California Court of Appeal Jun 24, 2015 No. E062338Unpublished
Filed 6/24/15 In re T.K. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.K. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E062338
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J256202 & J256203 & J256204 & J256205) v. OPINION S.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lynn M. Poncin,
Judge. Affirmed.
Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, Dawn M. Messer, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
To punish her daughter, E.K, for getting in trouble at school, defendant and
appellant S.H. (mother) hit E.K. several times with a belt, inflicting welts and lacerations
on E.K.’s arms and legs. The juvenile court found that E.K. suffered serious physical
harm under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (a), and that E.K.’s
siblings were at a substantial risk of similar abuse under section 300, subdivision (j). On
appeal, mother challenges the court’s jurisdictional findings, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence that E.K. suffered serious physical harm. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Detention
Mother and her children, E.K. (born May 2001), T.K. (a girl, born November
2004), N.K (a boy, born November 1999), and M.K. (a girl, born December 1998) lived
in Fort Irwin.2 On August 28, 2014, E.K. arrived at the Fort Irwin Military Police Station
to report an incident of physical abuse. She told the military police that her mother had
hit her several times with a belt. Sheriff’s deputies were called; they in turn called San
Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS). The social worker noted that
E.K. had “sustained numerous welts and lacerations from the leather part of the belt and
from the metal buckle.”
1All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2Mother’s oldest child, A.K. (a girl, born March 1997) is not a subject of this dependency matter; the children’s fathers are not parties to the appeal.
2
During her interview with the social worker, E.K. reported that her school had
called mother to inform her that E.K. had been yelling at another student. When E.K.
returned home from school that afternoon, mother slapped her across the face twice and
told her younger sister, T.K. to “go get a belt.” When T.K. returned with a belt, mother
told her to get a different one. E.K. told the social worker that mother hit her with the
belt five or six times. A deputy showed the social worker pictures the military police had
taken of E.K.’s injuries. The social worker opined that the photos showed “more than
[that] number of welts and lacerations.” The social worker observed that while the
majority of those welts had gone down in the six hours since the photographs were taken,
E.K. still had “several” lacerations on her arms and legs.
Mother was arrested for willful cruelty to a child. The social worker interviewed
mother while she was in custody. Mother stated that E.K. had been the aggressor.
According to mother, she had asked T.K. to get a belt in response to E.K. pulling
mother’s hair and hitting her. She had used the belts to “[fight] back against [E.K.].”
The social worker also interviewed E.K.’s siblings. T.K., E.K.’s younger sister,
confirmed that mother had asked T.K. to get a belt, but she said she did not see what
happened afterward. E.K.’s siblings told the social worker that when they get in trouble
they “ ‘get their butts beat,’ ” and that sometimes mother used a belt to hit them. The
children denied receiving any injuries from these beatings.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facie basis for detaining
the children.
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2. Jurisdiction and disposition
In the months leading up to the contested jurisdiction hearing, the children had
unsupervised weekend visits with mother and CPS changed its recommendation from
removal to return to mother’s care, with family maintenance services. The children
reported to the social worker that they wanted to return to mother’s care and that they
missed their friends and school.
At the hearing, the court heard testimony from mother, E.K., and T.K. Mother
denied that she ever hit E.K. with a belt or that she had ever hit any of her children in the
past. She testified that, on the day of the incident, she had pushed E.K. away to defend
herself from E.K.’s attack.
E.K. also denied that her mother had hit her with a belt or slapped her in the face.
She testified that she had pulled mother’s hair and punched her in the face because she
was angry with mother for taking her phone away and grounding her. E.K. testified that
mother had pushed her away to defend herself, but that she had not used any other force.
She also testified that the welts and lacerations on her body were from a game she had
been playing with her friends after school. She and her friends had been hitting each
other with belts for fun.
T.K. denied that mother had asked her to get a belt. She also denied that mother
had ever hit her or her siblings with a belt.
The juvenile court found that the version of the incident that E.K. and T.K. gave to
law enforcement and the social worker was more credible than their testimony at the
hearing. The court stated that E.K. had given three interviews “and she was consistent in
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those interviews as to what happened. It’s only now months after the detention hearing
that she is coming into court and saying that she lied about what happened.” The court
also stated that it was “more likely that the children gave the correct version of the events
. . . when it was close in proximity to the time they were being interviewed.”
The court reviewed the police and social worker’s description of E.K.’s injuries in
CPS’s detention report, as well as black and white versions of 16 photographs of E.K.’s
arms, legs, and back. The court found that E.K.’s injuries were “clearly visible” in the
black and white photographs.
Based on this evidence, the court found that E.K.’s injuries were serious enough to
establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a). It ruled that E.K. was a
dependent of the court under section 300, subdivision (a) and that E.K.’s siblings were
dependents under section 300, subdivision (j). The court returned the children to
mother’s care and ordered six months of family maintenance services.3
ANALYSIS
Mother contends that the court’s section 300, subdivision (a) finding must be
reversed because there was insufficient evidence that E.K.’s injuries were severe enough
to warrant jurisdiction or that E.K. was at risk of future harm. We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, “we determine if substantial evidence,
3 The court also found dependency jurisdiction over all the children under section 300, subdivision (b), but that finding is not at issue on appeal.
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contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
We consider the record as a whole, resolving all conflicts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in support of the jurisdictional findings. (In re Lana S. (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 94, 103.) “ ‘We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, in order to succeed on appeal,
mother must demonstrate that there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to
support the court’s jurisdictional findings. (Ibid.)
In order to make a dependency finding under section 300, subdivision (a), the
juvenile court must find by a preponderance of evidence that the “ ‘child has suffered, or
there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.’ ” (In re Isabella F.
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128, 138.) If a child has suffered a serious injury from an
incident of abuse, jurisdiction is proper under section 300, subdivision (a) even without a
showing that the child is at risk of future harm at the time of the hearing. (See, e.g., In re
David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1644.) In the context of corporal punishment
with a belt, the court in In re David H. found that the bruises, red marks, welts, and
lacerations on the child’s arms, back, and chest were serious injuries and therefore
jurisdiction was proper under section 300, subdivision (a). (David H., at pp. 1629, 1644.)
Here, E.K. suffered similar injuries when mother hit her multiple times with a belt.
The record contains 16 photographs of E.K.’s arms and legs, which the social worker
described as showing “numerous welts and lacerations from the leather part of the belt
and from the metal buckle.” The record also contains a police officer’s description of
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E.K.’s injuries as “welts and lacerations to her legs, arms and upper back area.” The
social worker, who saw E.K.’s injuries six hours later after “the majority” of the welts
had gone down, also observed several lacerations on E.K.’s arms and legs. The court
found that this evidence demonstrated that E.K.’s injuries were serious enough to
authorize jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a). Because we do not reweigh the
evidence on appeal, we uphold the court’s finding. (See, e.g., In re Lana S., supra, 207
Cal.App.4th at p. 103.)
Mother contends that In re Isabella F., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 128 requires us to
find that E.K.’s injuries were not serious enough to warrant jurisdiction under section
300, subdivision (a). We reject this argument because the court’s conclusion in Isabella
F. was based on distinguishable facts. In that case, the mother had struggled with her
daughter when she would not get ready for school, inflicting small scratches on the
child’s face. (Isabella F., at pp. 131-132.) Photographs of the child’s injuries showed a
“gouge mark” on her earlobe and a “small cut” on her cheekbone, both of which were
“consistent with a fingernail injury.” (Id. at p. 132.) At the jurisdiction hearing, the
mother’s counsel argued that the child’s injuries did not constitute serious physical harm,
but counsel “stopped short of asking the juvenile court to dismiss the petition, apparently
based on the mother’s desire to receive services.” (Id. at p. 135.) The appellate court
found that the fingernail scratches on the child’s face were not serious injuries for
purposes of section 300, subdivision (a) jurisdiction. (Isabella F., at pp. 138-139.) The
court also found that the child was not at risk of suffering serious physical harm in the
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future because the child had reported that the altercation with her mother was an “isolated
incident.” (Id. at p. 139.)
The holding of In re Isabella F. is inapplicable here because E.K.’s injuries were
more serious and extensive than fingernail scratches and because the belt incident was
not isolated. E.K. and her siblings reported that mother would beat them when they were
in trouble and that she had hit them with a belt before.
We also reject mother’s attempts to analogize E.K.’s injuries to the injury of the
older sibling in In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428. In that case, the appellate
court found that the bruises the younger sibling sustained on his stomach and hands after
his mother hit him with a belt constituted serious physical harm. (Id. at p. 438.) The
court suggested, but did not hold, that the single “red line on [the older sibling’s] back”
might not constitute serious physical harm. (Ibid.) Mother’s argument is unavailing
because the multiple welts and lacerations that E.K. suffered are not comparable to a
single red mark; rather, E.K.’s injuries are more like the bruises and welts that constituted
serious physical harm in David H. (David H., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1629, 1644.)
We find similarly unavailing mother’s arguments that E.K.’s injuries were not
serious because E.K. was 13 years old and because she “instigated the incident.” First,
while the fact that a child is an infant can weigh in favor of finding an injury to be serious
(see In re Mariah T., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 438), the converse is not true. That is,
there is no rule that the older the child, the more serious the injury must be in order to
establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a). Second, the court did not find
E.K.’s testimony that she instigated the altercation with her mother to be credible;
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instead, it found that the evidence more strongly supported a finding that mother initiated
the abuse. As stated, we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal but rather uphold the
juvenile court’s findings where there is evidence to support them. (In re Lana S., supra,
207 Cal.App.4th 94 at p. 103)
We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding
that E.K. suffered serious physical harm and we uphold the court’s jurisdictional
findings.4
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER J.
MILLER J.
4 We need not address mother’s contention that jurisdiction over E.K.’s siblings under section 300, subdivision (j) is improper because that contention depends on a conclusion that jurisdiction over E.K. was improper.
9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the child suffered serious physical harm under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), due to the mother hitting her multiple times with a belt.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence that the child suffered serious physical harm to support jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a).
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court found that this evidence demonstrated that E.K.’s injuries were serious enough to authorize jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a).”
“We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that E.K. suffered serious physical harm and we uphold the court’s jurisdictional findings.”