Turner v. CRST Van Expedited CA4/2 (2015) · DecisionDepot
Turner v. CRST Van Expedited CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jul 24, 2015 No. E059915Unpublished
Filed 7/24/15 Turner v. CRST Van Expedited CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ANTHONY TURNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E059915
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVSD1109836)
CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Brian S.
McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.
Employment Lawyers Group, Karl Gerber and Ann Guleser for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith and Kevin M. Erwin for Defendant and
Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Anthony Turner (Turner) appeals from the trial court’s
order granting summary judgment to defendant and respondent CRST Van Expedited,
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Inc. (CRST) on all six causes of action in Turner’s complaint. Turner alleged CRST
terminated his employment because he refused to engage in activities that he believed
violated the California Labor Code. Turner also alleges CRST violated Labor Code
provisions dealing with employee health and safety. Finally, Turner alleges CRST failed
“A defendant moving for summary judgment must prove the action has no merit.
He does this by showing one or more elements of plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be
established or that he has a complete defense to the cause of action. At this point,
plaintiff then bears the burden of showing a triable issue of material fact exists as to that
cause of action or defense.” (Towns v. Davidson (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 461, 466.)
A. First Cause of Action—Section 1102.5, Subdivision (c)—Retaliation
Section 1102.5, subdivision (c), provides: “An employer may not retaliate against
an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of
state or federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or
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regulation.” Turner alleged in his complaint that CRST terminated his employment in
retaliation because he refused to work more than 30 consecutive days and complained
about being forced to work for more than 30 consecutive days.
The undisputed facts indicate that CRST did not terminate Turner from his
employment with CRST, either actually or constructively. No one at CRST ever told
Turner that he was being terminated. Turner effectively resigned no later than July 21,
2011, when he began a job with another trucking company. Therefore, Turner did not
establish a cause of action for retaliation.
B. Second Cause of Action—Section 2802—Reimbursement for Meals and Lodging
Section 2802, subdivision (a), requires an employer to reimburse an employee “for
all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of
the discharge of his or her duties . . . .” Turner alleged in his complaint that he was
entitled to reimbursement for “lodging for each night that he was forced to sleep in the
truck and was not allowed to stay at a hotel.” Turner also alleged he was entitled to
reimbursement for meal costs “since he was forced to work 30 consecutive days without
a hotel room and without being reimbursed for meals.” In his appellate brief, Turner
cites to section 2802’s general statement set forth above, but does not fulfill his burden on
appeal to establish error by, for example, citing to any law based on section 2802
requiring a trucking company to reimburse its drivers for meals while on the road. The
California labor regulation which Turner repeatedly cites in his complaint to support his
request for reimbursement—California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 13703—is
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not a current, valid regulation. The trial court, in its order granting summary judgment,
pointed out that this regulation “is not the law. It is only a proposal.” Therefore, Turner
did not establish a cause of action for reimbursement of meal and lodging expenses.
C. Third Cause of Action—Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
The elements of wrongful termination in violation of public policy are: (1) an
employer-employee relationship; (2) a termination or other adverse employment action;
(3) the termination violated a public policy; and (4) the termination caused the plaintiff’s
damages. (Holmes v. General Dynamics Corp. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1426, fn. 8.)
As discussed above, CRST did not either directly or constructively terminate Turner;
rather, he effectively resigned by taking a new job approximately one week after failing
to obtain a new codriver during his visit to the CRST terminal in Fontana. Therefore,
Turner did not establish a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy.
D. Fourth Cause of Action—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: “(1) the defendant
engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of causing, or reckless
disregard of the probability of causing, severe emotional distress to the plaintiff; (2) the
plaintiff actually suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the outrageous
conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the emotional distress.” (Ross v. Creel
Printing & Publishing Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 736, 744-745.) In his complaint,
Turner alleged CRST engaged in outrageous conduct both by firing him and by exposing
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him to the dangerous environment in the truck, which included driving and sleeping in a
confined space without proper ventilation and without shower or bathroom facilities, and
driving in excess of 30 days in a row. As discussed above, CRST did not fire Turner.
Regarding the conditions in which Turner worked while codriving the CRST truck, to the
extent that they may have exceeded the conditions that an employee would be expected to
encounter in a long-haul trucking job, CRST is correct that any recovery for emotional
injury as a result of his working conditions would have to be obtained exclusively under
California’s worker’s compensation law. (§ 3602.) In any case, the trial court was
correct that, even accepting Turner’s description of these conditions as accurate,2 they
just did not rise to the level of “extreme” or “outrageous” as is required to sustain a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
E. Fifth Cause of Action—Labor Code Violations Regarding Workplace Safety
In his complaint, Turner alleged CRST failed to provide him with a safe and
healthful place of employment, safe practices and procedures, and maintained and
required him to work in an unhealthful place of employment, pursuant to sections 6400 to
6404. The facts upon which he based these allegations were, again, the working
conditions on the truck and being made to work in excess of 30 days in a row. We agree
with the trial court that these facts—driving and sleeping in a confined space without
ventilation other than from the air surrounding the truck and without shower or bathroom
2 The trial court sustained CRST’s objections to statements made in Turner’s declaration regarding it not being “safe to move in the truck while it was in motion” and regarding the air supply in the sleeping area being “unhealthy.”
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facilities, and driving in excess of 30 days in a row—as alleged by defendant, do not
demonstrate that there was an unsafe or unhealthy workplace or any defects in the truck
that made it unhealthy or unsafe.
As part of this cause of action, Turner also alleged violations of sections 6310
(retaliating against an employee for complaining to the Division of Occupational Safety
and Health or to his employer about a health and safety violation) and 6311 (discharging
an employee for refusing to do work that would violate the health and safety rules).
Regarding section 6310, Turner first complained to state labor and safety agencies about
conditions at CRST on July 27, 2011, which was after he stopped working for CRST and
after CRST could possibly retaliate for this complaint. In addition, for the reasons stated
above, we conclude that CRST did not terminate Turner. Regarding section 6311, again,
CRST did not terminate Turner.
F. Sixth Cause of Action—Unsafe Working Conditions
The sixth cause of action realleged the unsafe working conditions previously
described and points to section 2699, subdivisions (f) and (g), which allows Turner to
recover compensation and attorney fees for those conditions. For the reasons discussed
above, the trial court correctly dismissed this cause of action because Turner’s general
descriptions of typical long-haul truck driving conditions do not raise a material question
of fact that he was subjected to unsafe working conditions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CUNNISON J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
McKINSTER J.
Retired judge of the Riverside Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer, finding the plaintiff failed to establish that he was terminated, that he was entitled to reimbursement for expenses, or that his working conditions were unsafe or outrageous.
Issues
Did the employer terminate the plaintiff's employment, either actually or constructively?
Did the plaintiff establish a triable issue of fact regarding his claims for retaliation, wrongful termination, or Labor Code violations?
Did the plaintiff's working conditions constitute extreme and outrageous conduct or unsafe working conditions under the Labor Code?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The undisputed facts indicate that CRST did not terminate Turner from his employment with CRST, either actually or constructively.”
“Turner effectively resigned no later than July 21, 2011, when he began a job with another trucking company.”