We review an award of fees and costs by the trial court for abuse of discretion.
(Crews v. Willows Unified School Dist. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1379.) However,
de novo review of an award is appropriate where the determination of whether the criteria
for an award of attorney fees and costs have been satisfied amounts to statutory
construction and a question of law. (Ibid.; Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 353, 365.)
Here, plaintiff was the prevailing party in the underlying mandamus proceeding.
On remand, the defendant did not initially challenge plaintiff’s entitlement to an award of
attorney fees. Instead, at the hearing on the motion to tax costs, it was the court, which,
for the first time, questioned plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney fees, referring to the
holding of Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274 (Trope). This was improper, without
giving plaintiff an opportunity to address the issue.
4
On appeal, defendant relies on the reasoning of Trope, but Trope is inapposite. In
Trope, a law firm sued an ex-client for unpaid attorney’s fees and sought attorney’s fees
with regard to the action for recovery of those attorney’s fees. There, the action to
recover fees was based on Code of Civil Procedure section 1717, which permits an award
of fees in any action on a contract where the contract specifically provides for such fees
and costs. The Supreme Court reasoned that the term “fee” related to the consideration
that a litigant actually paid or became liable to pay in exchange for legal representation,
and that an attorney litigating in propria persona pays no such compensation. (Trope,
supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 280.) That case did not involve a petition brought pursuant to the
CPRA, and it did not involve a law firm seeking disclosure of public information relating
to civil litigation defense costs in other cases.
Here, the Law Firm represented a plaintiff, Jose E., in an action against the
defendant arising from injuries sustained in a violent bathroom assault.1 Although the
Law Firm filed the petition for writ of mandate in its own name, the petition clearly
alleged that it sought documentation relating to the amount of money spent defending the
civil case litigated on behalf of Jose E. The mandamus action was not filed to seek
compensation for the Law Firm or to obtain any other relief beneficial to the plaintiff
firm alone. It was filed to obtain information pertinent to three separate civil actions filed
on behalf of separate clients of plaintiff. To deny fees because the petition was filed in
1 The Law Firm asserted in its opening brief that it also represented several of Jose E.’s classmates who had been molested by their teacher, an employee of defendant.
5
the name of the Law Firm is to elevate form over substance. But “[w]e care about the
nature of the transaction, not the label attached.” (Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Board (2006) 39 Cal.4th 750, 761.)
More importantly, our order in the previous proceedings on mandamus stated that
“petitioner shall recover its court costs and reasonable attorney fees.” [Italics added.] In
defendant’s motion to tax costs, the school district did not contend that attorney fees were
not allowed, nor did defendant assert that plaintiff was not entitled to fees because it had
litigated the mandamus petitions in propria persona. It merely objected to the amount
requested by plaintiff for attorney fees. The trial court abused its discretion by applying
an inapposite decision to deny attorney fees without prior notice to the plaintiff.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the judgment denying attorney fees to plaintiff is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the San Bernardino Superior Court for a determination of
reasonable attorney’s fees to which plaintiff is entitled.
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER J.
CODRINGTON J.
6
Filed 7/21/15 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ORDER
LAW OFFICES OF MARC GROSSMAN, E059579 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super.Ct.No. CIVVS1103873) v. The County of San Bernardino VICTOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent. _______________________________________
A request having been made to this court pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a), for publication of a nonpublished opinion heretofore filed in the above matter on June 26, 2015, and it appearing that the opinion meets the standards for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c),
IT IS SO ORDERED that said opinion be certified for publication pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b).
RAMIREZ P. J.
I concur:
McKINSTER J.
7
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a law firm prevailing in a California Public Records Act (CPRA) mandamus action is entitled to recover attorney fees, even if the firm represented itself, because the CPRA's fee-shifting provision is intended to incentivize public access to information and the firm's action served a broader purpose than mere self-interest.
Issues
Whether a law firm that prevails in a CPRA mandamus action is barred from recovering attorney fees because it represented itself.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying attorney fees based on the inapposite holding of Trope v. Katz.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The CPRA mandates a fee award to a plaintiff if it prevails, and to a defendant only if the plaintiff’s case is clearly frivolous.”
“The trial court abused its discretion by applying an inapposite decision to deny attorney fees without prior notice to the plaintiff.”