People v. Griffith CA2/7

Filed 8/10/15 P. v. Griffith CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B256853

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PA075765) v.

KIM GRIFFITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David B. Gelfound, Judge. Affirmed. Gideon Margolis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Timothy M. Weiner and John Yang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________

Kim Griffith appeals her conviction of one count of grand theft by embezzlement (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)), asserting that the trial court erroneously denied her continuance request. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Transactions Kim Griffith was the primary cashier from 2009 through 2011 for Kramar Iron & Metal, a metal recycling business. Griffith worked in the front office with Melanie Becerra, the office manager, and Maria Mendoza, the office assistant. At Kramar Iron & Metal, non-industrial customers drive their vehicle onto an automated scale before and after depositing material. A cashier manages this process through “ROM,” a software program that stores transaction information and calculates the value of the deposited material. The cashier pays the calculated amount to the customer in cash and receives the customer’s signature on a receipt. At the end of the day, the cashier places the register’s remaining money alongside the receipts in a safe for reconciliation the following business day. In November 2011, after noticing a suspicious transaction in ROM, Becerra conducted a comprehensive audit of transactions. Because ROM records the time and nature of each action, the review permitted a detailed look into the history of all transactions. The audit exposed 195 fraudulent transactions, resulting in a loss of $74,512. Although all three front office employees had access to ROM through their own distinct usernames and passwords, Griffith’s user account authored each fraudulent transaction. Griffith was working alone when 83 percent of these transactions ended, and most of the remaining 17 percent occurred when either Becerra or Mendoza were on vacation. Through the audit, Becerra discovered three types of fraudulent transactions. One method, encompassing 48 transactions, involved manual adjustment of the final weight of customer Marco Guerrero’s vehicle. By grossly understating the vehicle’s actual weight, the manual adjustment resulted in overpayment. Another method, recorded under several