California Court of Appeal Jul 15, 2015 No. E059612Unpublished
Filed 7/15/15 P. v. Park CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E059612
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF1201991)
NORMAN ANDREW PARK, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Albert J. Wojcik, Judge.
Affirmed.
Cynthia Grimm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
and Barry Carlton and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, Norman Andrew Park, owned certain residential
property in Lake Elsinore. The property was the subject of structure abatement
proceedings by the City of Lake Elsinore (City). After a confrontation between
defendant and several code enforcement officers in September 2012, defendant was
has cautioned, however, that although “‘a trial court has broad discretion to remove a
juror for cause, it should exercise that discretion with great care.’ [Citation.] The trial
court’s decision to dismiss a sitting juror will be upheld on review if the juror’s inability
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to serve appears in the record ‘as a “demonstrable reality.”’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Grimes (2015) 60 Cal.4th 729, 784.) This standard of review is less deferential than the
typical abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Debose, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 201;
People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 711.) “‘It requires a showing that the court as
trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion
. . .’ that the juror was unable to perform his or her duties. [Citation.] Although a
reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence, we ‘must be confident that the trial court’s
conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied.’
[Citation.] In reaching that conclusion, we ‘will consider not just the evidence itself, but
also the record of reasons the court provides.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Debose, supra, at
p. 201.)
In light of these standards and the record in this case, we conclude there was no
error. Initially, we note that the prosecution’s case was almost entirely based upon the
testimony of City employees, in particular, its building department and code enforcement
personnel. The testimony of these witnesses often conflicted with the testimony of
defense witnesses on material points. Their credibility was therefore critical to the
prosecution.
There was substantial evidence that Juror No. 2, at the outset of deliberations,
spoke in derogatory terms about City employees for at least four or five minutes, and as
much as 10 minutes, before being asked to “set that aside” to begin the task of
deliberating. According to Juror No. 12, Juror No. 2 immediately announced that she
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would like to share something with the other jurors, then spoke for some time about
friends who have “had hard times” dealing with Belvin or other City employees, who
“mess[] with people for a power trip.” He later summarized the gist of her commentary
as: “‘All Lake Elsinore employees are jerks . . . .’” The foreman, who was otherwise
critical of Juror No. 12 and spoke favorably of Juror No. 2, generally corroborated Juror
No. 12’s statements on this point. He said that Juror No. 2’s speech about City
employees “was one of the very first things” that happened and recalled that Juror No. 2
spoke from “personal knowledge” about how City employees are not the most “ethical”
or “scrupulous,” and that “[t]hey treat the public mean.”
Juror No. 12 also connected Juror No. 2’s derogatory statements with the
substantive deliberations by stating that after deliberations began, Juror No. 2 beat around
the bush for the “next hour,” then stated “‘I just don’t think this guy is being truthful and
the other two employees are on the take.’” Juror No. 12’s reference to “this guy” appears
to be a reference to Belvin, and the “other two employees” are presumably the two
employees who corroborated Belvin’s testimony. These statements suggest that Juror
No. 2 not only had a bias against City employees, but that her opening monologue was an
attempt to color the discussion and to set up her conclusion that Belvin and the two
corroborating employees should not be trusted or believed.
In explaining its dismissal of Juror No. 2, the court was particularly troubled by
the juror’s evasiveness and lack of forthrightness in responding to the court’s questions.
The court’s concern about such behavior is not only appropriate (see People v. Debose,
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supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 201-202), but well supported by the record. When Juror No. 2
was asked directly if she made any statement during deliberations that Lake Elsinore
employees are jerks, she did not answer the question, but instead spoke of people who
have received parking tickets or had difficulty getting building permits. When
questioned further, she stated that she could not recall making such a statement to the
jurors. The court then asked more generally whether she made “any derogatory
comments about any Lake Elsinore employees? Yes or no.” She stated that she did not
think City employees were very smart, but did not actually say whether she had made
such a comment to the other jurors.
As our summary of the court’s examination of Juror No. 2 indicates, the court
appeared to become increasingly exasperated with Juror No. 2’s evasive responses.
Ultimately, when the court used broad terms to phrase the question whether she made any
derogatory statement regarding City employees, Juror No. 2 did not deny making such a
statement, answering only that she could not remember. Because this inquiry took place
on the second day of deliberations, Juror No. 2’s purported inability to remember reflects
poorly on her credibility and suggests that she was attempting to avoid disclosing that she
had expressed derogatory views about City employees.
Based on the foregoing, the record provides ample evidence that Juror No. 2 made
derogatory statements about City employees at the outset of deliberations, possibly for
the purpose of coloring the other jurors’ perceptions of the employee’s testimony, and
that she was not forthright and candid during the court’s inquiry. It is also clear from the
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court’s comments that the court actually relied on such evidence. The court expressed
concern about Juror No. 2 only after learning from Juror No. 12 that deliberations began
with Juror No. 2 expressing derogatory statements about City employees. It appears from
the record that the court considered excusing Juror No. 2 at that point, but decided to
conduct further questioning of Juror No. 2 and the foreman. It was only after the
foreman’s statements corroborating those of Juror No. 12, and Juror No. 2’s evasiveness,
that the court made its decision. We are thus satisfied that the demonstrable reality test
for our review of a decision to dismiss a juror has been met, and that the court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Juror No. 2.2
Defendant further contends that removal of Juror No. 2 was not justified because
her conduct was not “serious and willful.” We disagree. As mentioned above, the factual
issues in this case depended heavily upon the credibility of the witnesses, and almost all
of the material witnesses for the prosecution were employees of the City. Not only were
the derogatory statements directly pertinent to the credibility of the employee-witnesses,
but Juror No. 2 apparently expounded her views at some length at the outset of
deliberations, suggesting an attempt to place the witnesses in a negative light.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
2 Defendant also argues that because the record does not reflect a demonstrable reality that Juror No. 2 was unable to serve, her dismissal violated defendant’s federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. Because the record does reflect such a demonstrable reality for the reasons stated, defendant’s constitutional argument fails.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
KING J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a juror who exhibited bias against City employees and provided evasive, non-forthright responses during the court's inquiry into her conduct.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing a juror during deliberations for alleged bias and lack of forthrightness.
Whether the dismissal of the juror violated the defendant's constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The lack of a juror’s forthrightness and candid disclosure regarding the facts suggesting bias may support the court’s finding of bias.”