergency
room. Ferraro had a large, 12-centimeter-long laceration on the left side of his forehead,
and a five-centimeter-long laceration on his right flank area. The forehead and flank
wounds were "gaping open" about one or two centimeters wide.
The examining emergency room physician testified that an injury to the flank area
can cause severe, life-threatening, internal bleeding because of the organs and large blood
vessels located in that area. Because of this concern, Ferraro was transferred by
ambulance from the emergency room to a trauma center equipped to handle acutely
injured patients.
A CAT scan performed at the trauma center showed Ferraro was bleeding
internally. Ferraro's flank wound was large enough for the trauma center surgeon to
place a "sponge in deep, pack the wound" to attempt to stop the internal bleeding. The
bleeding did not stop, so the following day Ferraro underwent surgery. During the
surgery, the surgeon saw that Ferraro's flank wound was deep (about four to six inches);
it was causing a lot of bleeding of the muscles; and it had fortunately missed the kidney
and major blood vessels. The surgeon used sutures and clips to stop the bleeding; used
"electrocautery" to cause the tissue to coagulate; and closed the wound in layers. The
surgeon testified that without surgery Ferraro could have gone into shock and died.
Gang Evidence
Prosecution gang experts testified defendant was a member of the Oceanside
Varrio Posole gang; Perez and Marroquin were members of the National City Block Boys
gang; the two gangs were not rivals; and it was not uncommon for gang members from
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different sets and areas to commit crimes together. An expert opined that an assault in
which a gang member escalates the violence by using a weapon when the victim has no
weapon benefits the gang by enhancing its reputation for violence.
Defense
Defendant (corroborated by his girlfriend who also testified) claimed he was no
longer in a gang and he had moved out of Oceanside to distance himself from the gang.
Defendant testified he knew Perez but had met Marroquin only that night. He claimed he
was not aware that Marroquin and Perez were talking with anyone outside the store; he
did not hear them ask Ferraro where he was from; and he did not see Perez try to pull
Ferraro out of his car or spit at him. According to defendant, when he first paid attention
to what was occurring, Ferraro was by the back of his car swinging at Perez. Perez either
got hit or tripped and was "down with his back against the [ground] crawling backwards."
Marroquin was standing to the side "as if he was frozen, as if he was scared to advance."
Because Perez was "backpedaling" and Marroquin was standing immobile,
defendant "imagined [Ferraro] probably must have a weapon" that he was "pulling out."
Defendant retrieved a pocket knife he had clipped onto his pocket, ran up, and stabbed
Ferraro in the torso area once because he "thought [his] friend's life was in danger."
Defendant acknowledged he "specifically stabbed him in the torso area" and he was not
trying to stab him in another area such as the foot or hand. Defendant also acknowledged
he did not see any blood on his two companions and he did not see Ferraro holding a
weapon.
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Defendant claimed he did not tell Perez and Marroquin to hold Ferraro before he
stabbed him; he was not trying to kill Ferraro; and his conduct had nothing to do with
gangs. After stabbing him, defendant realized Ferraro did not have a weapon. Defendant
started backing up and then left the scene in the car.
Jury Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was charged with attempted murder (count 1) and assault with a deadly
weapon (count 2), with allegations that he acted to benefit a gang, inflicted great bodily
injury, and (for count 1) used a deadly weapon. The jury was instructed that it should
find defendant not guilty of the charged offenses if he acted in reasonable self-defense or
defense of another, or it should reduce the attempted murder charge to attempted
voluntary manslaughter if he acted in unreasonable self-defense or defense of another.
Rejecting the claim that defendant was acting defensively, the jury convicted defendant
as charged.
At sentencing, the court struck the punishment on the gang enhancement and
sentenced defendant to an 11-year prison term (i.e., a seven-year midterm for attempted
murder, three years for infliction of great bodily injury, one year for deadly weapon use,
and a stayed term on the assault count).
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DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the record does not support a finding of intent to kill required for
attempted murder.
Relevant Law
Attempted murder requires the intent to kill. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th
680, 701.) Intent to kill may properly be inferred from " 'the defendant's acts and the
circumstances of the crime.' " (Ibid.) No one factor is necessarily dispositive; rather, the
totality of the circumstances may be examined, including, for example, the defendant's
words, the manner of the attack, the number and location of the wounds, and the victim's
evasive measures. (See id. at p. 702; People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539,
1552 ["fact that appellant missed [victim's] heart and lungs was fortuitous rather than
indicative of the absence of intent to kill"]; People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105,
1114 [evidence supporting intent to kill included fact that "defendant stabbed the victim
not in the arm or leg, but in the abdomen, an extremely vulnerable area of the body"].)
Even if the defendant acted with intent to kill, under principles of self-defense or
defense of another, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal if he actually and reasonably
believed there was an imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, or to a voluntary
manslaughter or attempted voluntary manslaughter verdict if he actually but unreasonably
believed in the need for defensive action. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073,
1082; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581; People v. Szadziewicz (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 823, 833-834.) Application of these defensive principles requires that the
defendant use only " 'so much force as is necessary to meet such danger and no more. If
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he goes beyond this limit, he transcends the law of self-defense, and becomes himself a
wrongdoer.' " (People v. Aguirre (1938) 11 Cal.2d 248, 253; People v. Hardin (2000) 85
Cal.App.4th 625, 629-630 [" 'deadly force . . . may be used only to repel an attack which
is in itself deadly' "].) Thus, a defendant who acts defensively but " 'the force used
exceeded that which was reasonably necessary to repel the attack' " is guilty of murder or
attempted murder (People v. Hardin, supra, at p. 630), or is guilty of the reduced offense
of voluntary manslaughter or attempted voluntary manslaughter if the defendant honestly
thought the excessive force was necessary (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668,
777-778).
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether there is
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 701.) It is the
exclusive province of the jury to determine credibility and to resolve evidentiary conflicts
and inconsistencies, and we presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (Ibid.; People v. Young (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings,
reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances might also be reasonably
reconciled with a contrary finding. (Avila, supra, at p. 703.)
Analysis
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, the jury could
reasonably conclude defendant had the intent to kill Ferraro when he stabbed him in the
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torso. As explained by the physicians who testified at trial, a stabbing wound to the flank
area can cause life-threatening internal bleeding due to the organs (particularly the
kidney) and the major blood vessels located in this part of the body. The jury could
deduce that defendant intended to kill Ferraro because he stabbed him in this vulnerable
area. Indeed, defendant admitted that he aimed for the torso, and he did not aim for a less
vulnerable area such as a hand or foot.
Further, the jury was entitled to credit the prosecution witnesses that defendant
told his two male companions to hold Ferraro, and to discredit defendant's testimony that
he thought the victim was pulling out a weapon. The request to hold the victim can
support an inference that defendant did not merely want to intervene in the fight to break
it up or to inflict nonlethal injury, but rather defendant wanted the victim to be in a
position that allowed him to use his knife to attack the victim with lethal force. The jury
could deduce that if defendant was motivated solely by a defensive concern or to
intervene with nonlethal force, he would not have instructed his companions to hold
Ferraro and he would not have aimed the knife at Ferraro's torso. The jury could also
consider that even if defendant initially intervened in the altercation for defensive
reasons, his use of a knife in a lethal fashion constituted excessive force in response to a
fistfight, particularly given that defendant admittedly saw no blood on his two
companions, he saw no weapon in the victim's hands, and the victim was outnumbered
three to one. Considering all these circumstances, the jury could reasonably conclude
defendant did not honestly believe he needed to stab the victim in the torso to protect his
companions and he acted with unjustified and unmitigated intent to kill.
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To support his challenge to the jury's finding of intent to kill, defendant points to a
variety of evidentiary items, including that the victim started the physical altercation and
knocked defendant's two companions to the ground; defendant did not threaten to kill the
victim; Vizcarro testified defendant appeared more frightened than angry after the
stabbing; defendant testified he was intoxicated; and after the stabbing the victim was
able to make a gang sign and yell a gang name. These were relevant matters for the jury
to consider, but they do not defeat the sufficiency of the evidence to support intent to kill.
To support his challenge to the jury's finding of intent to kill, defendant also
contends he did not inflict a life-threatening type of injury on the victim. No such injury
is required to establish intent to kill. (See People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 702
["degree of the resulting injury is not dispositive of defendant's intent"].) In any event,
the physicians' testimony about defendant's internal bleeding supports a contrary
conclusion.
The record supports the finding of intent to kill required for attempted murder.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HALLER, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:
MCDONALD, J.
IRION, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for attempted murder, as the jury could reasonably infer an intent to kill from the defendant's decision to stab the victim in a vulnerable torso area while instructing companions to hold the victim.
Issues
Whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the finding of intent to kill required for an attempted murder conviction.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The jury could deduce that defendant intended to kill Ferraro because he stabbed him in this vulnerable area.”
“The request to hold the victim can support an inference that defendant did not merely want to intervene in the fight to break it up or to inflict nonlethal injury, but rather defendant wanted the victim to be in a position that allowed him to use his knife to attack the victim with lethal force.”