The Sombrero, Inc. v. Markel International Ins. Co. CA4/2 (2015) · DecisionDepot
The Sombrero, Inc. v. Markel International Ins. Co. CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jul 20, 2015 No. E060705Unpublished
Filed 7/20/15 The Sombrero, Inc. v. Markel International Ins. Co. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THEE SOMBRERO INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E060705
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1206570)
MARKEL INTERNATIONAL OPINION INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Donna G. Garza,
Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Guinevere M. Malley and Guinevere M. Malley for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Smith Smith & Feeley, Stephen E. Smith and Scott P. Ward for Defendants and
Respondents.
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I
INTRODUCTION
Thee Sombrero Inc. (Thee Sombrero) owns commercial real property in Colton.
Defendant and respondent, Markel International Insurance Company, Ltd. (Markel), was
the insurer for Thee Sombrero under an insurance policy. Harry W. Gorst Co., Inc.
(Gorst) is an insurance broker. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary
1152-1153; Chase v. Blue Cross of California (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1152.) Thee
Sombrero also relies on Smeaton v. Fidelity Nat. Title (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1004,
in which the appellate court ruled the limitations period could not begin to run before a
complete title policy had been issued: “Moreover, because a claim founded upon a title
policy relies upon the policy’s language, an insured could not institute a lawsuit prior to
reviewing the policy. Although the insured may have discovered facts leading the
insured to believe a claim existed, the insured could not be certain of the viability of the
claim before reviewing the actual language contained in the policy.”
We conclude, however, that the undisputed facts establish there was no causation
between the incomplete insurance policy and Thee Sombrero’s delay in making a claim
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and filing suit. (Nardizzi v. Harbor Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc. (2006) 136
Cal.App.4th 1409, 1414.) Causation is an essential element of negligence. (Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781; Van Dyke v. Dunker & Aced
(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) The facts demonstrate Three Sombrero’s president did
not review the Markel insurance policy until more than three years had elapsed since the
loss occurred. Furthermore, no facts showed the president relied on the incomplete
policy when he failed to submit a timely claim. He did not review the policy for
coverage until years later. The incomplete policy was not the cause of the delay.
In the absence of detrimental reliance, estoppel does not apply. (Golden West
Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 48.) As in Lawrence, Thee
Sombrero did not refrain from initiating a timely suit within the two-year period for filing
an action because the insurance policy was incomplete. (Lawrence v. Western Mutual
Ins. Co. supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 574.) This case is also unlike the Vu case which
involved positive misrepresentations by the insurer about whether the damages exceeded
the policy’s deductible. Defendants made no misrepresentations about coverage to Thee
Sombrero. For the same reason, Thee Sombrero cannot plausibly assert defendants
breached any fiduciary duty (Gibson v. Government Employees Ins. Co. (1984) 162
Cal.App.3d 441, 449-450) or any duty of good faith and fair dealing. (Sarchett v. Blue
Shield of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1, 13-18.)
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Based on the foregoing, none of Thee Sombrero’s three causes of action survives a
summary judgment motion. The lawsuit was filed more than four years after the loss and
there was no factual showing of causation, of negligence by Martel, or of reliance by
Thee Sombrero.
IV
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Defendants, the prevailing parties, are awarded their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
KING Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff's lawsuit for insurance coverage was time-barred because it was filed after the policy's two-year contractual limitation period, and the plaintiff failed to establish causation or detrimental reliance to support claims of negligence or estoppel.
Issues
Whether the plaintiff's insurance claim was barred by the policy's two-year contractual limitation period.
Whether the insurer is estopped from asserting a limitations defense due to the provision of an incomplete policy.
Whether the plaintiff established the necessary elements of causation and reliance to support claims of negligence and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“When an insured does not file a lawsuit within an insurance policy’s contractual limitation period, it is a complete defense and the trial court may grant summary judgment.”