Chaudhry v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections CA4/2 (2015) · DecisionDepot
Chaudhry v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jul 24, 2015 No. E059366Unpublished
Filed 7/24/15 Chaudhry v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ASHFAQ CHAUDHRY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E059366
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1113593)
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF OPINION CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni
and Dallas Holmes, Judges. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Zulu Ali, Zulu Ali, and Maleha Khan-Avila for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Judge Perantoni presided over the April 26, 2013, hearing on the motion for summary judgment and signed the June 4, 2013, order granting said motion. Judge Holmes is a retired judge of the Riverside Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution and signed the August 15, 2013, judgment granting the motion.
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Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Alicia M. B. Fowler, Assistant Attorney
General, and Chris A. Knudsen and Terry R. Price, Deputy Attorneys General, for
employer may not discriminate “because of a conflict between the person’s religious
belief or observance and any employment requirement, unless the employer . . .
demonstrates that it has explored any available reasonable alternative means of
accommodating the religious belief or observance, including the possibilities of excusing
the person from those duties that conflict with his or her religious belief or observance or
permitting those duties to be performed at another time or by another person, but is
unable to reasonably accommodate the religious belief or observance without undue
hardship . . . on the conduct of the business of the employer . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 12940,
subd. (l).) “Religious belief or observance . . . includes, but is not limited to, observance
of a Sabbath or other religious holy day or days . . . .” (Ibid.)
“Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination
laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own
statutes.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) California has
adopted the burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for
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trying claims of discrimination based on a theory of disparate treatment. (Ibid.)
“‘Disparate treatment’ is intentional discrimination against one or more persons on
prohibited grounds.” (Rosenfeld v. Abraham Joshua Heschel Day School, Inc. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 886, 893.)
Under this burden-shifting process, the plaintiff has the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013)
56 Cal.4th 203, 214.) There are three elements to a prima facie case of failing to
accommodate an employee’s religious practices under Government Code section 12940,
subdivision (l): “[T]he employee sincerely held a religious belief; the employer was
aware of that belief; and the belief conflicted with an employment requirement.”
(Gemini, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011.) Of these, CDCR challenges only the third:
that there was a conflict between Chaudhry’s belief and an employment requirement.
If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
establish that “‘it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate or no accommodation was
possible without producing undue hardship. [Citations.]’” (Gemini, supra, 122
Cal.App.4th at p. 1011, quoting Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 345, 370.) The defendant “bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence the existence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment action . . . .” (Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S.
248, 252.) To do this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through admissible evidence,
the reasons for the employment action that are “legally sufficient to justify a judgment for
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the defendant.” (Id. at p. 255.) If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must show that the
proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination, or produce other evidence of a
discriminatory motive. (Harris v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 214-
215.) “The ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of discrimination remains with the
plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 215.)
2. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when all papers submitted show there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) Summary judgment allows a party to show that material
factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in
dispute. (Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 604-605.)
“When the defendant moves for summary judgment . . . the defendant must
present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that it was
more likely than not that the material fact was true [citation], or the defendant must
establish that an element of the claim cannot be established, by presenting evidence that
the plaintiff ‘does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.’
[Citation.]” (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003,
quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 854.)
If the defendant carries its burden, the burden of production shifts to the opposing
party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.
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(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2).) A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of
the party in question. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, at p. 851.)
“In determining whether the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth . . . and all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“Although a party may rely on reasonable inferences drawn from direct and
circumstantial evidence to satisfy its burden on summary judgment, [courts] do not draw
inferences from thin air.” (Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 592.)
“[I]f any evidence or inference therefrom shows or implies the existence of the required
element(s) of a cause of action, the court must deny a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment . . . because a reasonable trier of fact could find for the plaintiff.” (Smith v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474.) “‘But if the court
determines that all of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, and all of the inferences
therefrom, show and imply [the existence of a required element of a cause of action] only
as likely as [its nonexistence] or even less likely, it must then grant the defendant[’s]
motion for summary judgment . . . , even apart from any evidence presented by the
[defendant] or any inferences drawn therefrom, because a reasonable trier of fact could
not find for the plaintiff.” (Ibid.)
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. (Buss v.
Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60.) In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we take
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the facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on the motion.
(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) We consider all the
evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers, except that to which objections
were made and sustained. (Ibid.)
B. There is No Triable Issue as to Any Conflict Between Chaudhry’s Religious Practices
and His Employment
CDCR claims the undisputed evidence establishes there was no conflict between
Chaudhry’s religious practice and his work schedule; therefore, Chaudhry could not
establish a prima facie claim of discrimination. Chaudhry claims that a triable issue of
material fact exists because his shift directly conflicted with his religious practice. We
agree with CDCR.
“[I]n general, employees do not have ‘[a]n inflexible duty to reschedule’ their
religious ceremonies.” (Tiano v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 139 F.3d 679,
682, quoting Heller v. EBB Auto Co. (9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1433, 1439.) Therefore, an
employer has the duty to accommodate upon notice that there is an actual conflict
between a religious observance and a job-related requirement. (Wilkerson v. New Media
Technology Charter School (3d Cir. 2008) 522 F.3d 315, 319.) This duty is triggered
when the employee tells the employer that he has a “religious obligation” and would be
unable to perform his job-related requirement. (Gemini, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p.
1016.) However, the employee must provide enough information to make the employer
aware that there is an actual conflict between the employee’s religious observance and
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the requirement for performing the job. (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) Directives Transmittal No. 915.003: Religious Discrimination (July 22, 2008)
EEOC Compliance Manual, § 12-IV, p. 46.)
As stated above, in deciding whether CDCR is entitled to summary judgment, we
must determine what any evidence submitted by Chaudhry or inference therefrom
“‘could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.’” (Smith v. Wells Fargo, supra, 135
Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.) “Therefore, if any evidence or reasonable inference therefrom
shows or implies the existence of the required element(s) of a cause of action, the trial
court was required to deny [CDCR]’s motion for summary [judgment] because a
reasonable trier of fact could find for [Chaudhry].” (Ibid.) “‘But if the court determines
that all of the evidence presented by [Chaudhry], and all of the inferences therefrom,
show and imply [the existence of a required element of a cause of action] only as likely as
[its nonexistence] or even less likely, it must then grant [CDCR]’s motion for summary
[judgment], even apart from any evidence presented by [CDCR] or any inferences drawn
therefrom, because a reasonable trier of fact could not find for [Chaudhry].’” (Ibid.)
Applying this standard, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could not infer from
the evidence that the existence of a conflict within Chaudhry’s cause of action is more
likely than its nonexistence. In his deposition, Chaudhry explained that the Taraweeh
prayer occurs during Ramadan, takes place at a mosque, starts after the last of the five
daily prayers, and lasts about one hour. He also stated that the Taraweeh prayer starts
between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., and that his first watch started at midnight. Therefore,
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if the Taraweeh prayer begins at the latest possible start time, 10:00 p.m., it would be
completed by 11:00 p.m.—one hour before Chaudhry’s shift began at midnight.
Chaudhry does not allege or assert that he could not travel from the mosque to his place
of work in that hour. Indeed, Chaudhry admitted that he was able to complete his
Ramadan prayers and report to first watch by midnight. Although this admission was
made in response to a question about a period of time in August 2008, there is nothing in
the record from which we can reasonably infer that Chaudhry’s travel time between the
mosque and work had changed in 2009. Therefore, based on the undisputed facts, there
is no triable issue of material fact as to any conflict between Chaudhry’s religious
observations and the requirement that he report to his first watch shift by midnight.
Because Chaudhry cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, CDCR is
entitled to summary judgment.
C. CDCR Provided Reasonable Means of Accommodating Chaudhry’s Religious
Observance
Even if a triable issue of fact exists with respect to a conflict between Chaudhry’s
religious practices and his work requirements, CDCR has also established that it
reasonably accommodated Chaudhry’s requests regarding Ramadan 2009 as a matter of
law.
Once a prima face case with sufficient evidence is established by the employee,
the burden shifts to the employer to show that “‘it initiated good faith efforts to
accommodate or no accommodation was possible without producing undue hardship.
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[Citations.]’” (Gemini, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011, quoting Soldinger v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 370; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (l).)
An individual alleging denial of religious accommodation is seeking an adjustment
to a neutral work rule that infringes on the employee’s ability to practice his religion.
The accommodation requirement is “plainly intended to relieve individuals of the burden
of choosing between their jobs and their religious convictions, where such relief will not
unduly burden others.” (EEOC Directives Transmittal No. 915.003: Religious
Discrimination, supra, EEOC Compliance Manual, § 12-IV, p. 46, quoting Protos v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc. (3d Cir. 1986) 797 F.2d 129, 136.) “Reasonable
accommodation may include, but is not limited to, job restructuring, job reassignment,
modification of work practices, or allowing time off in an amount equal to the amount of
non-regularly scheduled time the employee has worked in order to avoid a conflict with
his or her religious observances.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11062, subd. (a).)
Here, there were no second watch positions open to reasonably accommodate
Chaudhry’s request for a shift change. Although an ALJ had not ordered any
accommodations, Captain Hernandez informed Chaudhry in August 2009 that he would
“welcome any interaction” with Chaudhry regarding his request to be exempted from
mandatory overtime. Later that month, Captain Hernandez responded to Chaudhry’s
inquiry about swap privileges by affirming that Chaudhry did have such privileges.
Chaudhry was also granted a temporary exemption from mandatory overtime and told he
was able to make any shift swaps with other officers he felt were necessary. These
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actions constitute good faith efforts by CDCR to accommodate Chaudhry’s requests as a
matter of law. Therefore, even if a conflict existed between Chaudhry’s religious
observance of Ramadan 2009 and CDCR’s work requirements, there are no triable issues
of material fact on this issue of reasonable accommodation and CDCR is entitled to
summary judgment.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
KING J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination because the evidence showed no conflict between his religious observances and his work schedule, and alternatively, that the defendant provided reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.
Issues
Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case of religious discrimination under FEHA by demonstrating a conflict between his religious observance and work requirements.
Whether the defendant provided reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff's religious practices.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“there are no triable issues of material fact as to the existence of a conflict between Chaudhry’s religious observance and his work requirements and, if there was, CDRC reasonably accommodated his religious observance.”
“there is no triable issue of material fact as to any conflict between Chaudhry’s religious observations and the requirement that he report to his first watch shift by midnight.”